TIME, TEMPORALITY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN
THE WORK OF AHMET HAMDİ TANPINAR

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ABSTRACT

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As a man of letters, a literary historian, and a poet, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar is a writer who has transformed his life into a work reflecting the cultural conditions that created him. As a literary work, this work serves as a source for those who want to reach the historical reality of Turkish society. As a narration of Turkish modernization, this source allowed many interpretive needs to be met in reconstructing a lost past or the idea of historical disconnection. However, the essential feature of this source has always remained at the margins of the interest directed toward him. The social scientific privilege of Tanpınar in his works is that he has placed a social interaction story in a void that is constantly in the blind spots of other contemporary thinkers such as Niyazi Berkes or Sabri Ülgener. He did this by placing the human experience as a singular focus of interest in the center of the dualities, such as east-west, continuity-rupture, and subject-object, an ancient discussion. Although he did not use a specific sociological method, the social interaction environments he revived in the works cognate with the theoretical preferences of sociologists who placed the concept of "interaction" at the center of sociological theory, especially that of Georg Simmel. The primary purpose of this study is to think of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar as a "storyteller" in a sense coined by Walter Benjamin and to question the possibilities of using the human experience he conveys as a sociological monograph and to reveal the theoretical perspectives it has.

Keywords: Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Historical Time, Temporality, Social Transformation, Human Experience

ÖZ

AHMET HAMDİ TANPINAR'IN ESERİNDE ZAMAN, ZAMANSALLIK VE TOPLUMSAL DÖNÜŞÜM

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Bir edebiyatçı, bir edebiyat tarihçisi ve şair olarak Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, kendisini var eden kültürel şartları yansıtacak şekilde, kendi yaşamını bir esere dönüştürmüş bir yazardır. Böylelikle bu eser bir edebi eser olarak bugün özellikle o toplumun o günkü gerçekliğine ulaşmak isteyen başkaca ilgi odakları için bir kaynak vazifesi görmüştür. Türk modernleşmesi içindeki kayıp bir mazinin yeniden inşası ya da toplumun geçmişi ve geleceği arasındaki tarihsel kopukluk ve süreklilik tartışmaları içindeki bir çok yorumsal ihtiyacın giderilmesine imkan vermiş olan bu kaynağın en temel özelliği olan anlatıcı ve aktarıcı vasfı ona yönelen ilginin hep marjinlerinde kalmıştır. Tanpınar'ın eserlerinde ve ona yönelen ilginin marjinlerinde kalan sosyal bilimsel ayrıcalığı ise Niyazi Berkes ya da Sabri Ülgener gibi çağdaşı olan diğer düşünürlerin ve bizzat kendi yorumcularının sürekli kör noktalarında kalan bir boşluğa bir toplumsal etkileşim hikayesini yerleştirmiş olmasıdır. Bunu kadim bir tartışma olan aktör-yapı başta olmak üzere daha büyük anlatıların içinde sürekli yeniden üretilen doğu-batı, süreklilik-kopuş ve özne-nesne gibi duatilerin merkezine tekil bir ilgi odağı olarak insan deneyimini yerleştirerek yapmıştır. Belirli bir sosyolojik yöntemi kullanmamış olmasına karşın romanlarındaki toplumsal ve kültürel tikelliklerin sunumu başta Georg Simmel olmak üzere "etkileşim" kavramını sosyoloji teorisinin merkezine yerleştirmiş figürlerin teorik tercihlerine yakınsamıştır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar'ı, kelimeye Walter Benjamin'in verdiği anlamda bir "hikaye anlatıcısı" olarak aktardığı insan deneyiminin ve bu deneyimin toplumsal etkileşime dönüşme biçimlerinin bir sosyoloji monografisi olarak kullanılabilme imkanlarını sorgulamak ve barındırdığı teorik perspektifleri ortaya koymaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Tarihsel Zaman, Zamansallık, Toplumsal Dönüşüm, İnsan Deneyimi

to my mother

in the memory of my father

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A story can only be told so that the narrator combines all the disjointed events and makes his experiences transferable with all its fragments. All the little stories will provide memory transfer to the extent that they contain excellent advice. The distinction between advice and knowledge is essential. Because the need for knowledge is rooted in curiosity to explain the "surprising thing." On the other hand, advice offers a surprise with the conflict it represents, and its purpose is to understand and convey an experience. While information includes an effort to understand or explain to remove surprise, advice is an effort to preserve the surprisingness of the strangeness in the story. For example, a story about a young man's encounter[1] with a *muezzin* (religious officer) at the end of the 20th century might be engaging in describing this moment of surprise.In the story, a young man deals with historical images of an ancient city where he lives. He also does not know why he is interested in these images. One day, he wants to combine this interest with the art of photography, which he is passionate about and goes to an old district of the ancient city where he lives. He wants to take pictures of a mosque from the Ottoman Empire period. This mosque[2], an example of 17th-century Ottoman art, has valuable aspects in transforming Turkish-Seljuk art and in terms of Ottoman art history. When the young man comes to the mosque, he sees that the mosque is under restoration and that there

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[1] What I mean by encounter here is an encounter in the sense that Sarah Ahmed, a writer in Postcolonial literature, emphasizes and generalizes in her *Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality* (2000). Here Ahmed emphasizes that the meaning of encounter includes surprise and conflict and underlines that encounter is something other than a meeting (Ahmed, 2000: 6-9).

[2] The mosque in question is the Aziziye Mosque in Konya. It was built between 1671 and 1676 by Damat Mustafa Pasha, husband of Hatice Sultan (daughter of Sultan Mehmet IV). However, when the mosque was destroyed by a fire in 1867, it was rebuilt in 1874 by Pertevniyal, the mother of Sultan Abdülaziz (Name *Aziziye* refers to Abdülaziz). The mosque was built in the eclectic Ottoman architecturalstyle that prevailed during the tenure of Balian architects in the mid-nineteenth century, blending Empireand Neoclassical forms with traditional Ottoman mosque design. It has many features that make it one of a kind. It is a double minaret structure. The roof of the *şerefe* (balcony) in each minaret is supported by columns that make the mosque unique in Turkey. Unlike many other mosques, the main floor is elevated and stairs are used to reach the main floor (Kuban, 2010: 581; Goodwin, 1971: 474).

are construction scaffolds all around. The *muezzin* (religious officer) of the mosque follows these works. However, the young man realizes that this officer also has an attitudethat guidesthe restoration in progress. The young man sees that new paints have been applied tothe gold leaf root paints on the reliefs around the doors and windows of the mosque and tells the attendant that this is wrong. On the other hand, the *muezzin* expresses his satisfaction by saying that the mosque is clean in this way. The young man was surprised that the *muezzin* was so detached and unaware of the historical meaning of the mosque. He is also angry that the restoration, which should be done more professionally and following historical premises, is carried out by a *muezzin* with no experience and training in this field. It is unknown whether this anger and surprise caused the young man to argue with the *muezzin* or if it prompted him to explain this situation. Still, the story ends here because any explanation for this surprise in the sequel will distract the listener from this story's advice.

No historical artifact cannot be the subject of history just because it has stood in one place for centuries. On the contrary, it becomes an element of the narrative to the extent that one can fit it into a historical narrative. Itsstory starts from a single moment and is told in a specific chronological flow. This flow is historical time, and historical time will lose its meaning and function only to the extent that singular experiences are included in the story. Here, the situation that surprises the youthin the relationship between the mosque and the *muezzin* is the difficulty of equating history and humanity, as Levi-Strauss[3] points out. History is another desire with the gold leaf root dyes it contains, and man is another desire that can throw different colorson those dyes at any time. The gap between the *muezzin*'s passion for the mosque to be "clean" and the historicity of the mosque (in the history of art, in the History of Islam) may stem from many reasons. First, the purest purpose the muezzin chooses for his action may be worship. Second, his thoughts on the mosque's history may have been integrated into a particular image corresponding to a historical narrative whose temporal parts are intermingled. Thus, this image may have arisen partly from the Ottoman period, partly from the early periods of Islamic history, and partly from the utopia of being the ideal

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[3] "We need only recognize that history is a method with no distinct object corresponding to it to reject the equivalence between the notion of history and the notion of humanity which some have tried to foist on us with the unavowed aim of making historicity the last refuge of a transcendental humanism" (Levi-Strauss, 1966: 261).

Muslim described in the Qur'an: *Ecdad* (Ancestors). However, the desire to tell all these stray images in a single story will bring together these imagesbelonging to different temporalities in the historical and social sense in historical time. This merger will transform the human experience into a transferable memory for the next moment. This coherent memory will be communicable and transferableat the same time. However, whenever we try to make the *muezzin*'s astonishing reality part of any historical time, the gap between his uncanny reality and the historicity of the mosque will widen. Thus, stories such as the history of Islam and the history of the East, which can be fictionalized as a narrative of the unique history of that *muezzin*, will be reduced to the gap between the first Muslim and that *muezzin*. This gap or discontinuity will turn into a short circuit in Dariush Shayegan's lines, which can be considered an example of auto-orientalism. The following extended excerpt from Shayegan's text entitled *Cultural Schizophrenia Islamic Societies Confronting the West* (1992) can be read as the *muezzin*'sself-defense against the young man's surprise in the story:

> *And by the way, where, strictly speaking, am I? My historical coordinates are altogether different. I do not calculate in terms of centuries, sixteenth, seventeenth or eighteenth; or in terms of the historical breaks which mark the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, or distinguish classical from modern periods. The sequence of historical periods means nothing to me. I tend to scramble the order of the centuries, because the qualitative discontinuities which punctuate Western history have no concrete representation in my mind. I have a past which — because I continually refer to and resuscitate it — is confused with the present; and a present which is my future. It is true that over the last hundred years, I have experienced profound upheavals, that I talk about history, think about it, do my best to understand its mechanisms and linkages, to get back to the very relative sources of my pseudo-modernity. But during this short period, which marks my formal entry to a time of ever-broadening horizons, on the psychic level, I have continued to inhabit a meta-history in which the before and the after is confused with the after and with post-history. And between the two, I find myself postponing an End without which there can be no Beginning.* (Shayegan, 1992: 6-7)

The gap that Shayegan constructs between a mythical beginning and an always deferred end is depicted by an analogy that makes his shortcircuit possible: "On holiday from history" (Shayegan, 1992: 12). These shortcircuits can be reproduced in other contexts, such as vacationing in history, sleeping in time, being a cold society, subject to weak historicity, and being a passive object of history rather than a subject. One can enumerate different forms corresponding to each moment of the famous story of the encounter of east and west. Ontological shortcircuits turn into political short-

circuits over time. These forms range from questioning whether a tribal person is human to deciding whether a culture can be self-governing. As Edward Said (1977) has shown, it continues to operate with an inner rupture even when the other is affirmed. In any case, however, it is apt to be explained as an exclusion from a history that has arisendue to major social and historical transformationsthat have accompanied it historically (such as modernization or the development of capitalism). These explanations are accompanied by implicit or explicit accusations of incompetence, incapacity, or inability to achieve an evolution (revolution, transformation, social or political progress) that is expected to occuruniversally. However, all these explanations cannot go beyond being narratives of an abstract and hypothetical human story without considering the complex and multiple layers of human historicity and sociality. As Johannes Fabian (1983/2006: xxxix) prefers, the concrete reality of the human appearing in the eye of the observer always turns into a theoretical abstraction or the theoretical absence of its empirical reality, which is coded as passivity in the face of a superhuman structure. However, man's relation to history cannot be evaluated independently of the association of human experience with temporality. For this reason, the young man's surprise at the temporality of the *muezzin* or the different time experiences that caused this surprise should be added to the story. It also means that the unhistorical and unconscious impossibilities of reaching the singular human experience of this surprise are added to the story without separating the two. This challenging undertaking will only be possible as a new relationship between history and time fills the gaps in theoretical contexts. The first thing to do is to preserve the moment when every great and well-constructed story of social transformation is surprised by the singular reality and add this surprise to the story. However, scientific and disciplinary initiatives have a "curiosity" to remove and explain curious elements of reality. For this reason, it should be taken into account that this great encounter, which Shayegan sees as the encounter of the east and the west, actually stems from the scientific and objective perspective that emerged as a result of the Enlightenment thought stemming from his internal preferences and that it first emerged in its conception of the subject.

When the efforts to unite the story of humanity (totalization of history) in the context of great social transformations are examined well, it will be seen that the blind spots here coincide with the theoretical void of human reality. The formation of nation-states

in the political sense, modernization in the social and cultural sense, the development of capitalism in the economic sense appear as the great stories of great transformations in every field. Social scientific initiatives such as sociology, anthropology and economics, each of which connects the previous phases of history to this great transformation story, emerged to reveal the place and importance of these large and singular narratives in human history, and by the time they turned into areas where these processes became universal. This universality has manifests itself either in a historical consciousness of time, where time becomes universal in an absolute and collective present, or in the form of Eurocentrism, which constitutes the historical basis of all developments. Today, every attempt to tell this story through its own socialization and cultural dynamics feels obliged to refer to the Enlightenment, the Renaissance or the French Revolution that took place in northern Europe, and the concepts of progress and process that emerged as a chronology of all these historical events are both the result and the indicator of this universality.

As Bhambra (2007) emphasizes, all social sciences, based on empirical generalizations, claim a rupture and differentiation that emerged in this century. The great works of the great philosophers, economists, or sociologists of these disciplines emerged either after the French Revolution in the 18th century or with the consequences of the Industrial Revolution during the 19th century. These centuries are a period in which every historical and social element is rapidly transforming, deepening the gap between the past and the present. In this way, everything related to human life and memory has also changed. Differentiation is the primary motivation of any scientific curiosity. And every scientific curiosity involves an effort to understand and explain this differentiation universally. A new universal cult of humanity, which August Comte, who lived in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution, called the "religion of humanity," is undoubtedly the most important example, if not the first, of attempts to singularize the collective human relationship with time and space. The religion of humanity has transformed over time into the study of social collectivity within the framework of a discipline. It has revealed the field of research that we call sociology today. The positivist religion of humanity expressed by Comte at the beginning of the 18th century would turn into "collective consciousness" in the works of Emile Durkheim (1893/1994: 38-39) at the end of the 19th century. The "collective

consciousness"[4], the explanation of society as a wholeand the study of facts, combined with Durkheim's call to "study society as a thing"[5] (1895/1982: 113) in its strict scientific perspective. In keeping with the spirit of the times, Durkheim's sociological initiative emphasized the contexts of integration, unity, and order required by the nation-state story. On the other hand, this idea of national unity, which bringsa modern present to the foreand reconstructed on the overturned structures of the past, should have been based on a past and historical consciousness. Maurice Halbwachs (1877/1992), similar to Durkheim, emphasized the importance of another collectivity, the collective memory, in the context of the integration of the pastand detailed the importance of this memory for social cohesion. As a matter of fact, Durkheim's work *Suicide* (1897), which he wrote at the age of thirty-nine, will be the first and most important example of the attempt to reintegrate the individual's indefinability in the face of this collective consciousness and memory into the narrative of collectivity. Social theory has been able to tell the whole story of a human collectivity believed to be universal to the extent that it excludes the "unconscious," which is an essential part of consciousness, and forgetting, which is a crucial input of memory.

This perspective, which coincides with the birth of social theory, is based on a new consciousness of time. This consciousness has emerged as an effort to place the past and the future in a present that is thought to be experienced collectively. This rebuilding will only be possible with a collective remembrance which works as a "modern simultaneity" that coincides with the formation of an imaginary community, the nation-state (Anderson, 1983/2006: 24). While this approach, which we will call the positivist, structuralist, and functionalist school, lays the foundations of the discipline of sociology, it left noexceptions to this foundation in terms of participation in the collective consciousness and inclusionin the collective memory, that is, regarding surprise and conflict as deviations from this collectivity. However, different theoretical contexts based on the fact that history, society, and the individual cannot be considered separately from each other have made short circuits visible in a macro

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[4] "The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or common consciousness" (Durkheim, 1893/1994: 38-39).

[5] "In the second place, our method is objective. It is wholly dominated by the idea that social facts are things and must be treated as such" (Durkheim, 1895/1982: 113).

theory. This has been possible thanks to the micro perspective offered by historicismwith an effort to understand the singularity of human action. In the thought represented by this school, it was emphasized that the meaning of human action could not be considered in the context of a philosophy of consciousness alone, and it was underlined that the arbitrariness it contained should be understood. Wilhelm Diltheyis one of the influential owners of this emphasis. For Dilthey (1961: 97), the past is the only source of meaning; therefore, the process of understanding must be purely historical. Since man is a historical being, this being acts with the experience of a certain time and place. In this sense, Dilthey's contemporary Max Weber also problematized the historicity of the individual's historical action. He built his social theory on a conception of social action that could be studied with the subjective meaning that an individual attache to his action. However, Weberian theory also dealt with the transformation of this meaningthat the individual attaches to his action in parallel with a major transformation. He studied the change in the meaning of action in the shadow of the development of capitalism. Thus, a meaning and a great historical transformation were intertwined, not as cause and effect in the positivist sense, but in what Weber called "elective affinity" (Weber, 1978: 341).

The difficulties of incorporating human experience into the story in a predicament arisein structuralist approaches, where collective representations and supra-individual phenomena are considered, or in historicist approaches, which are the search for meaning in the individual's unique action. These difficulties do not leavethe sociological theory, which cameto the stage of history with the discussions of modernization, industrialization, or capitalization. Today, a wide field of discussion, where we provide the tools used by all collective representations or our efforts to understand and explain the historicity of human beings, tells a story consistent within its own history but maintains consistency over short circuits when it encounters strangers. As Jorge Larrain (1994: 18-26) has shown, the 18th-century Enlightenment thinkers and the 19th-century European colonial order thought rhetoric formed the intellectual basis of the civilized-barbarian dichotomy.[6] Whether it is a positivist claim

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[6] Jorge Larrain discusses this situation under the heading of "Reason and Reduction of Difference" and gives a wide range of examples from J. B. Say, James Mill to Hegel (especially from *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*) (Larrain, 1994: 18-23). He also underlines the racist contexts in the works of John Locke and David Hume while discussing the racism caused by the emphasis on reason in European thought in the context of "reason and racism"(Larrain, 1994: 23 -26).

to universality or an effort to understand and tell the story of a particular historical being, after the 20th century, it has become globalized in a context that Chakrabarty (2000: 4) calls "political modernity."[7] To the extent it has become globalized, the rift within itself has become anabyss between itself and the other. A line stretching from the 19th century to the 20th century has turned into a common language or heritage, especially as a period in which "political modernity" has been globalized concretely or mentally, spreading its validity worldwide.[8] Today, this is the planeon whichall stories of encounters can be told, as the ground on which social science can be built. Being aware of the handicaps of this plane, this study questions the possibilities of how to tell the story of an individual not through her actions but through her experience.

All human stories must be told with the help of this language's vocabulary, but with the surprise and conflict of singular encounters. This understanding of narration should not start with structures, processes and transitions but with the power of the singularity of a moment provided by the encounter. The singularity of the moment must be a singular moment in what Simmel calls "pictures of a moment" (Simmel, 2000: 11). This perspective, which requires considering the human being as an "anthropophorous"[9] at a point of intersection, will be able to capture the human experience not as an absolute consciousness or an absolute expression of meaning (historically), but in a context where the two are intertwined in sociality. It is possible

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[7] Chakrabarty defines "Political Modernity" as "the rule by modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise—is impossible to think of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of Europe." He insists that the "Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history" (Chakrabarty, 2000: 4)

[8] Chakrabarty also insists that the concepts brought by "political modernity" of Europe, entail an unavoidable—and in a sense indispensable— universal and secular vision of the human. He admits that he himself "writes from within this inheritance. Postcolonial scholarship is committed, almost by definition, to engaging the universals—such as the abstract figure of the human or that of Reason—that were forged in eighteenth-century Europe and that underlie the human sciences" (Chakrabarty, 2000: 5).

[9] Agamben uses this term in order to define man ontologically in a tension between being animal and human: "Man exists historically only in this tension; he can be human only to the degree that he transcends and transforms the anthropophorous animal which supports him, and only because, through the action of negation, he is capable of mastering and, eventually, destroying his own animality" (Agamben, 2004: 12).

to find such an approachin Simmel's sociology, which can be an alternative to the social and historical theories that read the great rupture and process I mentioned above. Simmelian social theory placed many unhistorical and unconscious elements that emerged individuallywith the concept of conflict into his theory of society and tried to understand society as sociation through human interaction. How one deal with experience as a struggle against the cultural world that limit oneself externally (and is indeed its product) has protected Simmel's approach from the positivist and historicist blind spots I mentioned. Simmel's social theory is open to coincidences and encounters from the beginning, with the way it dealswith human experience in his philosophy of history.

To tell the Turkish modernization narrative, which is essentially another story of encounter, with an approach freed from the duality of modernity and tradition, it is necessary to capture the moment of encounter, as in the story of the young man and the *muezzin*. In 1853, a similar encounter occurred between August Comte and the Ottoman Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Pasha, the author of the Tanzimat Edict. The letter of August Comte, the founding thinker of positivism and sociology, to the Ottoman Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşit Pasha, dated February 4, 1853, offers a suitable starting point for the Turkish modernizationstory. This letter was written because of the dream of uniting humanity around a universal cult, which August Comte described as the "religion of humanity." Comte's letter, which contains essential content in many respects, assumes that the religion of Islam has aspects that aremuch more suitable for positivist universality than Catholic Christianity:

> *From the late Middle Ages, the emancipation of elite minds from theology necessarily proceeded at the same pace in the East as in the West, albeit in different forms. Because this liberation is the result of a definite conflict that makes one feel the common unnecessaryness of the assertive attitudes of both monotheisms, which are incompatible with the universality of positivism. Even closer to the truth because of his simpler faith and more viable rule, the Islamic genius must be less opposed to the acceptance of positive religion than the Catholic genius. (Comte: 1853/2009: 480-481)*

This passage, taken from Auguste Comte's letter, reflects the universal positivist thought that left its markon the Enlightenment century in European thought with its subject comprehension and the fiction of the other outside itself. The "Islamic societies" praised in the passage arereduced to a society identified with Islam as a

whole and a ruling class identified with the identity of Mustafa Reşit Pasha as a singular subject or class. It is a romantic encounter[10], as Tanıl Bora (2017: 45) prefers while describing this correspondence, since Comte constructs his interlocutor hypothetically from the beginning. The dualities created by the Tanzimat reforms in social and cultural life are not mentioned in the letter. He also does not take into account that the desire for reform, which he thinks is in the rulers, is possible with the disconnection between the rulers and the people. However, the universalist and evolutionist views of Auguste Comte were reflected in Mustafa Reşit's circle and exciting personalities of the period, such as Ahmet Rıza and Ziya Pasha, who were more intellectually involved than him. It is included in the main Westernization agendas of both the Committee of Union and Progress and later of the Republic. The theoretical and sociological encounter of Emile Durkheim and Ziya Gökalp, in which Comte's views were based on a more scientific ground and turned into a scientific initiative, this time theoretically reproduces social and cultural dualities at the beginning of the 20th century. Gökalp's work *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Medenileşmek* (1918) while translating Durkheimian sociology into the Turkish modernizationcontext, is basedon duality in the context of outside and inside, which emerged as civilization (*medeniyet*) and culture (*hars*). Although Gökalp hopes that the tension expressed by this duality will disappear and the two poles will turn into a singular culture through assimilation over time, dualities continue to exist both in theory and in life after the proclamation of the Republic. However, it should be underlined that Mehmet İzzet, a contemporary of Ziya Gökalp, was interested in German historicism. He is not mentioned much in the Turkish modernization debates and in the history of Turkish sociology today becausehe died at an early age. However, unlike Gökalp, Mehmet İzzet's works, which emerged as a Simmelian alternative to the Durkheimian positivist beginning of Turkish sociology, did not become a systematic school with his early death.

This Turkish modernization story, which produced dualities in the middle of the twentieth century, is the focal point of the works of a generation born at the beginning of the century and witnessing great social transformations. Here, many people question

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[10]Tanıl Bora thinks this meeting is a romantic one. Because, according to Bora, "It is natural that Comte's positivism, which associates the Enlightenment and humanism optimism with a subjectivism-voluntarism supported by scientific determinism, fascinated Ottoman modernists"(Bora, 2017: 45).

both the relations of reform thinkers, intellectuals and administrators with the West and how thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura have adoptedthe theoretical tradition of the West. The 1940s and 1950s, in whichthis generation produced its essential works, were when the disconnects between the past and the present and the newly established nation-state and society, which constantly produceddualities, were experiencedin the centennial of the encounter of East and West. Other dilemmas created by the Republican revolutions in social life are also on the agenda. In this sense, the contexts of rupture and continuity, which are presented as a fundamental opposition in which all dualities are discussed, have formed this generation's main area of interest. Kemal Sayar defines this generation as the 1910 generation[11] and thinks their main difference from previous generations is "to investigate the basic processes that determine Turkish society based on a historical heritage" (Sayar, 1998: 225). He said this was possible by including the time dimension in the research. These historical and social studies are in harmony with the spirit of the period. Mümtaz Turhan's *Cultural Changes*was published in 1951, Niyazi Berkes' *The Development of Secularismin Turkey* in 1964, and Sabri Ülgener's *Moral and Mental Issues of Our History of Economic Decline* in 1951. The common point of these studies is that they theoretically address the cultural, political, and economic gaps of Turkish modernizationin their historical realities and revealthe reasons for the disconnection between the past and the present. This idea of emptiness or disconnection comes as a surprise when they cannot see what they want to see as they approach their objects from the beginning. However, they do not include this surprise in their works. While the historical perspective is embedded in the methodology oftheir works, the relationship between history and time is influenced by the temporality defined by political modernity. It also bears the traces of social dilemmas emerging in the Westin the universal and local context. In this sense, the subject is expressed with the historical and cultural obstacles to the development of capitalism, which is described as medievalization (*ortaçağlaşma*) in Sabri Ülgener, and the obstacles in front of the

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[11]Kemal Sayar, in his article titled "1910 Generation in Turkish Thought", thinks that the 1880 generation has conquered the republic, while the 1890 generation has beenlost in the Balkan, the World War I and the Independence Wars, and those born in 1900 and in 1910 worked with curiosity to understand the history of the society they live in and the ongoing transformations. Among the names he counted from the 1900 generation are Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901), Hilmi Ziya Ülken (1900), A. Gölpınarlı (1900), Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu (1901), Ömer Lütfi Barkan (1901). He lists the names of Sabri Fehmi Ülgener (1911), Mümtaz Turhan (1908), Niyazi Berkes (1908), Behice Boran (1910), Nurettin Topçu (1909) as the 1910 generation (Sayar, 1998: 223-228).

development of secularization, which is the basis of social revolutions in Niyazi Berkes. The historical timeaccompanying Western modernity's fictionalization has permeated these works' perspectives.

On the other hand, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's works have emerged under the influence of another need, especially since the 1940s, emphasizing the effect of the past on the present. For Tanpınar, like Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, one of the names he was most influenced by, the issue is to understand the reasons for the gap between the past and the present, the old and the new. Sometimes it comes out as complaining about this abyss, and sometimes feeling the anguish of this abyss. However, in his works, we see the first nuclei of a modernist effort to express the old with a new language. His search for a new relationship between time and history accompanies the effort to understand the dynamics and consequences of change. Tanpınar places the story of a singular human experience and a historical and cultural sociality in which these singularities interact in the void where Niyazi Berkes and Sabri Ülgener see inadequacy and incompetency. At the same time, this story is told in the context of a new relationship between time and history, in the context of man's relationship to his environment, past and present. In this context, I think it deserves special attention. This difference and search in Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's work is the main subject of this study. His works, which are unique in terms of Turkish modernization history, went throughan important transformation, especially between 1943 and 1954 when his novels began to be published. *Mahur Beste* is the first novel in which this historical, sociological curiosity is revealed, and Turkish modernization is explained. Published in 1954, *The Time Regulation Institute*is his last and most influential novel in which the multiple interplaysof different temporalities isdepicted with an emphasis on the clock. In this novel, Tanpınar also tried to understand and explain the political, social, and cultural story of Turkish modernization through the inner tensions and social types of the human, whom he defines as the inner human; they manifest themselves in the moment of social interaction, avoiding the dichotomous dilemmas of historical time. The main issue of Tanpınar, who gives a special place to the concept of time in his poems, newspaper articles, and finally in his novels, is to describeTurkish modernization both through a new history and time relationship and a new society (culture) and individual relationship.

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's position in Turkish modernization debates is ambiguous. The purpose of this study is not to resolve this ambiguity. Because the ambiguity in question stems from the indecision of what Tanpınar is trying to understand. What makes Tanpınar different from his contemporaries is his resistance to this indecision. This persistence, culminatingin his latest novel, *The Time Regulation Institute*, detailed his thinking in ways that revealthe complexity of the present's relationship to the past. For this reason, comparing Tanpınar with his contemporaries, Niyazi Berkes and Sabri Ülgener, is not to reveal that he has overcome the dilemmas he faced in the context of Turkish modernization. However, it is possible to say that he is persistently trying to tell a story wherethe past and the present are in constant interaction, and the new and the old are intertwinedin a historical flow that others see as a rupture. In order to reveal this indecision that feeds Tanpınar's thought, it is necessary to pass to the chaotic literature of the multiple relations established by history, society, and theory over time. The main interest of the second chapter is the place of the concept of time in the history and social theory of human experience. In this chapter, the debates on history, society, and temporality that affected Tanpınar and his contemporaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be tried to be put forward in the context of the relationship of this temporality with human experience. While revealing the details of historical time, which Benjamin (1968/2007) defines as "homogeneous emptytime," which both reveals and enables the existence and globalization of modernism, it will also be discussed how alternative temporalities can be included in the historical and social imagination. In this context, the waysof capturing modernity in human experience and Simmel's view of society and history will be essential points of interest in this chapter. The reasons that privilege Simmel from his contemporaries in sociological theory are parallel to the reasons that privilege Tanpınar among his contemporaries. In the third chapter, the reasons for Tanpınar's indecisive situation in the Turkish modernization debate, which is read as brake and continuity and progressing with the possibilities of this duality, will be detailed. The relationship of this privileged position with history, time, and humans will be revealed. The Fourth Chapter aims to reveal the reflections on the main features that distinguish Tanpınar from his contemporaries in his works. Here, a line will be drawn from Tanpınar's first novel *Mahur Beste* to his latest novel, *The Time Regulation Institute*, and the distinctive aspects of Tanpınar's work in temporality, human experience, and modernization will be detailed.

CHAPTER II

DETEMPORALIZING MODERNITY[12]

What is modernity? Every answer given to this question creates new problem areas. When we say that modernity is a great transformation in the history of humanity, what will we mean by humanity, transformation and history? When we say humanity, how should we think of human existence? When we look historically, man in the ancient age, man in the Middle Ages or feudal man, capitalist man exhibits different features and forms from each other. In addition, when we look at history, what kind of temporal sequence will this historicity have preferred. Or when we say transformation, what is this transformation? Is it sufficient to consider it as a social, economic or cultural transformation? In which continent of the world did this transformation take place? Yet when we embrace all of these conceptions, when we try to define modernity, how do we know whether modernity has changed the way we define humanity, transformation, and history? It is precisely because of these problem areas created by the definitions of modernity that Marshall Berman (1982) resorts to the opportunity offered by the description "all that is solid melts into air" borrowed from Marx and Engels to express a great transformation in the human experience of mordenity. This transformation, which he calls a mealstorm:

> *great discoveries in the physical sciences, changing our images of the universe and our place in it; the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class struggle, immense demographic upheavals, severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats, hurtling them halfway across the world into new lives; rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth; systems of mass communication, dynamic in their development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and societies; increasingly powerful nation states, bureaucratically structured and operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of people, and peoples, challenging their*

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[12] This title was chosen as a reference to the title of Dipesh Chakrabarty's *Provincializing Europe* (2000). The preference for the concept of detemporalization, which has a temporal meaning instead of provincialization, which has a spatial meaning, contains a content in the context of the criticism of the temporal inclusiveness of modernity.

political and economic rulers, striving to gain some control over their lives; finally, bearing and driving all these people and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world market. (Berman: 1982: 15)

All these developments, which Bermann has listed, took place in Europe and enabled people to experience modern life starting from the 16th century. According to him, in the first stage between the 16th and 18th centuries, there was no full conscious interpretation of the effects of this transformation. The effects or consequences of modern public life are not obvious. People do not have a vocabulary that can express the change in their lives. According to Bermann, after the French Revolution that took place in the 18th century, a vocabulary in which modern public life can be expressed begins to emerge (Berman, 1982: 17). After this vocabulary was formed, people who still remember the past and live under the influence of the opportunities provided by the new public life in the 19th century became the source of a modernist perspective. These three stages that Berman emphasizes undoubtedly contain the notion of great social transformation, historical turning point and rupture shared by attempts to explain modernity. However, the difference in Berman's treatment of modernity is the way he pluralizes modernity temporally, if not spatially. The main intention of his book is "To appropriate the modernities of yesterday [which]can be at once a critique of the modernities of today and an act of faith in the modernities-and in the modern men and women-of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow" (Berman, 1982: 36). This is can be taken as a temporal deconstruction against the modern conception of time that presents itself as an eternal present.

Discussing not modernity, but modernities, has been possible since the middle of the 20th century, since the social experience horizon of modernity has become global. Thus, it has gained a content that covers all other social transformations as a great social transformation. The history of this pluralization is usually started with the works of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. While Eisenstadt (1968: 257) argued that modernity and modernization processes carry a certain universality, he argued that "different societies develop different institutional patterns" should also be accepted. In this context, "modernity is frequently identified as a feature of the West that is exported and has an impact on other societies, which then incorporate the institutional forms while adapting them within local conditions and cultures" (Bhambra, 2007: 58). The idea that modernity would be internalized in a local context was met only by the spatial

locality of a different cultural particularity. In this context, in order not to fall into a Eurocentric trap, it is necessary to tell the story of the modern or traditional individual (the representations formed in him, his subjectivity, the relationship of this subjectivity with the outside world). This will only come about through attempts to understand at a micro level everything that has happened in human history and the ways in which humans have reacted to it. However, the micro level needs to be understood temporally, not spatially. In order "to disrupt the powerful story of modernity rather than contribute its globalization" as Michell suggests, "it is not enough to question simply its location but has to question its temporality" (Mitchell, 2000: 7). If it is possible such questioning of time and temporality can provide theory with two important sources: the incommensurability of time and the deconstructive character of its recurrence which gives the opportunity of remember as well as forget. This will bring together the critic of "now" of modernity, its culture of contemporaneity, the particular sense of simultaneity all of which implies the modernity's experience of time and temporality (Mitchell, 2000: 15).

In order to make "questioning" in the sense Mitchell mentioned, the relationship between the ways of using time in the narrative of modernity and three things should be questioned. These are theory, history and society. The historical time peculiar to modernity first shows itself in theory. This causes the totalization of History. With a totalized history, a universal social theory has emerged with reference to both temporal totalities (periods, transformations, processes) and social totalities (community, collective consciousness). Undoubtedly, this situation is compatible with sociology's claim to be a science. However, the point I want to come to is the distinctive position of Georg Simmel's work as an important exception to the emphasis on universal structures and periods in the history of sociology. As many have stated, the atypicality of his social theory is that it has kept its analysis at the individual level, while at the same time preserving its connection with supraindividual structures (Frisby, 1981; Ritzer, 2008: 31). He did this in a context he called formal sociology. As can be seen, he did so by universalizing the destructive effect of modernity on individual experience, mentioned by Berman, with a method hidden in the details of his sociology. That is, by incorporating the individual's conflict with the surrounding culture into his analysis from the very beginning, at the most micro level. This ensures that his theory provides a meaningful ground for the deconstruction of the individual's

world of meaning before the destruction of individual experience. It also presents a method of how modernity can be presented in a context of detemporalization.

2.1. Three Layers of Time Apprehensions: Time, History, Society

This section is based on the claim that human sociability can be transformed into an object of research to the extent that three things can be considered mutually. History, society and time make up this trio, but the relationship between each other requires opening many parentheses. Together, the three of them both originate and direct human thought. As Robert Levine states "Homo Sapiens is the only time-dependent animal" (Levine, 2006: 76). In this context, all our perceptions of ourselves and the world are mediated by our ways of thinking, expressing, using and applying time. This situation has a deep relationship with human sociality. Man's experience of time is the building block of culture, history, and society, which is the sum total of man's relationships with others. In addition, history is a founding element of both the individual and the collective sense of the society. In any case, as a conceptually indefinite concept, time actually needs to be brought into a certain state in terms of its functions of transforming both human historicity and sociality into both an experience and a narrative. For this, it is necessary to take into account the concept of time and its various forms that emerge in human and social experiences. But the biggest obstacle to this reckoning is the uncertain and elusive nature of time. Therefore, the first step in problematizing the complex relationship of the concept of time with history and human experience is to free the concept of time from the ambiguity it represents. Considering the last of the questions[13] David Couzens Hoy asked in the *Times Of Our Lives*, it seems appropriate to start with the distinction he made: "Then there is Immanuel Kant's question: is temporality a feature of us or of the world? That is, is the world? time of our lives subjective or objective, or is there a third possibility?" (Hoy, 2009: xii-xiii) According to Hoy, the objective and subjective nature of time will lead

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[13] Hoy in this work, asks some crucial questions about time: "Is the time of our lives a function of a life as a whole, a lifetime, or can it be condensed into a single moment of vision? Does a life have a unity that runs through it, or is the unity of time, and of a life, a narrative, a story, a fiction, or even an illusion? Can time be perceived? What is the time like that we encounter in our experience of our world and ourselves? Is the time of our lives the same as the time of nature or of history? In particular, if time runs through our lives, in which direction does it run? Does time come toward us from the future, as Martin Heidegger maintained, from behind us through the past, as Pierre Bourdieu asserted, or from the present, cycling perhaps in an eternal recurrence, as Friedrich Nietzsche speculated?" (Hoy, 2009: xii-xiii).

us to make a distinction when thinking about time. It will also be an important first step to resolve the ambiguity of the famous aporia from St. Augustine[14], which is quoted in every study of time and temporality.

To put it in the words of Benedict Anderson (2006: 24), one way to eliminate the ambiguity in terms of "time conceptions" is to make a distinction between time and temporality. Roughly speaking, "The term "time" can be used to refer to universal time, clock time, or objective time, in contrast, "temporality" is time insofar as it manifests itself in human existence" (Hoy, 2009: xiii). The distinction here is still problematic. Because this first distinction immediately opens the door to other distinctions, such as "Transcendental time and Immanent Time, The time of the soul and the time of the world, ordinary time, cosmological time (nature and social), historical time and time of the narrative" (Osborne, 1995: 30-68). Thus, the distinction between time and temporality here will be based on a distinction between conceptions of time and lived time. It should not be forgotten that there is a large literature in which the interaction between these two is discussed ontologically, philosophically and sociologically. Much of this literature is actually about how the two affect each other and how we encounter the other where we hope to find one.

The lived time that Hoy emphasizes is also the time we can call the time of experience. Since the experience basically emerges in a phenomenological context, the time lived is also the phenomenological time. Kant's investigation of whether this time is objective or subjective is shaped precisely by a discussion on the nature of time lived in cosmological time. The line of argument stretching from Aristotle to Plato, from Augustine to Descartes, constitutes an area where the subjectivity of human experience is discussed. Truth, subjectivity, and the nature of time have always been found side by side. This discussion was formed under the title of Historical time and progressed as the totalization of history, which appeared as a grand narrative. In other words, it progresses with the risk of recording a time lived by human beings as memories of collectivities and turning into an event, a character or a structure in a story told by someone else. This danger also arises in a dialectical context where cosmological time

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[14] "What then is time? I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled" (St. Augustinus, Confessions, Book II).

and phenomenological time are intertwined and turns into an error in the representations of the two. Thus, historical time is godless uninterrupted, a time when all events take place in a time is indifferent to these events. The first place where the gods were expelled from this time is Hegel's Dialectic. As Kojeve emphasized, "Hegel does not need a God who would reveal the truth to him. And to find the truth, he does not need to hold dialogues with "the men in the city," or even to have a "discussion" with himself or to "meditate" as in Descartes" (Kojève, 1980: 186). According to Kojève, dialectical thought dating back to Socrates, Plato or Descartes is a philosophical method that has no counterpart in reality. In Hegel, on the other hand, there is a real dialectic. In order to explain this difference Kojeve gives the example of a thought experiment which Hegel proposes to the reader of the Phenomenology in its first Chapter. As Kojeve narrates: "Look at your watch, he says, and note that it is, let us say, noon. Say it, and you will have enunciated a truth. Now write this truth on a piece of paper: 'It is now noon.' And now look at your watch again and reread the sentence you have written. You will see that the truth has been transformed into error, for it is now five minutes past noon" (Kojeve 1980: 186, 187). What is at stake in Hegel, is that a real being can transform a human truth into an error - at least in so far as the real is temporal, and time has a reality. Kojeve states that the error highlighted by Hegel has been emphasized since Plato or Permenides. But one aspect of the question was neglected until Hegel; "Namely, the fact that, through his discourse, through his written discourse in particular, man succeeds in preserving error in the very heart of reality" (Kojeve: 1980: 187).

The statement that the time lived is transformed into an error while transferring, and that this error is inherent in every situation where temporal experience is conveyed, forms the backbone of Hegel's dialectic. Because according to him, only man can continue to deceive himself without having to disappear and turn his mistake into an experience. Nature, on the other hand, proceeds by immediately eliminating a mistake. Hegel's philosophy is based on the belief that this error will be corrected in the course of history through "work", a reflection of the human will. This is the source of the notion of the progress of Spirit that Hegel adds to the Historical time. In Marx's thought, this dialectical error will turn into false consciousness, and the concepts of "work" and "labor" will become the basic unit of measurement for human experience. At the very beginning of Marx's *German Ideology*, he depicts position "in contrast to

German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven" (Marx, 1846/1998: 42). And the starting points are not "what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of the ideal reflexes and echoes of this life-process" (Marx, 1846/1998: 42). Thus, while Marx borrows Hegel's dialectic, he also inherits Hegel's mistake. If false consciousness corresponds to the individual error of man against time, Marx's mistake is that he has taken over the blind spots of historical time, such as evolution, development and process, through Hegel's dialectic. This situation will be emphasized as the weakest points of Marxism itself, such as the human experience of time and the flow of history, which Marx thought to embody in human labor (Larrain 1983, Agamben 1993).

In this context, Benjamin's *Theses on the Philosophy of History* can be seen as an attempt to save historical materialism from this temporal error. This perception will be compatible with the "post-marxism" label of the Frankfurt school in the history of social sciences. Benjamin (1968/2007) opposes a time of salvation to modern historical time, which has emerged as a result of a dialectic where there are no gods anymore and man has entered through his own fault. He defines this in his *Theses on Philosophy of History*, as a "redemption of mankind by which receives the fullness of its past – a redemption that mankind makes its past become citable in all its moments" (Benjamin 1968/2007: 257). Here not only Marx but also Benjamin's main distress is largely about which becomes selfreferent through the capitalist modernization. Benjamin's conception of the "Jetzt-Zeit" (now-time) is the good example of this distress. He uses the term *Jetztzeit* in a reference to a moment without history, a moment outside of time – "History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 261) Against the empty, quantified instant, (time), Benjamin "sets a 'time of the now', Jetzt-Zeit, construed as a messianic cessation of happening, which comprises the entire history of mankind in an enormous abridgement" (Agamben, 1993: 102). According to Benjamin, all revolutionary times can be understood by referring to a present that cannot be associated with such a before and after. The French Revolution is such a moment, and an important indicator of this is that "the first evening of fighting it turned out that the clocks in towers were being fired on

simultaneously and independently from several places in Paris" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 262).

> *A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.* (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 262)

This storm can be taken as the reminiscent of mealstorm in the use of Berman (1982). For Benjamin "Angelus Novus" not only expresses as the angel of history, but also the spirit of temporality which one can find the past and the future as well as present, and the chaotical relation of time, history and society.

2.1.1. Time: As a Source of the Theory

The theory[15] is closely related to the first reflection in the human consciousness of the reality that man witnesses and translates to other planes. According to William James (1904), action comes from the belief, which consists of thoughts at rest. This is also true for theory. The human being, whose reality is transformed into concepts and structures in his mind, must associate these conceptual structures with each other in motion, as they are in real life. This association and movement happens through models. Theory is the process of animating the images, which are perceived as detached from their own temporality in the mind of the human, after being modeled, but this time on a fictionalized plane. Here, the theory contains a temporality and spatiality to the extent that we perceive motion as an experience of time and space. All the classical and grand theories of social sciences deploy, employ and mobilize a peculiar conception of time and space. However, the theory suffers the same fate as Hegel's (1977: 88) experiment of time problem and error. The theory may remain attached to a particular place of focus. However, while translating a lived temporal

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[15] The word "theory" has religious origins. The theoros was the representative sent by Greek cities to public celebrations. Through theoria, that is through looking on, he abandoned himself to the sacred events (Habermas, 1972: 301).

experience into a mental understanding of time, it also translates lived time into a conceptual (and in many cases hypothetical) time. This is where theory becomes universal in an uncontrolled and hypothetical way.

In the words of Habermas, theoria accepted from the beginning to draw a boundary between being and time in philosophical language: "This separation is first found in the poem of Parmenides and returns in Plato's Timaeus. It reserves to logos a realm of Being purged of inconstancy and uncertainty and leaves to doxa the realm of the mutable and perishable" (Habermas, 1972: 301). Here it is crucial to see through the grand theories of the social sciences or more specifically this sociology in which modernization theories or narrations dominate, not only how two types of theoretical stances depend on a specific conception of time, or more accurately conception of historical time, but also how historical time causes a contradiction when this temporality faced with its "other(s)." Then in the own trajectory of each social science disciplines it seems so important to ask that is there a way to produce a theory or a model with a peculiar mode of "time" and "temporality" in order to run outside the borders of any deterministic "trap" in the large canopy of Social Sciences and in the course of modern history. Doing so, the main aim of this study is to grasp the core of the tension between modern dichotomies as the modern aporetic historical phenomena. These dichotomies vary in a range starting from the traditional-modern, old-new or as I will argue here in a same sense historical or universal. The historicism, as it is widely known is settled on the German historicist school that basically represents the notion of singular historical phenomenon in the course of history. On the other hand, the notion of Universalism can be understood as the universalization of the positivist school through a deep belief to the empirical generalizations of scientific truths.

As Johannes Fabian (1983) admits there are huge difficulties of speaking about time and for him its ok to leave them to interests of philosophers. However, he thinks that it is not difficult to show that "we speak, fluently and profusely, through time and in addition, to understand time, much like language or money, as a carrier of significance, a form through which we define the content of relations between the Self and the Other" (Fabian: 1983/2006: xxxviii). Accordingly, for Fabian, "time may give form to relations of power and inequality under the conditions of capitalist industrial production" (Fabian, 1983/2006: ix). Then, in a Marxist fashion, Fabian tries to make

apparent a fundamental contradiction through an old and huge contradiction about the history of anthropology and it is not so difficult to find in it something for the sake of the "base structure" of all body of social sciences. He describes this "contradiction" as such:

> *We constantly need to cover up for a fundamental contradiction: On the one hand we dogmatically insist that anthropology rests on ethnographic research involving personal, prolonged interaction with the Other. But then we pronounce upon the knowledge gained from such research a discourse which construes the Other in terms of distance, spatial and temporal. The Other's empirical presence turns into his theoretical absence, a conjuring trick which is worked with the help of an array of devices that have the common intent and function to keep the Other outside the "Time" of anthropology.* (Fabian, 1983/2006: xxxix)

If time can be taken as a structure which gives form to the relations of power and inequality under the conditions of capitalist industrial production, then it could be also taken as a "base structure" in which a fundamental temporal contradiction occurs between self and other. On the other hand, if there could be a time of anthropology as Fabian argues, then also there could be time of modernity, of sociology, of economics or the time of privileged or western reason. So, in a reflexive move, all we can say about time is neither about its conceptual being which is the reflection of an impersonal objective flow, nor about its a-priori ontology which one can find in every human being universally. So here one question arises about the conception of time, that can it be taken as a "base structure" in the process of theorizing?

Norbert Elias takes the notion of time in line with Fabian's contradiction but with a transposed form. In his words, "other's empirical presence turns into his theoretical absence", becomes "other's theoretical presence turns into his empirical absence" (Elias, 1993: 18). For him conception of time in social theory, especially when it is counterposed with the physical time, does not supply a convenient position in order to overcome problems and contradictions about theorizing of a society (or time of theorizing). Elias thinks that in order to understand the notion of "time" and overcome contradictions about it (contradictions between subject and object) one should move through a conception which is not divided as nature and human, or object and subject (Elias, 1993: 8-10). Instead, he maintains that one should move through a conception in which human grasped within the "nature." This insight represents the main controversy of his times, about proper methodology for the social sciences – that istwo

folded as idiographic or nomothetic. As close as Simmel or Weber, Elias contributes this controversy with his ideas in which he prefers to see this duality as "fallacy of separateness" of conception of "time" as one and unique thing. Thus, his definition of "historical sociology" developed as a necessity to understand "time" without intervening or reducing its *unique* dimension (moment, "otherness" or individual) and its recurrent character. His conceptions like "civilizing ğrocess" (1939) or "society of individuals" (1959) can be taken as the reified examples of this principle.

The theory's generalization of time as an entity that deconstructs something unique and repeats it manifests itself in historical and sociological contexts. Since history has no direction of its own accord, for it is shaped by the will of man, the historical time appears as the temporality of the will of that man (Abrams: 1989: 3). As Peter Burke (2005: 2) contents, Sociology can be defined as the study of human society, with an emphasis on generalizations about its structure and development. On the otherhand History is the study of human societies in the plural placing the emphasis on the differences between them and also on the changes which have taken place in each one over time. Explaining each discipline in this vein Burke highlights an attention about two types of parochialism of two disciplines. For the history the risk of parochialism occurs as spatial which is concentrating on particular region, and consequently they may come to regard their specific space as their 'parish', as completely unique, "rather than as a unique combination of elements each one of which has parallels elsewhere." On the other hand, the risk of parochialism in sociology occurs as parochialism of "time" rather than space, whenever they generalize about 'society' on the basis of contemporary experience alone, or discuss social change without taking long-term processes into account. Burke believes that these two types of parochialism can be cured by the integration of two sides: history and sociology. On the other hand, Larrain (1994: 6) takes Burke's two kinds of parochialism as the forms of two type of theorizing process: universalistic theories and historicist theories. For him these two types of theories have tendentially, different conceptions of history and cultural reality as well as conception of time. Universalistic theories conceive time as universal, unilineal, teleological and progressive, whereas the historicist theories conceive of time as a goalless, discontinuous and segmented process which no one can find a universal subject which is driving the universal vehicle of the time and history. As

Larrain (1994: 6) concludes universalistic and historicist theories are not only responsible for their parochial outcomes but also their reductionist and imperial ones:

> *Paradoxically, the emphasis on historical specificity leads historicist theories to conceive of cultural identity a historically, as an essence, as an immutable spirit which marks an unbridgeable difference between peoples and nations. The emphasis on history as unilineal progress, on the contrary, may disregard historical specifities, but usually accepts a notion of cultural identity as a process of construction and reconstruction which cannot be reduced to an essence.* (Larrain,1994: 7)

Larrain gives some examples of universalistic theories, and counts them as the representatives of modernization theories. For him the classical political economy, Marxism and Weberian modernization theory and neo-liberalism are the examples of this type of theories. He accepts them, in spite of their many differences, "as being similar insofar as these theories take different angles to see and approach the big project of modernity which had its roots in the European enlightenment." If all these theories are different scientific approaches to the social and economic development, with an effort to see the big picture as the universalism of humanity, how paradoxically parochial and Eurocentric outcomes emerges? To give an answer to this question, it should be necessary not only to know the factor of time in the process of theorizing, but also the conception and manipulation of time through the process of theorizing – whether under the shelter of historicism or universalism. If, as Wallerstein (1997: 22) points, the social science has been said to be Eurocentric (or parochial), in the sense of its historiography, the parochiality of its universalism, its assumptions about (western) civilization, its orientalism and lastly its theory of progress, it should be claimed that all these dimensions emerge through a specific exploitation of time as well as space. This exploitation involves its inverse as sacralization of a particular time and space as universal time and space. As a consequence, one can speak at least three types of Eurocentrism in the formation of theory. Initially, social sciences are (said to be) Eurocentric with regard to space since they are all produced in the West, secondly they can be Eurocentric pertaining to conception of time when theory starts to formulate and analyses non-west. May be the most insidious and modern versions of Eurocentrism can be thought in a third form, that is Eurocentrism of social theory in which western conception of time and space overlapped. In the famous lines of his introduction to *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, one can see the pure form of this kind of Eurocentricsm, when Weber declare that

The product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value. (Weber, 1905/2001: 13)

In this monumental passage of the history of Sociology, it is easy to see the exploitation of time and space through the process of theorizing in which theory departs from Western civilization "only", through tracing and tracing "only" a line of development arrives the universal significance and value. So as it is seen, the Eurocentric character of the social sciences becomes more problematic when they started to run over their pot and invade theoretically the non-western time and space conception. By the time this pot has become a melting pot of all the historical singularities and differences in a global form, in which all interlocutors used same scientific terminology in a game of differences. In this context (western) social sciences and its peculiar way of theorizing operates in the same way with Colonialism through a mental invasion of the conceptions of time along with the space.

2.1.2. History: As a Written and Rewritten Narration of Human Experience

Theoria's relationship with testimony has caused the theory to influence the discipline of history before other sciences and disciplines. The question of making the testimony with a certain care and conveying what is to be conveyed in accordance with the truth forms the center of the debates on the method of historiography. However, the discussion of what reality is exactly on a philosophical level and how much this reality is open to intervention by those who witness it constitutes an important topic of discussion in the philosophy of history as well as in the historical method. In this context, the relationship of testimony with truthfulness begins at the same time as history's relationship with facts. The situation of the cases, on the other hand, should be evaluated together with remembering and forgetting. However, it is necessary to remember the role of witnessing and accurate transmission in the emergence of historical time, and that this role can actually be traced back to Herodotus in order to lay the foundations of modern consciousness.

I, Herodotus of Halicarnassus, am here setting forth my history [historie], that time may not draw the color from what man has ⎯ brought into being, nor those great and wonderful deeds, manifested by both Greeks and barbarians, fail of

their report, and, together with all this, the reason why they fought one another.
The chroniclers [logioi] among the Persians say that it was the Phoenicians who
were the cause of the falling-out. (Heredotus, 1987: 33)

The famous passage quoted above from Herodotus, as stated by Agamben, "is a frequently used address for the understanding of modern time"(Agamben, 1993: 93). Because what Herodotus struggles with is to reveal the evidences of remembering in times when the destructive character of time and forgetfulness prevail (Agamben, 1993: 94). However, Herodotus' desire to prevent the glory of the Greeks and barbarians from being forgotten turns into a duty of history to remember and not forget. In this task, as Ricoeur expresses, we characterize the ghost of "a memory that will not forget anything" as a strangeness (Ricoeur, 2006: 413). This should be considered together with the idea that, as I have stated before, it is the only entity existing in the Hegelian dialectic and capable of perpetuating the error produced by the temporal experience of man. Forgetting is an error for memory, but it is precisely the error that its temporal experience necessarily produces. In this sense, the error (trace of the past) in Hegel's time experiment will also operate with the idea that remembering also contains its opposite, namely forgetting. It is precisely here that the debate on the historicity of man or his existence in history will emerge. For the historical materialism of Marx's name this would be the first action of man to transform nature. For the historian, it will be the first recall. However, the emphasis on remembering only will be analogous with the emphasis on facts only.

Bruno Snell (1972: 680) argues that Heredout "follows the reality of history in modern understanding while making a distinction between what he hears and what he sees (or gossip). Therefore, the main reason for starting the discipline of History from his work is this factuality. Just because it is based on a sharp distinction between the subjective and the objective, he sees that the integrativeness of history operates through this dualism, excluding forgetting, and always operates through memory. Thus, the same temporal error that occurs in the theory also occurs in the reality of History, and the historprogresses by incorporating this error into his narrative. As Edward H. Carr stated (1961/2002: 11), the 19th century was the century of the positivists, and as Ranke stated, "the task of the historian was 'simply to show how it really was (wei es eigentlich gewesen)." However, it would be wrong to take Ranke's (1830/1972: 30) insistence only as a call for factualism. He also claims that the particular entities of the

facts should be supported from a general point of view.[16] As Norbert Elias (1969/2006 :7) points, "the word history is always being used both for what is written about and for the writing itself." So, "what is written about" namely the subject matter of history neither true or false, it is the "what is written about it" that can be true or false. According to Elias, Ranke's warning is important in this respect, and something else needs to be added to the objectivity of evidenceto avoid the historian's blame and praise. For Elias, the way to avoid praise and blame is hypotheses and theory: every epoch, "people build houses of their own, in the style of their own time, from the ruins of buildings from earlies periods". Therefore "history is constantly being rewritten" (Elias, 1969/2006: 8-9). However, the "ruins of buildings from earlier periods" used by Elias should be read by taking into account that the image of ruin represents forgetting as well as remembering. From this point of view, as I said at the beginning, the theory will consider ruin only as a remembrance with the notion of testimony; by excluding the forgetting in it.

Ricoeur is aware of the testimony of the theory and is one of those who think that oblivion should be added to the theory. Since, for him "with testimony opens an epistemological process that departs from declared memory, passes through the archive and documents, and finds its fulfillment in documentary proof." (Ricoeur, 2006: 161). An important context of this epistemological process is to problematize the historical time in which it is remembered as merely witnessing time. For this problematization, Ricoeur refers to "four ways of visualizing time, of translating it into signs" by Kryzystof Pomian in *L'Ordre du temps* (1984): chronometry, chronology, chronography, and chronosophy (Ricoeur, 2006: 155). Chronometry and chronology correspond to calendar time. In other words, the timeline moves with nature. With chronography, one goes beyond the time of the calendar and the relationship between nature and history is broken. Episodes are now understood by reference to episodes. According to Ricoeur, chronography is the time of the chronique. And it is neither cyclical nor linear time. Chronosophy, on the other hand, is historical time, that is, "the history of history". On the horizon of the large categories that shape historical discourse in the phase of explanation/understanding and in that of the representation

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[16] "Nevertheless, equally mistaken are those historians who view all of history merely as an immense aggregate of facts to be committed to memory, meaning that particulars are strung to particulars and all of these held together only by a common moral principle" (Ranke, 1830/1973: 30).

of the past, whether it be a question of "events," "repetitions," "ages," or "structures". (Ricoeur, 2006: 157). Thus, memory as witness becomes thinkable together with chronosophy. And also theory leaks the memory. The palace of memory, we have read in Augustine's Confessions, not only holds the memories of events, the rules of grammar, and rhetorical examples, it also preserves theories, including those that, claiming to embrace it, have threatened to eliminate it (Ricoeur, 2006: 161).

Nietzsche is among those who treat the factual situation of (historical) knowledge which lives in this palace of memory. His text *The Use and The Abuse of History* (1873/1957) offers provocative perspectives on the sociality and history and the production of historical knowledge. The book also shifts its main interest to what it defines as "unhistorich", although much has been said about the production of history as a fictional field, which is an interesting starting point for discussions of historical knowledge. For Nietzsche, the main problem is the separation of humans from other living things, and the focus of attention is on memory. His starting point in problematizing memory is a quote from Goethe, where he reflects on the value and worthlessness of historical knowledge: "I hate everything that merely instructs me without increasing or directly quickening my activity." (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 3 These words of Goethe, "like a sincere *ceterum censeo*, may well stand at the head of my thoughts on the worth and the worthlessness of history" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 3). Nietzsche invites the reader to understand why a teacher who does not create vitality, a science that numbs activity, and history that emerges as a luxury for the understanding is something to be hated. According to him, of course, there is a need for history, but this need should be "a need other than the needs of the arrogant irresponsible people wandering in the garden of knowledge" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 3). An existence that does not have knowledge of the past and present, Nietzsche thinks and describes the relationship of this existence with forgetting and remembering. no matter how much Ricoeur thought he didn't give an exact answer, "the question raised by Nietzsche's unfashionable temperament is simple" that is "how to survive a triumphant historical culture?" (Ricoeur, 2006: 288) Nietzsche wants to show that forgetting is as functional for a society as remembering, for which he makes use of a distinction between human and animal.

Observe the herd which is grazing beside you. It does not know what yesterday or today is. It springs around, eats, rests, digests, jumps up again, and so from morning to night and from day to day, with its likes and dislikes closely tied to the peg of the moment, and thus neither melancholy nor weary. To witness this is hard for man, because he boasts to himself that his human race is better than the beast and yet looks with jealousy at its happiness. For he wishes only to live like the beast, neither weary nor amid pains, and he wants it in vain, because he does not will it as the animal does. (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 3)

Nietzsche thus tries to make an important difference visible by contrasting the human and animal state of being. This difference emerges in memory, that is, in the contrast between remembering and forgetting. Nietzsche dreams of a dialogue:

One day the man demands of the beast: "Why do you not talk to me about your happiness and only gaze at me?" The beast wants to answer, too, and say: "That comes about because I always immediately forget what I wanted to say." But by then the beast has already forgotten this reply and remains silent, so that the man wonders on once more. (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 3)

Thus, according to him, people are surprised because they cannot learn to forget and always stick to the past. "Let him walk as far and quickly as he wills, he walks with the chain", however, depends on the fast-moving events. The impermanence of the moment or the present, according to Nietzsche, makes the next moment uncomfortable. "A continuous leaf unravels from the scroll of time, falls, flies away, and suddenly return to the lap of man." This is the moment when a person says "I remember" according to him. This moment is the moment when man is jealous of the animal, which forgets immediately, sees that every moment is really dead, left behind in fog and night, and extinguished completely. From the opposition of animal and human, Nietzsche tries to reach the decisiveness of a concept that he describes as ahistorical. In this context, *Unhistorich* is equated with the animal's condition. The distinction here is important in that the out-of-history sees a boundary measure: "Whether it is a person, a society or a culture, there is a limit to insomnia, rumination, sense of history, once it reaches this limit, the living suffers from it and eventually disappears" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 5). In order for this extinction to be impossible, he takes into account the transformative effect of a power that Nietzsche defines as plastic power. This power introduces the non-Historic as a kind of forgetting precisely to prevent life from being damaged, and "[society, culture, self] develops from within itself… that changes the past and the foreign, reshapes it, heals the wounds, replaces the lost, is broken. works as a mechanism that gives a new form to forms from within"

(Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 7). In this context, it is possible to summarize the basic question of *The Use and The Abuse of History* as follows: "The unhistorical and the historical together are equally necessary and necessary for the health of a person, a society, or a culture" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 7). But here, Nietzsche's emphasis on usefulness also draws Benjamin's attention and in a context relates to his *Theses on Philosophy of History*: "Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed class itself is the depository of historical knowledge" (Benjamin 1968/2007: 260).

Ricouer criticizes Nietzsche's text in various contexts. For him, it is unclear what exactly Nietzsche was attacking (history, historiography, or historical time). However, Ricoeur insists that "Nietzsche's target is not the historical-critical method, historiography properly speaking, but historical culture" (Ricoeur, 2006: 288). To the extent that this culture is based on the assumption of a subject, it renders Nietzsche's criticism "a plea at one and the same time antihistoricist and antimodern" (Ricoeur, 2006: 289). On the other hand, it is similar to what Freud tried to do in the context of unconsciousnes, which we encounter here on the basis of the concept of *Unhistorich*. The discovery that action is not a phenomenon that occurs entirely in the direction and effect of consciousness was realized with Freud's concept of the unconscious. This was undoubtedly a challenge to Descartes' famous cogito ergo sum. In other words, Freud's unconscious was an objection that my being is something that cannot be connected only to the consciousness of my thinking self: it is directed at the philosophy of doubt and consciousness. Because until Freud, the uncontrollable cleavage passed outside the self, that is, the "subject", separating it from the outside world. However, with Freud, we began to think that the rift, the boundary, passes through the individual, the thinking subject himself. From this point of view, Nietzsche shows that the rift between history and ahistorical is not outside of societies, cultures and individuals, but within themselves. In doing so, it makes us question the possibility of historical action in the manner of chronological time of rememberence. On the contrary, Nietzsche compares the artist's "spontaneous moment of creation" with the dramatist's fictional temporal chain. He is a dramatist historian and "thinks one thing with another, and weave the elements into a single whole, with the presumption that the unity of plan must be put into the objects if it is not already there" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 37-38). Nietzsche is on the side of the artist, not the dramatist. In other words, the force he calls plastic force.

There is ample reason to think that Nietzsche offer in this context an important alternative to what Osborne (1995: 30) sees as the totalization of history. Chief among these is that they showed that the factual and the temporal singularity were corrupted, and that repetitive history was actually the date in which oblivion was excluded. Because of the collective nature of this recollection, it also permeated social theory.

2.1.3. Society: Domain of Social or Community

When we consider sociology as a field in which a social theory is clustered and the society as a structure in which history and people are intertwined, some basic problems arise as I have shown above. As I tried to show in the sections above, these problems are due to the totalizing tendencies of history and the relationship of theoretical contexts to time. In this sense, social theory must deal with this double problem, which comes from history and theory. In this context, following this double trace left behind is essential while thinking about society and its theory. The object that social theory deals with and pursues historically is "social." While dealing with this object, as Ian Craib[17] (1992: 4) stated: "Social theory generates its special prejudices." Because social theory will also include how people, who are a part of that sociality, make sense of the world. The first and foremost of these prejudices is the emphasis on collectivities and social unity. First point is the epistemological and ontological trajectory of the creation of "social" (as a reality, an episteme, ontology or ideology, discourse and unconsciousness) in the history of social sciences through which the conception (s) of "society" – and its structures, actors, investigators, spectators, enemies etc. – shaped and constructed either through theory or practice. It will require the questioning of history and society, which is thought to be formed by individuals coming together.

As J. S. Mill put[18] it, "People do not become another essence because they are brought together." However, it would be wrong in terms of sociological imagination to think

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[17] As Craib (1992: 4) suggests "most of us know little about the natural sciences, but we will, none the less, accept that theoretical physics is a 'good thing': it seems to have useful practical results, and even if we know in advance that we cannot understand it, those few clever souls who can ought to be encouraged. On the other hand, social theory appears to have no practical results. Worse, it takes something we know about already in intimate detail - our own social life - and makes of it unintelligible nonsense."

[18] S. Mill, *A System of Logic*, 7, l.

that they existed before they were brought together. According to him, "*communitas*, not *societas* with its more impersonal connotations, is the real etymological source of the sociologist's use of the word 'social' in their studies of personality, kinship, economy, and polity" (Nisbet, 1966: 56). In this trajectory of the history of social sciences, as it is famous, the works can depict a starting point and the efforts of two fathers of the evolutionary and organist theory namely Comte[19] and Spencer.[20] They represent the first effort in a systematic effort to mobilize science to understand the forms and transformations of the collectivity that humans have created.

2.1.3.1. A Line from August Comte to Emile Durkheim

They saw society as an organism developing from simple to complex, from primitive to modern, not only insofar as they appear in various historical sequences but also in a body that ranges from childhood to adolescence (mature). In their universalistic claims, Comte and Spencer's main concern was constructing the ways of studying and explaining society in its own ontology. The example of "organ" and "evolution" was not an arbitrary and spontaneous choice. Their epistemological insights were heavily cognate and in tune with the central claims and premises of the Enlightenment, seventeenth-century natural sciences, andseventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. To apply the objective methodology of natural sciences, the first step was taking society as an "object" identical to "being" with the subjects of natural sciences like biology. This was the guarantor of the "reality of society" as a being apart from its superstitions. Their effort was to positively and objectively create the positive science of society to observe and explain its stages, sequences, courses, and consequences.

As in the case of the Comte, this was a positivistic understanding of human reality, but it was a first step, and the main aim was to construct the central premises of a positive science of society. Therefore, Comte's "social" was more sophisticated and a limited version of the approach to it which tries to take and construct its ontological

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[19] There are many reasons to start this time with Auguste Comte. The biggest reason is that every birth is accompanied by the act of giving a name.

[20] Although Comte and Spencer are the figures whose names are mentioned together in this sense, Spencer strongly rejected the influence of Comte on his own ideas (Coser, 1977/2003: 89).

peculiarities. This ontological peculiarity is taken from physics or biology as an "organ" and from the Cartesian formulation of the self-eminent and self-conscious subject position. As a representation of society, this subject was becoming an adult from childhood, as it is case in Comte's three stages of society. On the other hand, as Robert Nisbet emphasized, "nowhere was the vision of community more blinding at the beginning of the century than in mind and works of August Comte" (Nisbet, 1966: 56). It is not Comte's main purpose to do the science of Social, but to first enter into a discussion called "Community Lost, community to be gained." Therefore, as Nisbet emphasized, although it is seen "the rise of sociology was a direct response to, or reflection of, the proliferation of new forms of associative life in Western Europe, forms of industrialism and social democracy brought with them," Comte's intention was quite different. Comte was interested in these (unlike the conservatives, he welcomed industry, science and republicanism), but as Nisbet contents it is not difficult to show that what led to his earliest sociological reflections was not perception of new but rather an anguished sense of the breakdown of the old. In this respect, for Comte, progress was achievement of order but this order was the order of the past. Comte thinks that it will be achieved by the way of positivist society which one can understand it as the Medievalism without Christianity (Nisbet: 1966: 57).

On the other hand, for Durkheim Comte's was a big step in attempt to see society as a distinct and evolutionary organism, but an inadequate one especially with regard to its epistemological qualities. Therefore, if Comte's contribution is to name Sociology and transform it into a historical structure, determining the concrete study subject of this structure has emerged with the contributions of Durkheim. Durkheim's contribution to the development of the conception of "society" mainly implies a quasi-break from and the critique of the 19th century's hard positivism and also from what he calls psychologism. In Durkheim's approach to society both the debt and the rejection of Comte's theory is self-evident. His critique comes mainly from the sophisticated abstractions of Comte's theory, which was the natural consequence of his positive philosophy. For Durkheim, neither the philosophy nor the psychology can generate a proper knowledge as to the functions of Society. In order to provide the inadequateness of Comte's positivism he added the hitherto formulation of society its vital components of the scientific knowledge: structure and its inherent functions. Although being in cognate with evolutionary view of positivism, Durkheim takes the organism as

structure and explains its functioning. So the term sui generis implies his structural and functional preferences: sui generis, that is making all explanation of reality through the inner nature and functioning or wellbeing of society itself. In order to achieve a scientific explanation of society as a structure, he devices the subject matter, the minimal condition and part of sociological explanation as social fact (Durkheim, 1982: 50). And offered to treat this social fact as "things" as a guarantor of objectivity of the scientific inquiry (Durkheim, 1895/1982: 113). Taking society as sui generis also implies an important position of Durkheim's sociology in order to find a convenient middle place to his sociology between natural sciences and historical idealism. Doing this, he sees the social facts as different from the subject matter of natural sciences (that is sui generis) but it should be approached with the same state of mind that of a natural scientist. Here Durkheim's aim is to secure the objectivity while studying the society as a structure and its functioning and effects which is on the one hand coercive and regulatory, on the other hand composed of creative but passive subjects (individuals) that must be controlled. It is the collective consciousness that is also the provider of social solidarity.

An important consequence of sui generis and factual analysis is the emphasis on "collective consciousness" in Durkheimian terminology. According to Durkheim, "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own [and] it can be termed the collective or common consciousness" (Durkheim, 1893/1994: 38 -39). This idea of collective unity emerges as a result of positivist preferences, in parallel with the individual's collective understanding in his own ontology. The psychologism that Durkheim tries to avoid is not actually for the analysis to go down to the level of the individual, but it is a choice to get rid of the dark content of the individual. This dark content is closely related to its temporality: So there will have to be a collective vision of time for the collective consciousness: "It is not my time that is organized in this way; it is time that is conceived of objectively by all men of the same civilization [and] this by itself is enough to make us begin to see that any such organization would have to be collective" (Durkheim, 1912: 10). This includes the idea of simultaneity put forward in the modern sense and a reference to the present. On the other hand, this idea of collective unity, which emphasizes a very modern present and is reconstructed on the overturned structures of the past, also needs to be based on a past and historical consciousness.

Maurice Halbwachs also emphasized the importance of collective memory, following a similar collectivity with Durkheim in the context of integrating the past, and detailed the importance of this memory for social cohesion. However, French positivism's interest in collectivism and its belief in its unity is based on the assumption that the consciousness and way of remembering the past of the individuals who make up this collectivity are a whole and complete. As Halbwachs emphasized in *The Social Framework of Memory* (1925/1975), memory does not enable us to relive the past, but it emerges as a resource from which we can reconstruct it. "The ability to remember," says Halbwachs, "is closely connected with the totality of the faculties of the alert mind," which means for him that "the clearer, clearer and more complete our memories are, the more image-filled and colorful our feelings will be" (Halbwachs, 1925/1975: 88). However, although Halbwachs' relationship between the "awake mind" and the "active feeling" is important in terms of his emphasis on the transformation of life into an experience, his emphasis on the integrity and indivisibility of consciousness and memory should not be overlooked, since memory is explained only through the waking mind.

In this context, memory can be understood with reference to another memory, fact to another fact, and society to another society. The question of the social becomes in Durkheim's hands as a sui generis entity or structure which coercive and regulatory upon its components, that is individuals, and needs to be studied by the factual explanation through an objective observation and experiment which does not stands on the abstract generalizations which depends on the cast of investigators mind. Durkheim provides the 19th century positivism with the epistemological tools of (like structure, social facts, observation and explanation etc.) objective observation that guarantees the scientific self-assurance of sociology. But he does this in the prize of taking individuals and the investigator as passive subjects, for the former only calculable numbers (can be meaningful concerning volume and density) that are living within unity and regulation, and for the latter, observing the real consequences about the objects of investigation. As Nispet puts it "for Durkheim, society is simply community written large" (Nisbet, 1966: 84).

2.1.3.2. Max Weber and Georg Simmel

As a science that is very engaged in the positivistic view of society in tune with the French positivism in the 19th century, Durkheim's sociology can be seen as an investment to take "social" as a *sui generis* entity or creature lives its own life and the individuals in this sense the lost souls swimming in a fish bowl. The proponents of German historical schools, like Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert, rejected and criticized this conception of individuals in favor of a subjectas a unique and singular fact of history. They emphasized the importance of subjects as the creators of the social reality as the unique mediators of meaning, which is unavoidable in creating meaning. So, their main task was not to understand the social reality but to understand subjective meanings anchored in their social action. Since society is constructed and realized by actors to understand the social reality, it was compulsive to understand the social meaning attached by the actors to their actions. The German term *verstehen* appeared and deployed in emphasizing the urgency of the method of understanding rather than explanation. The term society was nothing more than a label (in a nominalist fashion), indicating the culturally motivated and meaningfully acting individuals – the unique element and mediator of historical meaning. According to this conception of society, the methodology proper for the social sciences was *idiographic,* and the proper for natural sciences was *nomothetic*. This mainly stemmed from Kant's views about the two distinct domains of human reality: the realm of *Kultur* and *Natur*. In the realm of *kultur* was a realm of *noumen*s which implies not only historically singular and unique but also the metaphysical aspect of the subject. This conception of a society composed of transcendental subjects in the view of the German idealist school was not convenient for a science that operates only through empirical generalizations. This was a profound problem about conceiving humans and their nature. But in these versions of German traditions, it is possible to see the evolution of subject, from transcendental to absolute sprit and to social actor, in contrast to the evolution of society in French tradition.

In this evolutionary trajectory of German tradition as to subject, there are important contributors like Max Weber and Georg Simmel. In their works, the attempt to reconcile the scientific aspects of French positivism and the subjective claims of German historicism can be seen. However, they are not exact proponents of these two approaches. The question of social becomes subjective and scientific in their account

of social reality. But Simmel does this differently from Weber while defining society as a total of individuals connected by interaction. While rejecting the organic and the historicist conception of society, he sees social as a web of affiliated interactions; the sociologist's task is to study these interactions as they occur in different historical and cultural domains (Coser, 1977/2003: 179). So for him, there is a society and should be, but it can only be understood through interaction among individuals. Since Simmel rejects the totalistic views of society and tries to grasp the social reality in its foundation, he prefers not a static conception of society and the subject matter of sociology. Instead of static conceptions of society, he prefers more active and mobilized concepts such as interaction. In cognate with neo-Kantianism, he offers to achieve the knowledge of various modes of interaction through a formal analysis of interaction. For some of the Simmel's commentators, Simmel's methodology suits the conception of methodological interactionism well. Accordingly, Simmel's question of what is social is nonsense, but it should be asked as "what is sociation." So what are the outcomes of the different forms of interaction for the sake of the society which is the recurrent sequences of the sociation?

Firstly, Simmel sees individuals in society in an absolute position. He thinks that individuals create a culture through their interaction within society. This culture, which can be called individual culture, constructs through interaction. But this individual culture, by time, stands against the individual and becomes a sphere of domination and repression. This dilemma of the individual informs all claims of Simmel throughout his work. In a Marxist vein, he wants to emphasize the dialectical character of sociation, which first appears as emancipation and then becomes a sphere of enslavement. But according to, "End of History" differentiates from the Marxist revolutionary view and comes closer to the pessimism of Weber about the bad faith of humankind in an *iron cage*. Dialectical thinking permeates all spheres of his work. His conception always appears as the binary oppositions: objective culture and subjective culture, more life and more than life, small circle large scale groups. In all these instances, Simmel thinks dialectically and thinks the "social" as a sphere or web of interaction from the beginning, giving the individual a subject position (instead of types in the forms) through which the individual becomes a social being through the other acting upon him. Still, this sphere of freedom and creativity becomes a dungeon for the individual in which she lost her freedom.

Simmel's spontaneously dialectic and pessimistic views about the conception of social (or sociation), can be seen self-evidently in his ambivalent view of modern culture (as the drift of modern history), as well as in his such works *The Philosophy of Money* and *The Metropolis and The Mental Life*. In these works, he writes the tragedy of modern life in the theatre of metropolis and by the cast of money and through the mental lifes of individuals. Here, Simmel claims the alienated nature of modern life reminiscent of Marxist alienation theory but not much economically more culturally. Mental life represents here a loss of subjectivity. The objective culture, like capitalism in Marxian theory, and its representatives, such as money or fetishism of commodities, makes creative individuals, the enslaved people, dominated by their innovative products. In this respect, Simmel's individuals are not fixed subjectivities acting in a given communal situation like Weber's. Therefore, the meaning they give to their actions can only be understood in a tension. For Social Simmel, therefore, society is an ever-changing and fixed structure that resists understanding. This tension also protects Simmel's thought and perception of modernity from the theory's emphasis on historical totalization and communal collectivity. Thus, his sociology conceives of social reality as tensions that arise at the level of the individual and are constantly distorted and reshaped.

2.2. The Sourse of Dualities: Methodology of Social Sciences

In light of various significant developments in the history of sociology, it can be claimed that the main problem was to seek a proper answer to the subject matter of sociology and the appropriate methodology for studying it. Or, in other words, how can one grasp the central core of the social "reality"? This history, of course, goes parallel with the developments and progress in the history of philosophy. And what is essential for this parallel relation in this history, especially for the sake of the subject matter of sociology, is the Kantian turn of the German school. German (idealistic) philosophical tradition, especially under the influence of Kant, viewed *Naturwissenshaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft* as qualitatively different. In this tradition, human or moral reality, in opposition to nature which Kant describes as the world of objects, had taken as obviously different from the natural reality. By setting out this radical distinction, the idealistic German school subsequently developed a moral philosophy, especially in the work of Hegel. According to this conception, two distinct

phenomena should also be entailed in different methodologies. The method considered appropriate for studying human phenomena was *idiographic,* which concerns unique events. On the other hand, the method considered suitable for natural phenomena was *nomothetic* and principled in establishing general laws (Coser, 1977/2003: 177).

On the contrary, in the 19th century's positivist science conception, which Comte leads in the French tradition, it isn't easy to find a radical distinction between natural and human reality, like that of the German school. Although it is acknowledged that there are some differences between them, the necessity of approaching them with the methodology of natural sciences is commonly emphasized. Because of this way of conception, all approaches to the human, moral or social reality take their validity only from their closeness to the methodology of "natural sciences" in generating general laws. According to this methodological conception, under the influence of this positivist science, human (or moral) sciences takes the name of "sociology." In the long history of this positivist science tradition, Durkheim appears as a critical point on which this methodology takes its own clear and powerful expression. Here, the line between Comte and Durkheim seems essential to understand the developments in the positivist approach to human sciences. In his introduction to Rules, Durkheim makes this point and his debt to Comte.

> *Up to now sociologists have scarcely occupied themselves with the task of characterising and defining the method that they apply to the study of social facts. ... It is true that Mill dealt with the question at some length. But he merely submitted to the sieve of his own dialectic what Comte had said upon it, without adding any real contribution of his own. Therefore, to all intents and purposes a chapter of the Cours de Philosophie Positive is the only original and important study which we possess on the subject.* (Durkheim, 1938/1982: 48)

Durkheim finds the roots of this negligence in the lack of determining the proper ways to observe and obtain valuable formulations to the principal problems or employing them. He thinks in his initial position that all these remained completely undetermined until his time. And he describes his position as a compulsion to generate a peculiar methodology to study social phenomena. For him, "the very force of events has thus led us to construct a method that is, we believe, more precise and more exactly adapted to the distinctive characteristics of social phenomena" (Durkheim, 1938/982: 49). It is apparent from these thoughts that although Durkheim insists that the subject matter of

sociology is distinct from that of the other sciences, as it is clear in the preface to the second edition of his *Rules* the sociologist should approach this subject matter "in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist, or physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain." (Durkheim, 1938/1982: 37). So in this peculiar position, Durkheim's approach implies no metaphysical conception, no speculation about the fundamental nature of social beings. They should be regarded, conseptualized and studied as things.

So in the Durkheimian project, sociology appears in a sui-generis positivistic approach: claiming that sociology has a unique subject matter and methodology should be the same as natural sciences at the same time. To fulfill these assumptions, Durkheim suggests some essential directions for his project. Firstly, he fixes the subject matter of sociology as "social facts." By emphasizing social facts, Durkheim wants to distinguish biological facts (since they consist of representations and actions) and psychological facts (since it exists only in the individual consciousness and through it). Then a social fact, for him, is a category of facts with such distinctive characteristics that it consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling which are external to the individual and endowed with a power of coercion because of which they control him (Durkheim, 1938: 3). As a result of all these distinctive features of social facts, for Durkheim, one should consider social facts as things while observing it. This first and foremost rule appears in Durkheimian sociology as a necessary component of concrete science. And for him, "Instead of observing, describing, and comparing things, we are content to focus our consciousness upon, analyze and combine our ideas. Instead of science concerned with realities, we produce no more than an ideological analysis" (Durkheim, 1938/1982: 60).

For Durkheim, this point appears so essential that he takes even his predecessor Comte as an example of this ideological analysis: "When [Comte] passes beyond his philosophical generalities and attempts to apply his principle and develop from it the science implied in it, he too takes ideas for the subject matter of study" (1938/1982: 63). On the other hand, what is his initial aim, while taking social facts as a thing, is to show "the impossibility of its modification by a simple effort of the will" (1938/1982: 28). This point makes clear this project's preferences about the objectivity while observing social facts: "when then, the sociologist investigates some order of

social facts he must endeavor to consider them from an aspect that is independent of their manifestations" (1938/1982: 45). Accordingly, for Durkheim sociologist should free his mind from all preconceptions and should take a more passive stance to social reality. This means precisely for Durkheim that the observers (investigator or sociologist vs.) should be in a state of pure objectivity so that he should deal with the social phenomena "in terms of their inherent properties" and their "common external characteristics." And as a result, this objectivity of the observer mainly depends on excluding all subjective preoccupations. This preoccupation-free approach to social facts guarantees the validity of an observation. It also provides a classification that does not depend on the cast of the observer's mind but on the nature of things. This attempt even in itself appears as an effort to construct social science as a concrete way of generating knowledge about social phenomena. And this point can be regarded as Durkheim's main contribution to sociology. But on the other hand, suggesting objectivity and preoccupation-free observation as easy-to-grasp abilities makes Durkheim's positivist project a dreamlike attempt. This attempt, without a doubt, takes its power from understanding social or human reality as a distinct and external force to the individual. And also its main difference from the German school is that its construction of the "observed" (agency) and the observer both as passive entities.

All these conceptions and approaches of Durkheim about the science of social phenomena had been intensely criticized by the neo-kantian representative of German school, Max Weber. While being under the influence of radical distinction between *Naturwissenshaft* and *Geisteswissenschaft,* Weber like Durkheim, tried to construct a science of social phenomena. Weber conceived scientific knowledge which is proper to social phenomena as emanating from a "one-sided" (selective) view of different aspects of cultural life (Smelser, 1976). In a deeply contrast position with Durkheim, Weber tried to construct his project with regard to the all-unavoidable subjective positions. This point becomes very apparent in his views on the subject matter of sociology. For Weber, the proper subject matter of sociology appears as "social action." Here action seems to be taken in to account as such "insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior." Also, this action can be regarded as social insofar as "its *subjective meaning* takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course" (Weber, 1978, 4). On the other hand, what particular problem attracts an investigator and what level of explanation is sought,

depends on the values and interests of the investigator. So for Weber, like subjective meaning attached to social action in the individual level, also the choice of problem or investigation is always value relevant and and subjective. Doing this, in opposition to Durkheimian approach, he incorporated a distinctively psychological level into his definition of the basic substance of sociology and social action (Smelser, 1976).

Because of this emphasis on the subjective meaning attached to the social action, Weberian conception also tries to re-incorporate the "preoccupations" in to the sociological formulation. And thusly, he does not suggest objective scientific observation but the interpretative understanding in order to study the subject matter of sociology. According to him, far from taking the "social facts as thing" and observing a thing from a (objective) distance, "we can only understand (verstehen) human action by penetrating to the subjective meanings hat actors attach to their own behavior and to the behavior of other. So, his science conception, aims an interpretative understanding of social behavior in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course and its effects (Coser, 1977/2003: 220). For Weber, there can be no possibility for a preoccupation-free investigation. Moreover, the goal of Weberian investigation cannot be that to reach through the exposition of general laws and concepts, precise as it could be. Instead of this his main aim is to seek knowledge of "an historical phenomenon, meaning by historical: significant only in its individuality." So, the decisive element here is that only "through the presupposition that a finite part alone of the infinite variety of phenomena is significant, does the knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful" (Weber, 1949: 78).

In this kind of argumentation in the Weberian approach, observer and observed relation appears somewhat modified, especially insofar as it is compared with their position in the Durkheimian approach. Since there could be no external realities or social facts waiting for the observer, Weber mobilizes the active "intention" of the observer through the subject matter of his/her investigation. When this intentional mobility becomes possible, and consequently when observer comes closer to the observed, only then it can be grasped that also observed's factual position is active and complex in its cultural settings - which resists all factual analysis. This point can be regarded as the important contribution of Weber to the methodology of sociology. But in this contribution, because of making "the concrete facts" useless in the hands of

investigator, his position appears somewhat problematic according to the construction of scientific knowledge. It can be argued that this position weakens Weber's scientific potentiality and makes him flirt with the extreme historical nominalist school (Smelser, 1976). On the other hand, this complexity and variety in constructing subjective meaning and the investigator's value-oriented positioning propose a new type of scientific tool instead of Durkheimian categorizations through facts. Therefore, he primarily uses the "ideal type" as a tool to employ interpretative scientific methodology. By this tool, he also tries to free himself from the chains of historical nominalism and the generalizing science conception. For Weber:

> *An ideal type is formed by the one sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.* (Weber: 1949: 90)

So he insists that "historical research faces the task of determining in each case the extent to which this ideally constructed types approximates to or diverges from reality" (1949: 90). So, in the ungraspable complexity of individual phenomena and reality, ideal-type appears as a mentally constructed "measuring rod to help calculate the distance between a concrete phenomenon and the type" (Coser, 1977/2003: 182). This "measuring rod" guarantees the degree of scientific knowledge of Weberian interpretative science. Instead of the taxonomical categorization of Durkheim, the invention of the idealtype appears as Weber's most significant contribution to sociology.

Then as a conclusion, to find appropriate answers to our initial questions, it is necessary to underline the radical distinction between the two main parts of scientific knowledge: As it is seen clearly up to now, the history of sociology, as well as the history of philosophy, can be regarded as the historical process of widening and narrowing of the distance between these two ontological partitions. Of course, one can find its initial appearance in the Western scene (or science) in Descartes' well-known expression *cogito ergo sum* – which implies the fundamental object-subject dichotomy. This distance between subject and object (observer or observed) occurs widely in Durkheim's 19th-century positivistic views and narrow in the Weberian

construction of interpretative social science. This difference comes from the very peculiar way of their approaches to sociology, their assumptions on generating scientific knowledge, and the factor (passivity-activity) of human agency. To reach substantial scientific knowledge, Durkheim, through his methodology, tries to overcome this distance through pure objective scientific observation that uses binoculars (categories, types, species vs.) to empower the sight of the "gaze."

On the other hand, by mobilizing and taking in a more active vein both the actor and the investigator, Weber tries to reach scientific knowledge by coming very close to his subject matter and using only his eyes for his scientific "gaze." Weber has shown that only through this close, unmediated, direct, and intentional gaze of the "observer" can we see the complex, subjective, and active reality of individual social phenomena which resists any factual conception. And also, through the idealtypes, he has shown the possibility of understanding (*verstehen*), arranging, and scaling this complex subjective meaning. Of course, only by way of this refined and well-constructed systematic methodology did Weber come to the point of grasping "the spirit of capitalism in the Protestant ethic." But it should be noted that although Weber, in his sociology, seems to narrow the considerable distance between the observer and observed (subject and object), it is also essential to see that his analysis still retains the subject-object dichotomy. Considering this point, it should be argued that the best results in sociology could be achieved only by the new attempts to overcome the problem of the radical distinction between subject and object – which haunts all Western Philosophy.

2.2.1. Structuralism: A Turn from Cognitive to Linguistic

The conception of a singular subject of history becomes an obstacle to seeing the whole and complex reality of the 20th-century social reality. Communal explanations and the accompanying dualist subject-object dichotomy emerged in the context of a structure that unites both the subject and the object, especially in the social sciences during this time period. It was also an attempt to evaluate the idea of the subject in an ideological context and liberate it from all ideal factors that constitute it. It should be noted if the subversion of subject position means to a deep critique of historicism and humanism, this critique comes mainly from the French representatives of the structuralism and its

subsequent mode of post-structuralism. Structuralism can be seen as a response to the effects of a unique development in 20th-century philosophy, what comes to be known as the *linguistic turn*, as Rorty (1967/1992: 1-4) calls it. This implies a shift of interest in the social sciences from social structures (such as class and bureaucracy) to *linguistic structures (*can also be social structures that appeared in the form of language*)*. This shift also appears as a critical point because of its effects on the philosophy. Habermas proposes that a way out of this reductionism is possible by giving up the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness and replacing it with the paradigm of linguistic philosophy:

> *Subject-centered reason finds its criteria in standards of truth and success that govern the relationship of knowing and purposively acting subjects to the world of possible objects or states of affairs. By contrast, as soon as we conceive of knowledge as communicatively mediated, rationality is assessed in terms of the capacity of responsible participants in interaction to orient themselves in relation to validity claims geared to intersubjective recognition.* (Habermas, 1990: 314)

In this respect, as Larrain points (1994: 148) Freud's discovery, among other contributions, taught that "any self is not safe even in his own home," as well as other discoveries in the 20th century (for example, the disintegration of the atom) and that a fragmentation and division surround the magic of unity. This discovery of Freud would later be structured by Lacan and would function as a process of the socialization of the individual. When Lacan declares that "unconsciousness is structured like language" this was an essential adaptation of Freudian psychoanalysis to structuralism (Lacan, 1973/1998: 20). Lacan here takes unconsciousness as structural and gives way to a linguistic turn in human experience. What is essential for him is to take the subject as a construction through the the Freudian stages of consciousness/unconsciousness; Oedipus complex, castration within the subject. So his theory of mirror stage is a turning point for an imaginary relation between subject and its bodly existence. Still, fundamental transformation occurs when the subject enters the domain of language: the symbolic domain of society. The unconscious, which Freud considered as a deficiency or deviation, will turn into a research object of science in Lacan's structuralist scientific approach. From one point of view, the situation put forward by Lacan is the inclusion of the unconscious as a conflict and deviation in the story of human socialization. As Althusser states, "Lacan has shown that the transition from

(ultimately purely) biological existence to human existence (the human child) is achieved within the Law of Order, the law I shall call the Law of Culture, and that this Law of Order is confounded in its formal essence with the order of language" (Althusser, 1971: 193). By incorporating the unconscious in the story in this way, the order of language reveals the socialization process of man as a simultaneity of consciousness and unconsciousness.

So what is new in the structuralism is the notion of the death of human that feels its effect on the conception of the classical subject position assumed as knowing subjects, the subject as self-conscious and endowed with self-assurance. But in structuralist thought, it becomes more apparent that a meaning encompassing the human reality is absent. As can be seen clearly in the work of Saussure (1959), language differential system of sign, in which signifier and signified overlap with an arbitrary[21] relationship (Saussure, 1959: 68). And this relationship does not appear in diachronic sequences but in synchronic sequences. So a meaning as an arbitrary relationship of signifier and signified can only be grasped through an appeal to that sign system in linguistic *La Langue.* For Saussure, "It is not to be confused with human speech [langage], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty" (Saussure, 1959: 10). Effects of structuralism become more prominent in the mid-sixties. Levi Strauss applies this mode of theory to the kinship systems in anthropology and Jacques Lacan to Freudian psychoanalysis, and Louis Althusser to Marxism.

Thus, structuralism emerges as a presentation of historical time in which the lived time of human experience is explicitly excluded. It can also be read as the abandonment of subjectivities along with objectivity. As Ricoeur puts it, "Structures are new objects, theoretical objects, endowed with a demonstrable reality or existence, in the same way that one demonstrates the existence of a mathematical object." (Ricoeur, 2006: 159) Thus, human subjectivity was also treated as a mathematical object. But Ricoeur approaches this mathematical problem in Pomian's words and thinks that "language is

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[21] The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary (De Saussure, 1959: 68).

continually changing and at each instant in the midst of some anticipatory transition. ... In itself, language is not a work done (ergon) but an activity in the process of happening (energeia). Thus its true definition can only be genetic" (Pomian, 1984: 209, cited in Ricoeur, 2006:). If post-structuralists like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida insist on the death of man as the subject, this tradition is very cognate with the declaration of the "death of the god" of Nietzsche. A temporality from which the gods are expelled is therefore a historical time from which subjectivities are expelled. Therefore, to criticize the Pomianian chronosophy of historical time also entails criticizing the Saussurean linguistic sign system. This criticism finds its meaning in the works of poststructuralists.

2.2.2. Poststructuralism: Critique of Sign

Structuralism marked an essential break in the history of the social sciences. However, a significant opening to the structure and agent dilemma that I tried to put forward in terms of the methodology of social sciences above has emerged as an essential form of explanation in the philosophy of the 20th-century as an effort to reveal both the structural and particular features of a single social phenomenon. This new explanation and approach to social phenomena have been called poststructuralism. This new trend in philosophy, which emerged with Jacques Derrida's criticism of Saussure's structuralist language analysis, later became a structuralism critique whose examples we can see in all other fields. Along with the brand-new examples of structuralism to be applied to its counterparts in anthropology, Marxism, and sociology, a framework has emerged in which the structuralist contexts of modernism are re-read and which manifests itself as postmodernism.

Critchley begins his essay on Derrida with a meaningful introduction: "In the last twenty years or so, particularly in the English-speaking world, no philosopher has attracted more notoriety, controversy, and misunderstanding than Jacques Derrida" (Critchley, 1994: 441). The notoriety, controversy, and misunderstanding seem to stem from the very peculiar position of Derrida in the philosophical tradition of topological inside and outside tension. In this peculiar positioning, Derrida's preference is to think from the "hymen" on which inside appears as outside, or with his words "outside [is med kryss] the inside" (Derrida, 1976/1997: 44), and also from the perspective of

deconstruction. Sarup (1993: 33) insists that in order to understand Derrida's thought and strategy as deconstruction in an approximatelyprecise vein, it is compulsory to grasp the concept of "*sous rature*" a term usually translated in English as "under erasure." The concept *sous rature* implies an important initial position in a deconstruction reading. Derrida derives this notion from the texts of Heidegger, "who often crossed out the word Being and let both deletion and the word stand because the word was inadequate yet necessary" (Sarup, 1993: 33). This process of crossing out the word (Being in Heidegger, and let's say "is" in Derrida) is anconvenient metaphor for the understanding the whole project of Derrida. Spivak (1976/1997: xv) in her preface to *Of Grammatology*, defines a difference between what Heidegger puts under erasure and what Derrida does in this process of *sous rature*: "Being is the master word that Heidegger crosses out… But [Derrida's] word is "trace" (the French word carries strong implications of track, footprint, imprint) a word cannot be a master word, that present itself as the mark of an anterior presence, origin, master." According to this initial difference, Derrida intends to indicate the absence of a presence through the crossing out of trace. The mark of "an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience, rather than the intention of the Heidegger in showing the inarticulable or ungraspable presence of "Being." Therefore, the term trace gets a prominent position in Derridarian strategy to develop a critique of sign (reading of Saussure) which is especially developed in the work of Saussure.

At this moment, taking the term Derrida which is precisely "trace," it is very time to confront this term with Saussure's "sign." As Coward and Ellis (1977: 123) point out, Derrida's work appears as a consistent attempt to restore the materiality of sign, against the Sassurian conception of the sign, which for Derrida appears as a concept which "is in its roots and implications, and in all its aspects is metaphysical." The metaphysical aspects for Derrida appear clearly in the idealistic attempts to maintain "the rigorous distinction − an essential and juridical distinction − between the *signans* and the *signatum*, the equation of the *signatum* and the concept, inherently leaves open the possibility of thought a concept signified in and of itself, a concept simply present for thought, independent of a relationship to language, that is of a relationship to a system of signifiers." From this passage, it is crucial to understand that Derrida's main problem withthe sign is to diminish its critical radical potential. Sassurian sign does this by leaving open and acceding the possibility of "transcendental signified," which in and

of itself, in its essence, would refer to no signifier, would exceed the chain of signs, and would no longer function as a signifier" (Derrida, 1981/2004a: 19). In this respect, the distinction or equilibrium of the notions signified, and signifier in the sign allows metaphysical belief of a reserve or origin of meaning which will always be anterior or exterior to continuous productivity of signification" (Coward and Ellis, 1977: 123). Instead of forging this possibility of transcendental signified in the system of "sign", Derrida sees the sign as a structure of difference, in the structure of *sous rature* which "half of it is always 'not there' and the other half is always 'not that'" (Spivak, 1976/1997: xvii). Accordingly, he proposes the term "trace" and "gramme" through which the radical critical function can be retained. This means in a clear vein that when we encountered with a sign, meaning is not immediately clear to us. Signs refer to what is absent so that the structure of the sign is determined by the trace of that other which is forever absent (Sarup, 1993: 33). So Derrida finds profound metaphysical traces in the conception of sign, but another and not least important problem about Sassurian linguistics for Derrida is the problem of "phonocentrism" which is the inevitable consequence of what he calls "metaphysics of presence" as a symptom of an idealistic tradition of "logocentrism"[22] in the Western Philosophy. As an extension of this tradition Saussure "suggests that there is a privileged bond between the voice and meaning, between speech and meaningfulness and that there is a natural link between thought and voice, between meaning and sound in the conception of *parole*. For Derrida, this idealist nostalgic recourse in Saussurian conception of sign is both theological and inescapable:

> *Of course, it is not a question of "rejecting" these notions; they are necessary and, at least at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them. It is a question at first of demonstrating the systematic and historic solidarity of the concepts and gestures of thought that one often believes can be innocently separated. The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological. Perhaps it will never end. Its historical closure is, however, outlined.* (Derrida, 1976/1997: 13-14)

The critique of logocentrism and phonocentrism is a crucial point to grasp well the Derridian intention to maintain the grammatology, the deconstruction, and the

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[22] Derrida relates this with pohonocentrisim to logocentrisim, in the belief which is inherent in Western Metaphysics and philosophy that the first and the last thing is the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the self – presence of full self-consciousness (Derrida, 1976/1997: 13 -14; 1981/2004: 22). See also Sarup (1993: 36).

concepts which he applied through this intention which are *differance*, *arche-trace* and a*rche-writing*, an intention to which practiced as a reading and for the sake of writing. As he points out in response to one of Kristeva's questions, the main problem is the reduction of writing and textuality: "The reduction of writing – as the reduction of the signifier – was part and parcel of phonologism and logocentrism. We know how Saussure, according to the traditional operation that was also Plato's, Aristotle's, Rousseau's, Hegel's, Husserl's etc., excludes writing from the field of linguistics – from language and speech – as a phenomenon of exterior representation, both useless and dangerous …" (Derrida: 1981/2004a: 22).[23] So this operation implies that "philosophers write, but they do not think that philosophy ought to be writing" (Culler, 1983: 89). Philosophy, as a characteristic of it, always hopes to solve the problems, to show how things are, or to untangle a difficulty through putting an end to writing on a topic getting it right. But on the other hand, Derrida takes writing or *text* "as a starting point which always leads to more writing, and more, and still more" (Rorty, quoted in Culler, 1983: 90). Then the unprivileged position of writing and *text*, stems from the very fact that writing always includes and reveals a rhetorical lack of the philosophical discourse in reaching an end, or only gaining "a simple element be *present* in and of itself, referring only to itself" (Derrida 1981/2004a: 23). This omnipotent position of the *presence* is what Derrida calls the "metaphysics of presence" as Culler (1983:94) points, it shows itself, in "the notions of 'making clear,' 'grasping,' 'demonstrating,' 'revealing' and 'showing what the case' which are all invoke presence is." In light of these indicators, Derrida takes the term metaphysics as a "gesture of erasing the distinguishing mark of the other, a trace of the absent thanks to which the present is the present" (Descombes, 1980: 148). On the other hand, about the problem of "metaphysics of presence", Derrida insists that by the privileging *presence* and that which can be made *present*, the ontological tradition also has privileged the Same and thereby marginalized that which is other, *absent,* and cannot "appear." Therefore "metaphysics of presence" comes to the stage in the Derridian conception in a way that is a "kind of shorthand for naming the ontological xenophobia that has characterized Western philosophy and has undergirded the social and political xenophobias of the West" (James, 2005: 31). This xenophobia makes apparent itself

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[23] Morrover, speech is associated with the authority of the teacher while writing is seen by Plato as a threat to this authority because it allows the pupil to learn without the teacher's guidance (Norris Derrida, p. 31, quoted in Newman, 2001).

in Western philosophy as an attempt to domesticate Otherness, or in very task of philosophical thinking that is the mastering of the other by reducing its alterity in this closed domesticity. This could be possible by always referring to the Same in the sense that what Descombes calls erasing the other's trace (principle of identity, to transcendental signified, Logos). In opposition to this privileging notion of presence, to the "logocentrism," which is the devaluation of writing in philosophical writings and to the xenophobia that is the marginalization of the "other" before the Same, Derrida through main terms in his theory *trace* or *gram*, constantly refers to other, the difference and emphasizes "the systematic play of the differences, of the traces of differences and of the spacing through which elements are related to each other." So for Derrida the *differance* or the play of differences that in effect "supposes syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself" (Derrida, 1981/2004a: 23 - 24). Here Derrida connotes the activity or productivity by the "a" of *differance* which refers to the generative movement in the play of differences. This generative movement, this interweaving and this textile to Derrida, is the *text* produced only in the transformation of another text. Then there are only, everywhere differences and traces of traces. Or the *gram* (*gramme* as *differance*) which is most general concept of semiology which now for Derrida becomes what he calls "grammatology." He insists that the advantage of *gram* in grammatology is that in principle it neutralizes the pohonologistic propensity of the "sign", and in fact counterbalances it by liberating the entire scientific field of the history and systems of writing beyond the bounds of the West. In other words, grammatology's "fundamental condition is certainly the undoing *[sollicitation]* of logocentrism." So grammatology appears as a Derridian project in which he elaborates a science of writing but a science that would study the effects of this *differance* (Derrida, 1981/2004b: x). Doing this, Derrida also admits this project impossible character (which spreads all of his corpus) that the notion of science or -logy belongs to the logocentric discourse which the grammatology itself would try to put in question: "this condition of possibility turns into a condition of impossibility. … [Since] it [*differance*] risks to destroy the concept of science as well" (Derrida, 1976/1997: 74). As to this possibility-impossibility tension which is inherent in the conception of grammatology, so that for Derrida grammatology appears something like a demonstration movement which points the problem, but always seems inadequate in solving. In other words, it seems an attempt is to "shake" the authority

of the presence, the Same, the Logos, all of which denote the very privileged a stable positions of Western Philosophy. This attempt of demonstration in effect, shows that "whether in the order of spoken or written discourse no element can function as a sign without referring to another element [trace of element] which itself is not simply present" (Derrida, 1981/2004a: 23-24). So this is a kind of interweaving of the elements and their *traces* which Derrida metaphorically describes in the very "logic" of the *differance (I am as if hearing that Derrida calling "it is even not a logic")*. Like the term deconstruction, Derrida often prefers to describe *differance* with non-beings:

> *Differance by itself would be more "originary," but one would no longer be able to call it "origin" or "ground," those notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-theology, to the system functioning as the effacing of difference (Derrida, 1997(1976): 23). Of course, the positive sciences of signification can only describe the work and the fact of differance, the determined differences and the determined presences that they make possible. There cannot be a science of differance itself in its operation, as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence itself, that is to say of a certain nonorigin... Differance is therefore the formation of form. But it is on the other hand the being-imprinted of the imprint.* (Derrida: 1976/1997: 63)

In all these descriptions about the "logic" of *differance* one initial position appears clearly that, for Derrida, *differance* is the first moment that nothing precedes it and also very logic of it subverts the privilege of "the first moment." And can be seen as a strategic position for Derrida in order to show the non-origin of the the presence which is the origin of authority as a non-origin. Since for him, if nothing precedes *differance* then there could be no subject who is agent, author and master of *differance*. Then subjectivity and objectivity can be regarded as an effect of *differance*, an effect inscribed in a system of differance. And then, the "a" of *differance* also recalls that spacing or tracing is temporization, the detour and postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation are always *deffered*whether it is phonetic or textual (Derrida, 1981/2004a: 25). This deferment or postponement provides us with only the *text*, or the textual element which functions, signifies and takes on meaning only by referring do another past or future element in an economy of traces, or in other words by the virtue of this deferment nothing can be outside from the text. Thus if there is nothing outside the text, then for Derrida, there should be nothing but reading, as a tracing in an "economy of traces."

2.2.3. Then What is Deconstruction(s)?

When asked the same question, Critchley (1994: 441) points that it is possibly much easier to give a negative response to this question, what is not deconstruction? This version seems to be easy that in "Letter to a Japanese Friend" makes a long list as to what deconstruction is not. First, Derrida insists that it is not negative; but at the same time it is not to say that it is positive. And it is neither an analysis nor a critique or a method. Furthermore, deconstruction is not an act produced and commanded by a subject, nor an operation that sets to work on a text or an institution. Derrida concludes his letter by writing that "what deconstruction is not? But everything! What is deconstruction? But nothing!" Critchley concludes in 1994 that "it deconstructs itself wherever something takes places." But as Derrida himself points very clearly that;

> *difficulty of defining and, therefore also of translating the word "deconstruction" stems from the fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all the lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations, which seem at one moment to lend themselves to this definition or to that translation, are also deconstructed or deconstructible, directly or otherwise, etc.* (Derrida, 1985: 4)

On the other hand, in his more recent text, Critchley (2008: 1) takes the position of more concrete definitions of deconstruction. He insists that deconstruction "is a praxis; deconstructions (Derrida always preferred the plural) are *praxoi,* a praxis of reading." And also, Critchley assumes Derrida as a supreme reader. Also, elsewhere, Critchley puts Derrida as a teacher. Then deconstruction, this time is a pedagogy (Critchley: 2008: 4). But precisely a pedagogy in which Derrida, in opposition to Plato, sends his pupils to the text. So, for Derrida, the initial task is to read the *text. A*s a unique reader, Derrida's reading appears as deconstruction, which can be said that deconstruction is always the deconstruction of a *text.* This is not to say that it is a strategy or methodology, but it seems clear today that it is foremost a strategy in reading practice. A reading in which Derrida applies two distinct strategies at the same time which distinguishes deconstruction as a textual practice which is double reading. Firstly, a reading repeats "the dominant interpretation", and secondly, within this repetition, leaving the order of commentary and opening a text up to the, what Derrida calls, blind spots within the dominant interpretation. A "blind" spot means that a word which "author" employs but whose logic is veiled to him/her so that it can be "ambiguous concepts in the texts he was reading, such as 'supplement' in Rousseau, 'pharmakon'

in Plato, and 'Geist' in Heidegger, where each of these terms possesses a double or multiple range of meaning, a *polysemy*, that simply cannot be contained by the text's intended meaning" (Critchley, 1994: 443).

Also, Newman (2001: 2) argues that deconstruction can be outlined as a way of reading texts – philosophical texts. A reading intends to make these texts question themselves, forcing them to take account of their own contradictions and exposing the antagonisms they have ignored or repressed. Culler argues that "the practitioner of deconstruction works within the terms of the system but to breach it." Here Newman makes a caution that this does not entail taking a side of another system or philosophical site. Derrida does not "question one kind of philosophy from the standpoint of another, more complete, less contradictory system." For Derrida, it seems that "there is no essential place of resistance outside the system" through what Critchley calls a parasitic reading, Derrida "works within the discourse of Western philosophy, looking for hidden antagonisms that jeopardize it" (Newman, 2001: 3).

For Critchley, this issue appears somewhat as a paradox that haunts Derrida's and all deconstructive discourse. Since "Derridian deconstruction attempts to situate 'a non-site, or a non-philosophical site, from which to question philosophy' and it seeks a place of exteriority, alterity or marginality irreducible to philosophy. In question is another to the philosophy that has never been and cannot become philosophy's other, but another within which philosophy becomes inscribed" (Critchley, 1994: 448). This implies for Critchley that there is a belonging problem in Derridian deconstruction. A problem of closure that indicates the ambiguity of being at the same time belonged and non-belonged. So closure for Critchley is the retaining double refusal of remaining within the limit of the tradition and of the possibility of transgressing that limit within philosophical language. Critchley prefers to describe this peculiar and hard position in deconstruction with the example of "hinge."

What is my preference for the example of "hymen" is an undecidable position of being both inside and outside. On which inside becomes outside in an aporetic vein: "outside (is med kyrss) inside." But how can this be possible? Derrida never seems to seek an answer to such a question, for it would be meant to privilege possible upon the impossible, to retain the hierarchical binaries, the ruins of authority. As Stirner points,

it would be resistance through the terminology of authority (or sovereign). However, Derrida's deconstruction aim can be seen as to "open a reading by locating a moment of alterity within the text" (Crithcley, 1994: 447). Then crossed "is" implies this impossibility but all the others (inside and outside as an effect of *differance*) implies distinct possibilities, on the other hand, all of the *text* shows the arbitrariness of the discourse and self-reference of authority by making two polarities close to each other (as a play of spacing). As an example of peculiar textual anarchism (Newman, 2001: 19), the task of Derridian deconstruction is not to replace one term with another but to displace both of them. This is the point that deconstruction gains all its (non-critical, non-analytical, non-operational) but deconstructive and anarchist reading strategy.

2.3. Taking Simmelian Sociology as an Example of Poststructural Sociology

The main feature that makes it possible for us to place Georg Simmel in a privileged place in Social Theory is that his thought is always in pursuit of in-between positions, just like in the post-structuralist examples. Contrary to an analysis that produces dualities, its case derives instead from the belief that dualities are multiple images of a single object: *una eademque res, sed duo bus modis expressa*[24](Simmel, 1971: 38). His life is also a reflection of this in-between situation. As Lewis Coser (1977/2003: 194) puts it "Simmel was born on March 1, 1858, in the very heart of Berlin, at the corner of the intersection of *Leipzigerstrasse* and *Friedrichstrasse*, having lived at the intersection[25] of many movements throughout his life, deeply moved by the opposing currents of intellectual life and the diversity of moral directions finds symbolic meaning for a person who has been affected in such a way. Simmel is a modern city person who has nothing to do with traditional folk culture. He received his doctorate in philosophy in 1881 (his thesis was entitled *The Nature of Matter According to Kant's Physical Monadology*). Simmel was familiar with a vast field of knowledge from history to philosophy and psychology to the social sciences. He worked for many years at the University of Berlin, where he was appointed a *Privatdozent*in 1885. He lectured on thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Charles Darwin and

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[24] One and the same thing, but expressed in two modes.

[25] According to Coser, this corner where two streets intersect corresponds to Times Square in New York (Coser, 1977/2003: 194).

Fredrich Nietzsche (Coser, 1977/2003: 195). He was a famous teacher, which was true for students and the elites of Berlin's cultural life. His lectures attracted attention from many different circles. Another context that can be transferred from Simmel's life is his academic life. His academic life, which started in 1885, continued as a kind of lecturer until he was appointed a chair as *Ausserordentlicher* Professor in 1901.

In this respect, when evaluated in terms of his tastes and career, he personally experienced the Stranger, a social type he created, in his life. This is also true in his sociological perspective. As generally suggested, Simmel was an atypical sociological theorist (Frisby, 1981; Ritzer, 2008). The first reason for this is that while the ideas of Marx and Weber were not very popular in American sociology, those of Simmel laid the foundations of a school known as the Chicago School (Ritzer, 2008: 31). The other is the analysis level of Simmel's Sociology. To use Nispet's preferred metaphor, that observation level is Simmel's approach "microscopic" (Nisbet, 1966: 97). However, this microscopic level does not mean that he did not analyze larger structures and historical sections in his theory. The micro-relationships he analyzes work as the DNA of society for him to analyze broader social relations, structures, and historical totalities.

2.3.1. Simmel's Formal Sociology

Simmel preferred to create the forms of social life by abstracting from concrete reality and the content that creates this reality. He preferred to enact these forms on a theater stage with relationality, which he called "interaction." Social statics and social dynamics, the two layers of Comte's sociology, are tried to be combined in Simmel's sociology. On the other hand, the Weberian context of social action is also treated as forms of social interaction. In this respect, his formal sociology does not from the start rely on positivist objective laws or human subjectivity as historical and particular. As understood by Simmel, sociology does not attempt to use the subject of economics, ethics, psychology, or history but instead focuses[26] on the forms of interaction that underlie it all. Simmel's formal sociology is more than simply an effort to classify

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[26] Coser gives the example, as that of a warfare and a marriage, which one can find same forms of conflict: "To be sure, the student of warfare and the student of marriage investigate qualitatively different subject matters, yet the sociologist can discern essentially similar interactive forms in martial conflict and in marital conflict" (Coser: 1977/2003: 179).

forms of behavior. His treatments of such groups as "the dyad and the triad and of such social bonds as friendship, obedience, and loyalty should be seen as a search for the molecular elements of society" (Nisbet: 1966: 97). These molecular elements, in fact, express the last social entities that can be reached, such as the prime factors in every number, in a mathematical expression. And Simmel progresses by revealing these forms in every social phenomenon, structure and particularity, which appear different as concrete reality from the outside, from their concrete contents.

> *I designate as the content, as the material, as it were, of sociation. In themselves, these materials with which life is filled, the motivations by which it is propelled, are not social. Strictly speaking, neither hunger nor love, neither work nor religiosity, neither technology nor the functions and results of intelligence, are social. They are factors in sociation only when they transform the mere aggregation of isolated individuals into specific forms of being with and for one another forms that are subsumed under the general concept of interaction. Sociation thus is the form (realized in innumerable, different ways) in which individuals grow together into units that satisfy their interests. These interests, whether they are sensuous or ideal, momentary or lasting, conscious or unconscious, causal or teleological, form the basis of human societies.* (Simmel, 1950: 41)

Formal Sociology is not the sociology of facts, nor does it deal with historical particularities. It is not concerned with Descartes' or Kant's subject but with the much more mobile "interaction." In this respect, although structures emerge in specific contexts in Simmel's sociology, they remain essential components of human interaction (in mathematical terms). In this context, Simmel's formal thought closely relates to Kant and Dilthey. However, Simmel finds the "individual" conceptualization in the Diltheyan interaction approach problematic. It also carries Kant's analysis of the incompatibility between man and nature into a context between man and history[27] (Simmel, 1977: X). In P*roblems of Philosophy of History* (1892), understanding society through forms, Simmel defends the view that man is a subjectivity that produces the cognitive world with his actions. This subjectivity is not concerned with itself but with the forms that emerge in social interaction. Thus, historical knowledge will be possible not as a simple reflection of external reality but as a form of human experience (Swingewood, 1991: 135). Thus, Simmel emphasizes that form is inherent and can never be deduced from structure or subjectivities. Since it is not concerned

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[27] This is the most deconstructive moment in the construction of Simmelian sociological theory. Because it is the presentation of timelessness and the orientation of *differance* to another difference, which Derrida put forward with the concept of difference, through forms.

with reconciling the concreteness of the subject with the abstractness of the structure or translating one to the other, the concept of time in Simmel's theory gets closer to the concept of modern time. This conception of modern time is discussed in *The Philosophy of Money* through the radical transformation of money into forms of social interaction. The way he treats money is a blueprint for what exactly we should understand from the interaction forms that emeralds emerge for sociation. The timelessness of money reflects as Kracauer has stated, "none of social fragments and vignettes of Simmel, "live in historical time, rather each is transposed into eternity, that is, into the sole form of existence in which it can exist as pure essentiality and can be contemporary with us at any time" (quoted in Frisby, 1986: 41). The timelessness and eternity of forms enable his theory to be positioned free from the handicaps of "historical time." This situation has two consequences in terms of micro and macro in Simmel's works. Whenever Simmel presents forms in various social interaction environments, they are presented to the reader in an aesthetic and give a sense of literary work. This situation emerges more prominently in social types, which are Simmel's forms representing the individual. It is also possible to perceive them as the heroes of the novel. The macro consequence of historical timelessness is that Simmel's interest never led directly to analyzing major social transformations and historical ruptures in the Marxist, Weberian, or Durkheimian sense of the word.

2.3.2. Social Types

For Simmel, "the type is found in the unique, the principled in the accidental, the essence and meaning of things in the superficial and temporary" (Frisby, 1986: 46). Images decomposed into fragments indeed contain the key that will lead to the whole of society. In this sense, society turns into a network of interactions between individuals. In his article *How Is Society Possible?* (1908)*,* Simmel emphasizes that "each member is absorbed in the feeling and knowledge of being in numerous, specific relationships and determining and being determined by others" and examines in depth the nature of these forms of interaction with each other (Simmel, 1908/1971: 7). The phenomenon of sociation holds the individual in a dual position: the individual is included in sociation and at the same time finds himself in opposition to it; in other words, it is both a bond within sociation and an autonomous, organic whole in its own

right. Simmel transcends the individual-society opposition in social theory with the following sentences:

> The "within" and the "without" between individual and society are not two unrelated definitions but define together the fully homogeneous position of man as a social animal. His existence, if we. analyze its contents, is not only partly social and partly individual, but also belongs to the fundamental, decisive, and irreducible category of a unity which we cannot designate other than as the synthesis or simultaneity of two logically contradictory characterizations of man. (…) Society consists not only of beings that are partially non-sociated, as we saw earlier, but also of beings which, on the one hand, feel themselves to be complete social entities and, on the other hand-and without thereby changing their content at all, complete personal entities. (Simmel, 1908/1971: 17-18)

According to Simmel, "society exists where a number of individuals enter into interaction" (Simmel, 1908/1971: 23). Underlying Simmel's lack of emphasis on collectivities as the representation of harmony and unity lies in his understanding of the individual as something sufficiently crowded in its formal structure. For Simmel, the social sphere is nothing but a chain of interactions in which social entities and individual selves are intertwined, always taking place with certain motives or for specific purposes, causing people to live together, to act for them, with them, and against them, establishing a connection between themselves and others. is nothing. Simmel emphasizes this model in his essay on Exchange, which he sees as one of the types of social interaction. When making a comparison between exchange and interaction, "exchange takes place not for the sake of an object previously possessed by another person, but rather for the sake of one's own feeling about an object, a feeling which the other previously did not possess" (Simmel, 1907/1971 43-44). Exchange is not receiving what is not in oneself, it desires what is not in another. In this sense, interaction in human relations generally creates forms that can be seen as an exchange. The mundane events of everyday life come and go in a "constant alternation of profit and loss" of life experience waning and increasing. This process of interaction is mentalized in exchange. Simmel constructs certain social types from such interaction types. These social types provide essential findings that will embody Simmel's approach to modernity and analysis of sociation and interaction.

The stranger (1908), one of Simmel's most critical social types, is a synthesis of the concepts of spatial and social distance. In Simmel's words, "the stranger is not counted here in the familiar sense of the term, not like a traveler who comes today and goes

tomorrow, but like a man who comes today and stays tomorrow" (Simmel, 1908/1971: 143). The Stranger is crippled by the fact that he does not belong to the social context he is in and has not been a part of it from the beginning, and has qualities that could never be. In this type of interaction, distance indicates that what is near is far and is an absolute element of the group itself; belonging to the group corresponds to an element that "contains both being outside it and confronting it" (Simmel, 1908/1971: 146). The foreigner, who is not involved in the economic and political organizations entrenched in the society, has a unique mobility ability. This mobility allows the stranger to come into contact with every element in society as the place and time comes, but none of them are organically connected by established ties of kinship or other local ties. This creates the objectivity of the stranger; Since it is not included in clusters and biased positions within the group, it can confront all these with an open and objective attitude. According to Simmel, what makes the relationship with the stranger unique is the mutual tension between closeness and distance.

The structure of the Stranger, which breaks the duality of proximity and distance, turns into a corruption of inside and outside for the Adventurer (1911). Simmel's lines describing this situation of the Adventurer contain a Derridian style: "While it falls outside the context of life, it falls, with this same movement, as it were, back into that context again, as will become clear later; it is a foreign body in our existence which is yet connected with the center; the outside, if only by a long and unfamiliar detour, is formally an aspect of the inside" (Simmel, 1911/1971: 188). For Simmel, the other miser and spendthrift social types, which have an important symbolic feature in social interaction, refers to two different forms of possession of money and objects. Miserly happiness corresponds only to the possession of money and not to be interested in the pleasure of things that can be obtained with money. For the miser, the feeling of power he will get because he has money is more valuable than the feeling he can get by mastering things. The characteristic of the miser is to be satisfied with the full possession of the possibilities, but not to take steps to realize that possibility. Having money and spending it on the desired object is the main difference between the stingy and the wasteful. Money is just as important to the spendthrift person as it is to the miser, but this importance is reinforced by spending. In this sense, miser and spendthrift represent two different types in money economy. Simmel reinforces these social types with examples from historical and different contexts and tries to open the

door to the emergence of savable money that eventually emerged in the modern money economy.

Thus, while Simmel considers a social network in which forms interact, these forms include both forms of interaction and forms in which individuals are involved in social interaction. Social types are individual forms, but this form is both attributed to them by society and is also specialized by their response to this attribution. Thus, the social type is not a collective representation but a form that is redefined and distorted every time the individual interacts. For this reason, the primary context, which can be considered as the common point of all social types of Simmel, is intertwined content such as distance in proximity, inside and outside. More precisely, it is the arbitrariness of the content in the forms. Although not a social type, a ruin is also within Simmel's interest as a spatial and temporal form. Simmel (1911/1958: 384) defines ruin as "it is the site of life from which life has departed." "The ruin creates the present form of a past life, not according to contents and remnants of that life but according to its past as such" (Simmel, 1911/1958: 385). This is where the magic in anything old comes from, according to Simmel. In his words, "with this piece which we are holding in our hand we command in spirit the entire span of time since its incept the past with its destinies and transformations has been gathered into this instant of an aesthetically perceptible present" (Simmel, 1911 /1958: 385). Thus, ruin is also a a form of past in the present.

2.3.3. Simmel's Modernity

Georg Simmel's approach to modernity is immune from the very beginning notions such as rupture, difference, change, process and progress, which are characteristic of modernist historical thought. The methodological preferences that appear in the details of his sociology, and especially the subtleties of his philosophy of history, cause him to place what he calls modern culture within the history of all cultural creations of man. Georg Simmel has approached much more closely than his contemporary sociologists to expressing and analyzing the ways of experiencing the 'new' and 'modern' life. This is partly because, as Frisby (Frisby, 1986: 37) emphasizes, his strong aesthetic interest in modernity brings him closer to Baudelaire's interpretation

of modernity and, more importantly, his ability to present the modern experience[28]. Another reason is that, as Berman (Berman, 1982: 17) states, his thought was shaped in modern life enough to analyze modernism from within modernity. For Baudelaire, who sees modernity as both the quality of existing life and a new goal of artistic enterprise, the 'painter of modern life' is identical to the new (Frisby, 1986: 39). Simmel, too, does not look at modernity from within his traditional world, causing him to see the novelty of the present through changing forms from the very beginning, but also to include in his thought the bewilderment at the transience of this present, which gives modernity its fundamental character. In this sense, his work, *The Metropolis and Mental Life*, reveals the transforming experience of man in the face of modern life as a surprise in the face of the new and a reaction of man's inner world to it. Baudelaire's (1893/2010: 54) depictions of "temporary, elusive and contingent" that he uses to define modernity embody himself in flaneur: someone who has just recovered from a recent illness, who tries to keep in his memory everything he sees among the city's ubiquitous authorities, whose curiosity has become an irresistible passion. The situation of human experience in the face of the multitude of modern images of the metropolis is similarly presented by Simmel. The experience of modernity, wildly stimulated by curiosity and emphasis on the present and the ephemeral, has a childlike quality. In this sense, Simmel's approach to modernity goes beyond the analysis of his contemporary Max Weber and approaches Baudelaire's understanding of modernity. Because Simmel's theory of modernity largely includes an analysis of the individual forms of human experience that are formed in modern life, which modern life makes this forms eternal (Frisby, 1986: 60). Insofar as this is a recurring human story on a microscopic level, it does not involve a systematic or chronological analysis of historical significance. Since it does not refer to the communal existence of the human in the collectivity and is not handled in the context of an order, it includes the human in the conflict analysis in the modern sense from the very beginning.

Simmel's analysis of modernity has been evaluated by many, such as Lewis Coser (1977/2003: 189), under the title of "Simmel's Ambivalent view of Modernity" The fact that form and content, which are the main characters of his thought, are handled in a singular style and in an animated way, facilitated his analysis of the instant and

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[28] However, we should not forget that the ability of presenting not only the modern experience but also the human experience in socialization and the predisposition of his thought cause this.

temporary images of what he calls modern culture. The trend of modern history appears to Simmel as a progressive emancipation of the individual from the shackles of private ties and personal dependencies, despite the growing suppression of the cultural products of one's own creation. In this context, his biggest attempt to compare with the social life before and after modernity emerges as the change of the individual's position against the culture he has created. However, for Simmel, the relationship between the individual and culture always exists in the form of a conflict. What he calls conflict is nothing new. Because, according to him, "whenever life progresses beyond the animal level to that of the spirit, and spirit progresses to the level of culture, an internal contradiction appears" (Simmel, 1971: 375). What is new in modernity is that the resistance of man to the pressure of culture has increased. Simmel attributes this situation to the fact that the number of social interaction environments that the individual is simultaneously connected to has increased and that none of them can completely suppress his personality as in the traditional world (Coser, 1977/2003: 189).

The most important difference that both defines and makes possible Simmel's theory of modernity is the aesthetic dimension. The aesthetic perspective that Simmel most frequently resorts to prioritizes the mode of social experience that is "the most superficial and insignificant in appearance" and "hidden in the details." This is because, unlike philosophy's concern with the unity of existence, Simmel always chooses a single and narrowly defined issue and tends towards the method of art. According to him, it is possible to establish a relationship between the details and superficiality of life and its deepest and fundamental movements. Fragments of social life can better grasp the unity in line with this understanding. For this reason, unlike other sociologists of his time, Simmel focuses on social fragments, avoiding substantialization and reification of society, instead of research objects related to the whole such as 'social structure', 'social system' or 'social institution'. The starting point is a social vision where "everything interacts with each other." This point of departure led Simmel to "the ever-moving relations between every point on the earth and all other forces", and this approach also built his understanding of modernity. The disintegration of social life in the sum of interactions between its fragments is the basic dynamic that builds modern mental life. In that case, the intra-Simmel society and the sociology that examines it should not be a reified society, but primarily the social

interaction, the forms of sociation and accordingly the phenomenological structure of the society (Frisby, 1986: 19).

2.3.4. Constructing Modernity as De(con)struction of Experience

When questioned about the time modernity began, it will be seen that the time chosen for the beginning differs in social, historical and individual meanings. Wagner (1994: 3) argues that, for example, in the context of urbanization, industrialization and democratization of political processes, all social processes specific to modernity "go back a long time", that "they did not always occur at the same time." Regarding the development of capitalism, there are many reasons to think that the modern world system emerged as a "crisis of feudalism" in the 16th century, as Wallerstein has shown (Wallerstein, 1987: 318). However, what begins in each of these contexts remains limited to the social or historical totality on which our perspective focuses. When attempting to explain all these social and historical totalities by a separate temporality, the distinctions emerge over capitalist and non-capitalist, democratic and undemocratic, and ultimately modern or traditional distinctions. However, as Berman emphasizes (1982: 17), if modernity started when Rousseau first used the concept of "modernist" as we understand it today, then modernity will have another story that can be told with an encounter represented by this beginning. On a more individual level, this story begins with associating modern life with a change in the context of human experience.

The fact that Rousseau called the daily life of the society he lived in as "le tourbillon social" and thought that it was on the edge of a cliff[29] makes it possible for a story to be started by him to be called the story of the individual in the *tourbillon* in question. Berman thinks that part of Rousseau's indulgence in this thought stemmed from his own complicated life and partly from his "deep sensitivity to the social conditions that are about to shape the lives of millions of people" (Berman, 1982: 17). Moreover, we can see how Rousseau's novel *Julie or New Heloise*,[30] written by Rousseau, who is in

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[29] Considering that the year he died was just before the French Revolution, it is obvious how strong this prediction was.

[30] Rousseau remains undecided about the novel. As Philip Stewart wrote in the Introduction of the novel, "a first version in four parts was finished by late 1757 and the final sixpart version in late 1758; meanwhile, Rousseau wrote the Letter to M. d'Alembert. His title all along was Julie, to which he later

pursuit of the individual time experience, actually evokes Georg Simmel's Metropolis and Mental Life in the 20th century. Making an exploration move from the countryside to the city, St. The lines that Preux talks about his experiences when he encounters Rousseau's "le tourbillon social" to his lover Julie, who he left behind, tells the modern experience in the temporality of human experience. However, this narrative is conveyed not as a great historical transformation but as a rupture within the individual: "for everyone puts himself constantly in contradiction with himself, without it occurring to anyone to find this wrong" (Rousseau: 1761/1997: 192). Surprise and conflict between the lines of St. Preux's letter are: "I am beginning to experience the intoxication into which this restless and tumultuous life plunges those who lead it, and I am falling into a dizziness like that felt by a man before whose eyes a plethora of objects are rapidly passed" (Rousseau: 1761/1997: 209). These lines are in harmony with the ideas presented by Simmel in *The Metropolis and Mental Life*. The past century and a half have not changed anything in terms of the effect of the context, which Simmel calls "objective culture", on people. For Simmel, "an inquiry into the inner meaning of specifically modern life and its products, into the soul of the cultural body, so to speak, must seek to solve the equation which structures like the metropolis set up between the individual and the super-individual contents of life" (Simmel, 1950: 409). Because the basis of the metropolitan type of individuality is in the "intensification of nervous stimulation" (Simmel, 1950: 410). However, Simmel treats man as a creature that distinguishes differences, and he thinks that the human mind is momentarily stimulated by the difference between before and after impressions.[31] According to Simmel, the possibilities of following this difference in the metropolis, "the rapid crowding of changing images, the sharp discontinuity in the grasp of a single glance, and the unexpectedness of onrushing impressions," are gone. When looked at carefully, it will be seen that these evaluations of the metropolis, which is the representation of modern culture, are precisely the same as the image of the city that St. Preux told in the letter he wrote to his lover Julie.

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added "ou la moderne Héloïse, and only as the typesetting was under way in early 1760 did he change this to "Julie ou la nouvelle Héloïse" (Stewart, 1997: xii).

[31] This situation reveals that in Simmelian sociology, human experience should also be perceived as the interaction of human mentality with the outside world. When this context is taken a little further, we can also conclude that impressions, which are the basis of Simmel's memories, are formed instantly and a collectivity is not required.

Associating this situation with a new phase that modernity has reached has formed an essential theme of 20th-century sociology. The ideas of Comte, who is an attempt to save human sociality in a conservative way, or of Durkheim, who sees it as a collective development, also show themselves in Giddens' interpretation of modernity. Experience is something that is lost, and this is a transformation that must be evaluated in terms of time and space in modern society. This imposition of time as a global reality, as a self-imposed claim of singularity and homogeneity, constitutes a large part of the modernity narrative. For example, the claim that this is so is put forward in his book *Consequences of Modernity*. Here, Giddens (1991), while constructing a relationship between modernity and the experience of time, emphasizes that the relationship of time with space is a development that has significant consequences and claims that the separation of the two categories that mutually define each other results in the hollowing out of both.

> *The "emptying of time" is in large part the precondition for the "emptying of space" and thus has causal priority over it. For, as I shall argue below, coordination across time is the basis of the control of space. The development of "empty space" may be understood in terms of the separation of space from place. It is important to stress the distinction between these two notions, because they are often used as more or less synonymous with one another. "Place" is best conceptualized by means of the idea of locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically.* (Giddens, 1991: 18)

While Giddens emphasizes that the previous forms of experience of space and time have changed as a result of the divergence of space and time, another empty situation emerges as human experience. The process of emptying time and space, which diverges from each other as it becomes universal, leaves itself to the destruction of human experience. At the beginning of the 20th century, Benjamin, like Giddens, thinks that the problem of experience in the modern world is an important feature that distinguishes it from other ages: "experience has fallen in value. And it looks as if it is continuing to fall into bottomlessness" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 83-84). But Benjamin doesn't see it as a result of modern life or anything else, which he sees as a major transformation. However, as we can derive from the example he gave, at least he evaluates it in terms of a human (fragile human body) involved in a great disaster (First World War):

Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent-not richer, but poorer in communicable experience? What ten years later was poured out in the flood of war books was anything but experience that goes from mouth to mouth. And there was nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to school on a horse-drawn streetcar now stood under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body. (Benjamin: 1968/2007: 84)

Agamben (1978/1993) begins his essay on the destruction of experience by quoting this passage from Benjamin. Rather than saying "experience has fallen in value" more assertively than Benjamin, he will express the current modern experience as "destruction of experience": "modern man has been deprived of his biography, his experience has likewise been expropriated" (Agamben: 1978/ 1993: 13). Because, according to him, the "untransferability of experience" as the reality that Benjamin expresses in the face of a disaster today has turned into unlivable in a day in modern urban life for Agamben. Just like Simmel, Agamben gives an example from a day of man in the metropolis: "we know that the destruction of experience no longer necessitates a catastrophe, and that humdrum daily life in any city will suffice" (Agamben: 1978/1993: 13).

To present modernity as a new time experience, but while doing this, to express this time experience as something that has always been experienced in every micro-human experience throughout human cultural history forms the basis of Simmelian thought. As I have stated in this way, the definition of modernity in Simmel's mind is plural both spatially and temporally. With the context of continuous conflict, it contains, it includes a conflict and bewilderment in every situation where people are involved in a cultural production, not today. In this context, Simmel's sociological theory adds a duality in the form of tradition and modernity to the story from the very beginning and transforms it from a state of surprise in the macro sense to the forms of a rupture at the micro level in social life. Simmel, in *The Metropolis and Mental Life* captures this micro level in man's conflict with the modern metropolis. The inner world of the individual becomes a reaction as mental life, the outermost periphery of this world, and carries human reflexivity to the next moment of cultural surprise. In this context,

Simmel (1903/1971: xx) states that the most important result of the text's basic "thinking task" is to make a sound that goes deep into the soul from every point on the surface of existence. Thus, all of life's most mundane externalities can ultimately be linked to final decisions about the meaning and style of life. This phrase evokes the lines in which Benjamin (1968/1971: xx) addresses the "chronologist" in the third of the theses on History. No event can be considered lost to history, but only liberated humanity can fully claim its past. In other words, only liberated humanity will attain happiness, and "*a citation a l'ordre du jour*" will reach the judgment day of a universal present. However, for this situation, it will be necessary to be on the "Day of Judgment." In the chronological expression of modern historical time or the time that feeds it, Benjamin[32] thinks, like Simmel, that the way to reach human experience is "to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger." According to him, "historical materialism wishes to retain that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a moment of danger" (Benjamin, 2007: 255). The difference between them is only in terms of the temporality and universality of this danger. This time is cairological time as emphasized by the Stoics.

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[32] This relationship between Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin is mentioned in the letters of Adorno and Benjamin. In a letter dated 10 November 1938, Adorno would say "passage about the relationship between seeing and hearing in the city, which not entirely by accident also employs a quotation from Simmel ... all of this makes me rather uncomfortable" (Benjamin, Adorno, 2003: 282). In response to this, Benjamin wrote Adorno in a letter dated 23 February 1939, "you cast a disparaging glance at Simmel - is it not time he was recognized as one of the forefathers of cultural bolshevism?" (Benjamin, Adorno, 2003: 311).

CHAPTER III

**THE DEBATE OF CONTINUITY AND FINITUDE FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE HISTORICAL TIME IN THE TURKISH
MODERNIZATION NARRATION: NİYAZİ BERKES, SABRİ ÜLGENER
AND AHMET HAMDİ TANPINAR**

The primary purpose of this chapter is to model the discussion of continuity and
rupture, which underlies the idea of social transformation and change and constitutes
an essential area of debate in Turkish Sociology through Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar,
Niyazi Berkes, and Sabri Ülgener. The modernization efforts, based on the pre-
Tanzimat reform discussions and gained momentum with the Tanzimat Edict,
transformed a social, political and cultural structure, like the Ottoman Empire, with a
seven-century life stage. This transformation, which has significant political and social
meanings and consequences, has been handled in various ways, especially by the
intellectuals born at the beginning of the 20th century and who directly experienced
the social implications of this transformation. It has always been a matter of great
debate to reveal the necessity of this transformation, which is a social transformation
evaluated under a broad umbrella called Turkish modernization, and to what extent it
has taken place. The main themes of this discussion have consistently emerged as two
oppositions, in line with themes such as rupture and continuity, death and life, and
mourning and melancholy. In the following pages, this field of discussion will be
examined through three names who tried to theorize a problem that started in the
middle of the 19th-century and could only be talked about in the 20th-century. However,
the content of rupture and differentiation, an essential theme of Turkish Sociology,
which first emerged as a model of Turkish modernization, and the debate that occurred
in the context of a continuity that overshadows them should be well understood.

Today, this area of discussion is called Turkish modernization.[33] What we mean by
modernization in the context of sociology or what we leave out also reveals the sides

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[33] The definition of Turkish modernization can also be called Ottoman modernization or Turkish-
Ottoman modernization, especially when looking at the curricula in sociology departments. However,

of this debate. Regarding the basic positions here, the parties differ mainly in expressing this social transformation as a break that separates the past and the present (and therefore the future) or as a continuum where we can think of the past together with the present. These two approaches, which emerged roughly, actually have a counterpart in terms of the notions of history and progress and the nature of the sociological imagination.In general, modernization, as a concept pointing to the social, cultural, political, and economic changes that took place in Western Europe since the 16th century, has meant a break and differentiation in the hands of all thinkers and theories using this concept (Bhambra, 2007: 2).[34] In this sense, it is evident that the sociological imagination has viewed the modernization process, which corresponds to a great social transformation and the vision of modernity both as a temporal break and a radical difference in terms of social organization.

On the other hand, Şerif Mardin (2013: 25) argues that "modernization is a process in which societies are increasingly differentiated and centralized at the same time" while conceptually addressing Turkish modernization. According to him, "this process, which started with the collapse of feudalism in western Europe, includes elements such as the development of the bourgeoisie, industrialization, and the spread of political rights to larger sections of the population" (Mardin, 2013: 26). Mardin also emphasizes that during this development, some functions of the society were concentrated in the center. Some of them were separated from each other with the emergence of new groups. According to him, Ottoman social transformation and these disconnections are filled with the emergence of new structures that Mardin gives as examples of citizenship awareness and national culture. Mardin thinks that there is a need for structures that will reconnect the center and the newly emerging social and economic structures, and these structures, according to him, constitute an essential shortcoming of the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 2013: 25-26).

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it is observed that the conceptualization of Turkish modernization, as a naming in which the Turkish and Turkey discussions are internalized, is becoming more stable day by day.

[34] Gurminder Bhambrain her book *Rethinking Modenity: Postcolonialism and Sociological Imagination*, insists that notion can be "highlighted in the work of the French and Scottish writers of the eighteenth century – such as Montesquieu, Ferguson, and Smith – who are largely seen as precursors of the sociological approach as well as in the work of the primary theorists of classical sociology – Durkheim, Weber, and Marx – who all express, in differing ways, the challenges faced by modern European society, a society that they see as distinguished from earlier agrarian societies and as unique within the contemporary world order." (Bhambra, 2007: 2-5)

According to Mardin (2013: 26), social mobilization cannot occur in this deficiency. Social mobilization evokes the Durkheimian idea of social cohesion at first glance. Mardin (2013: 26) uses the concept of social mobilization to identify "the collection of structures that were intricate before modernization with new tools after differentiation and putting them into action as a whole" (Mardin, 2013: 26-27). Thus, if there is a mutual dependency between the members of the society in terms of both communication and economic structure, only then social mobilization occurs. The development of communication and the ways that support it corresponds to what Mardin calls social mobilization. From this point of view, this disconnection that Mardin sees between the center and the periphery is a reflection of a temporal social map of the disconnection between the past and the present of society. Without the idea of simultaneity neither national unity nor collective consciousness in the social (in the Durkheimian sense) would emerge.

As Benedict Anderson (1983/2006: 24) emphasizes, one of the important criteria for imagining a nation as a whole is the idea of simultaneity, and temporal disconnection is, in a way, the disconnection between the parts that make up the social unity. Anderson thinks that imagining a nation in the modern sense begins when three cultural designs lose their influence. The first is the belief that scriptural languages are in a privileged position to reach the truth because they are part of the truth. The second is the belief that all societies are organized under or around a higher center. The third is the design of the time, which makes cosmology and history indistinguishable from each other, thus making the origins of the world and people identical (Anderson, 1983/2006: 34). According to Anderson, the destruction of these three beliefs, it is only possible to imagine a nation. But they will also be destroyed in different ways in each nation. According to Anderson, the destruction of the concept of time and its replacement by the concept of simultaneity is a more significant development than the others. Because the destruction of the other two elements is not fully realized without this third one, social life cannot turn into an experience at the level of the structure or individuals that compose it. Anderson expresses the importance of simultaneity with the concept of homogeneous time borrowed from Benjamin. He thinks that "the idea of a sociological organism advancing along the calendar in homogeneous and hollow time is a very clear counterpart to the modern idea of the nation conceived as a mass community moving up or down in history" (Anderson, 1983/2006: 36).

In the sociological organism, which cannot fit into a new meaning frame with the idea of simultaneity, individuals will emerge as singularities that are disconnected from their own contexts and move in different homogeneities when viewed from the outside. Anderson thinks this temporal transformation is necessary for the emergence of the nation as an imaginary community and that the two forms of imagination that first emerged in Europe in the 18th century can be reached by examining the structures of the novel and newspaper. In this context, "these forms are the source of the technical means of representing what kind of imaginary community the nation is" (Anderson, 1983/2006: 25).

Mardin (2013: 30) also joins Anderson and underlines how this break, which he thinks can be found in 19th-century Turkish Novels,[35] emerges as a duality problem. There are stories of individuals who have become very modern (here, modernization is considered Westernization) and are detached from the values of the society in which they live. For example, the contrast between Felatun Bey and Rakım Efendi in the novel *Felatun Bey and Rakım Efendi* (1876), or the estrangement of Bihruz Bey, who does not belong to two worlds (traditional, modern) and his tastes in the Recaizate Ekrem'snovel *Araba Sevdası* (1898) are satirical descriptions of the westernization attitudes adopted by the newly formed classes. In these novels, the position of women in new social formations and the Westernization of upper-class men, which are the two dominant themes according to Mardin (2013: 30), are presented as social tensions and conflicts behind the Westernized Ottoman society. In the presentation, these conflicts are directly juxtaposed with a question of experience. Here, westernization or modernization quickly replaces individuals' experiences as structural signifiers of social transformation. Unrealized Westernization is presented as individuals who cannot Westernize. These approaches, roughly described as the interchange of individuals and structures, are understood as the conflict of disconnections and sharp transitions. Social changes influence the characters who lack self-consciousness, but this situation has not become a consciousness narrative. Thus, we encounter stories of characters who remainpassive under the influence of Westernization and have no idea about the causes or consequences of their actions, which do not turn into an experience. Thus, *Bihruz Bey* created by Recaizade Ekrem, or *Efruz Bey* by Ömer Seyfettin is

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[35]Mardin describes these novels as thesis novels and complains that they are not adequately analyzed.

presented as anomic individuals who have neither mastered their own ancient culture and language nor fully internalized the Western way of life, falling into a deep rift of rupture (Mardin, 2013: 30-34).

However, it is important to model that there are other perspectives apart from the continuity and rupture of the process, which manifests itself as a binary opposition, and to make a new and more explanatory interpretation of modernism with this new understanding. Such a perspective will also shape a new perspective on Turkish modernization. This new trans-oppositional thought, which requires destroying the modern binary categories of rupture or continuity (past and present, or primary structure and agent) will be necessary for understanding a social process called Turkish modernization, which continues to be understood within the tradition-modernity tension even today. One of these initiatives can be found in Andrew Davison's (2002)[36] interpretation of Turkish modernization. Davison analyzes the Turkish modernization process with an approach that can offer an alternative to the historical reading of Mardin between rupture and continuity. According to Davison (2002: 63), "to think of modernity only as a transition from the old to the new patterns overshadows the contention that this concept refers to, namely the contest over the formation of public life." In his view, it is necessary to move away from a rigid notion of transition to understand and see that what often marks modernity is complex changes, some involving certain types of transitions and others not (Davison, 2002: 65). Davison's point here generally fits with the postcolonial thinkers' discussion of modernity and corresponds to Chakrabarthy's (2000) call for a shift from transitional thought to translation within them. In this sense, according to Davison (2002), the various modernist and non-modernist expectations must be placed in a picture of modernity that does not eliminate the conflict that is an integral part of it, but instead explains it. Only in this way will the phenomenon of modernity be considered together with the ability to see that it coincides with a moment of conflict without considering it as a substitute for anything else.

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[36] Davison's work that I use here is *Secularism and Modernity in Turkey*, which was translated into Turkish in 2002. The work was first published in 1998 as *Secularimzm and Revivalism in Turkey*. In this work, Davidson analyses Turkish modernization with a hermeneutic method and chooses the concept of secularization as an important conceptual tool for this.

20th-century Turkish thought and literature has emerged with many themes that deal with Westernization or modernization as a historical phenomenon and with new (social individual) types of experience. Nevertheless, these new themes brought new approaches to the idea of center-periphery disconnection, which I expressed above in the context of Mardin's argument, and mostly reproduced it. The ways in which the relationship between the past and the present, especially the sociological explanation, were instrumentalized and presented in terms of religious and cultural life inevitably emerged as efforts to explain the disconnection brought about by Ottoman modernization within the framework of a model. The most important of these efforts is undoubtedly the effort of Ziya Gökalp, who, with his university chair, gave birth to the discipline of sociology in Turkey.

Gökalp, who was affiliated with French sociology and highly influenced by the ideas of Emile Durkheim, believed that "all societies evolved from primitive societies based on mechanical solidarity to organic societies based on social solidarity and advanced division of labor" (Davison, 2002: 176). According to Gökalp, this evolution occurs at two levels[37] and emerges as a structural, functional differentiation at both levels. The first level was what he called culture-nations, in Durkheimian terms, where an advanced division of labor and differentiation formed an occupational group structure. The second level was civilization, which Gökalp saw as a supranational group to which different nations belonged and communicated with each other (Gökalp, 1915: 98-100). Thus, Gökalp accepted a structure in which the universality of religion gave way to the universality of sociality shaped by nationality, and translated the existing disconnection into another duality through the concepts of culture and civilization in a structuralist style. This initiative was a sociological enterprise in all its motivations and was in line with the basic principles of sociology. But it was also a problematic attempt to harmonize tensions in internal and external directions. However, in his thoughts, the interchange of the objective meaning he attributed to the concept of civilization and the subjective meaning he attributed to *hars* (national culture) and the prediction that these two will become more and more compatible with each other through assimilation (*özümseme*). According to Gökalp, "only at the moment when a nation begins to adapt the institutions of international civilization to its spirit by giving

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[37] Tanpınar (2007/2015: 256), a year before his death, writes "I am also opposed to the duality that Ziya Gökalp created as civilization and culture."

it the color of its language and conscience, it begins to have a national culture"
(Gökalp, 1915: 120).

In time, Gökalp's views turned into a project that would spread to all institutions of the modern nation-state. In this context, the effect of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the reforms accompanying the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its relationship with Yusuf Akçura's thoughts are a separate topic of discussion.[38] However, it is evident that the national and supranational social and cultural structures, which were theoretically put forward through structures and predicted to absorb each other in time, are constantly resisting the assimilation envisaged by Gökalp. On the other hand, it should also be emphasized that Yusuf Akçura acted more appropriately to the conflict he presented, especially in *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Ways of Politics). The most important indicator of this is that the national institutions that emerged in the context of Gökalp's thoughts since the 21st century were constantly confronted with a counter-revolution. The relationship between culture and civilization is still being discussed in the context of a conflict.

In this respect, the need to include the conflicts in the grand narrative and the great modernization story of Turkish society emerged over time. More insightful debates accompanied Ziya Gökalp's explanatory and constructive sociological choices. These attempts have come to the forefront with efforts to include the unique singularities of social action or experience into the narrative of analyzes of structures. A generation born at the beginning of the 20th century and producing their most essential works in the 1950s became important representatives of this effort. This generation expands the discussion I put forward through Gökalp above and opens it to other channels. However, the historical narrative forms of modernization efforts continue to be accompanied by the contexts of rupture and difference emphasized by Bhambra (2007). This will only happen when the efforts to present the unique human experience with major social structures are added to the story. It should be emphasized that Mehmet İzzet, who died in his 40s, was interested in the history of Turkish sociology,

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[38] In his articletitled "*The Forgotten Man: Yusuf Akçura*", Berkes takes Gökalp as a floating swimmer and Akçura as a deep diver. He argues that Akçura adopts a more realistic approach in terms of revealing the conflicts that civilization and culture will create with each other. Particularly in terms of religion's counterparts in social life, he associates his oblivion with his deep level of analysis (Berkes, 1985: 209 - 216)

and Mehmet İzzet, who taught philosophy at the *Darülfünun*, was interested in Simmelian sociology. Niyazi Berkes (1936/1985: 143)[39]s ees his sudden death as a reason for the lack of development of a Simmelian tradition in Turkey.

The works of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, one of the intellectuals who observed these results, brought a unique approach to this problem of rupture and difference. Focusing on a historical break between the new and the old, Tanpınar tried to tell the transformation story of modern man by considering the human experience, which he called "inner human," in a social context. In this respect, his effort and approach to understanding social reality and social transformation together with human reality have positioned the story[40]he tells closely with Simmel's, as will be discussed further in the following pages. To better understand his theoretical and intellectual stance, it is essential to compare him with his contemporaries, especially with social scientists such as Sabri Ülgener and Niyazi Berkes. Tanpınar, who makes historical and social analyses in the context of structure (society) and agent (human), went beyond applying existing theoretical social models. While others could see nothing but a rupture and radical difference, Tanpınar presented different manifestations of the unique human experience[41] with a Bergsonian consciousness of inner time and a Simmelian sociological interest. Translating this difference in Tanpınar's literary works and novels into a sociological context requires revealing how Sabri Ülgener and Niyazi Berkes understand the Turkish modernization process. Thus, the importance and difference of the effort to include the conflicts between contexts and social actors in the story for both 1950s Turkey and today's society will be better revealed.

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[39] Berkes speaks highly of Mehmet İzzet in his autobiography, *Unutulan Yıllar*(Forgotten Years)*,* "My favorite professor was Mehmet İzzet. Unfortunately, my studentship with him did not last even for a year, he was sent to Germany for treatment due to a blood cancer disease and died there. He was a true Western example of a professor" (Berkes, 1997: 55). In addition, Berkes in his article titled *Sociology in Turkey*, published in *The American Journal of Sociology* in 1936 discusses Mehmet İzzet in terms of his interest in Simmelian Sociology: "The early death of Mehmet İzzet, an eminent professor, in 1930 was a loss for the history of Turkish sociology. Mehmet İzzet was a professor who had studied German, British and American social views apart from the Western sociology tradition and had the power to expand the interest in the field of sociology. In his lectures, the influences of Georg Simmel and Max Weber can be seen" (Berkes, 1936/1985: 143)

[40] The position of being a storyteller in Walter Benjamin's sense.

[41] As will be discussed below, in some cases, as an experience which is non-experience.

3.1. Sabri Ülgener: Mentality as an Image of Society

Economic historian Sabri Ülgener, who produced important works such as Tanpınar and Niyazi Berkes in the 1950s, stands out as an important figure in the Turkish modernization debate. Ülgener's area of interest, mainly an attempt to interpret Turkish modernization history, focuses more on the effects of the social foundations (cultural and moral values) and the intellectual universe in the 16th and 17th-centuries on the social changes in the following centuries. In addition to the discussions about him, the fact that his works did not attract much attention for a certain period is an important theme that we can associate Ülgener with Tanpınar and Berkes. This indifference to Ülgener rests on three reasons. First, he put an essential distance between himself and Marxism at a time when the definition of intellectual was shaped within the framework of left jargon. In this context, it is possible to see opposition to Marxism, which made Ülgener particularly attractive to nationalists and conservatives. The second reason for the indifference is the shifting of reference points to Western sources and the lack of interest in Turkish intellectuals. The third reason is that after 1950, the empiricist tradition came to the fore in Turkey (Azman and Yetim, 2006: 175-176). Of course, besides many other reasons for this oblivion, it should not be overlooked that the presentation of Ülgener's comments on the backwardness of eastern societies, especially in relation to Islamic elements, may have been radical for many. Another difficulty in placing his works, as his student and probably one of his most devoted commentators, Ahmet Güner Sayar (1998: 143) argues, Ülgener under the influence of A. H. Hensen, he turned to Keynesianism,[42] which he would defend until the end of his life. Such influence is important in that it caused him to be labeled as a liberal intellectual and to ignored the other intellectual interests upon his works.

At the same time, the conditions and colleagues of the period determined the preferences and subject matter of Ülgener and his work. Ülgener had the opportunity to work with Fritz Neumark, Gerhard Kessler, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alexander Rüstow, who escaped from Nazi Germany and worked at the Istanbul University

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[42] Keynesianism is also important for Ülgener since J. M. Keynes about the human factor. Ülgener explained this situation as "J. M. Keynes is insistent on the point that unless we take the development process to the living, dynamic factor – the human – and its unaccountable 'emotional' reactions behind dim and abstract schemes, no results can be achieved.

Faculty of Law, Institute of Economics and Social Sciences, which was established within the framework of the university reform in 1933 (Özkiraz, 2000: 91). To give an example, Ülgener himself wrote that his interest in mentality and economic mentality studies goes back to 1934 when Alexander Rüstow's *Economic System and Economic Ideology* was published (Yılmaz: 2011: 50). This book enabled him to meet the works of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, who represent the German History School. Weber and Sombart formed the main references in Ülgener's mentality studies. In parallel with the views of the school he was influenced, Ülgener followed the methods of historical understanding (verstehen), which opposed the 'explanatory' view. In this context, he thought that the historical, economic and social reality of man, who is a historical being, can be reached through mentality analysis in a way that reveals the meaning of his actions.

3.1.1. Sabri Ülgener's Preferences

Ülgner's preferences are especially important in terms of understanding his philosophy of history and the way of his approach to Turkish modernization against historical time. The primary purpose of Ülgener, choosing the concept of mentality as the research object is that he preferred to explain the reasons for the economic backwardness of eastern societies in the context of the determinants of their mentality, despite the industrial revolution in Europe and the social transformations that followed. According to him, the researcher who deals with mentality issues has to carry out ideas in common problem areas where they converge to a collective sociological perspective and a broad philosophy of history plan. However, they are not entirely excluded from positive history studies (Ülgener, 2006a: 15). He argues that the human factor should not be overlooked in almost all social scientific studies, especially in the history of economics. A quote from Werner Sombart[43] reveals exactly what he means by the "human factor": "Who ever wants to know and describe a living thing, his first job is to expel his soul" (Ülgener, 2006b: 8). In this sense, he uses the concept of the disintegration period, which he frequently uses, to express not the periods of stagnation and regression in the classical period of the Ottoman Empire, but a period of continuous decline in eastern societies caused by the shift of the trade routes

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[43]Ülgener refers to the first volume of Werner Sombart's "Der moderne Kapitalismus" (1928).

to the Atlantic coasts following the geographical discoveries in the 15th and 16th centuries (Ülgener, 2006a: 21).

The mentality transformation experienced in eastern societies finds its expression in Ülgener's concept of "medievalization." According to Ülgener such disintegration, which took place gradually but decisively over the centuries, can be regarded as a period of "falling behind" (*Geride Kalış*) against the West. However, according to Ülgener, there is no harm in looking at this immutable destiny as a kind of medievalization (Ülgener, 2006a: 19). This concept refers to the phenomenon that classical medieval historians explained in three stages. These are first an individualistic world view that is the continuation of the structure of ancient times, then the solidification of some social and intellectual features, and finally the general periodization of some elements that led to the dissolution of the Middle Ages. According to Ülgener, the equivalent of these three periods within the framework of Turkish-Islamic civilization is the first period when eastern trade developed and liberal-individualist tendencies of the first phase of Islam were widespread. The second period is when scholastic thought solidified. The final period is when "the land, tradesmen, artisan view and to thinking" (Ülgener, 2006a: 27) emerged, that is, the medievalization period. The critical point here is that Ülgener criticizes the current periodization that deals with the social structure and the world of values as static between two breaks and states that he adopts a conceptualization that can express dissolution as a process to eliminate such an approach (2006a: 19- 20). Ülgener's main purpose here, is to create a conceptualization suitable for describing the transformation of the world of morality and mentality that the Islamic world lived in during the economic disintegration process instead of describing a civilization that remained in the Middle Ages for hundreds of years.[44]

Ülgener tries to reveal the effects of mentality in the difference between economic morality and economic mentality, two representations that he thinks go together. Ülgener places this difference in the general definition of economic activity.

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[44] He explains his preference for theconcept *Medievalisation* (*Ortaçağlaşma*) instead of the concept of the Middle Ages as follows: "Each of the stages listed one under the other in the usual age division is not a historical stage whose beginning and end must necessarily fit in the same time in all countries and cultural circles, but maybe their dimensions forward or backward in a long time period. It aims to introduce a life style that can slide, collectively and typically" (Ülgener, 2006a: 20).

According to this, economic activity is "the sum of the multifaceted relations between man and matter, environment and time on the way of need satisfaction" (Ülgener, 1981: 30). Within the framework of this definition, economic ethics comes into play as normative rules regulating the measure and limits of distance from matter, environment and time. Ülgener defines the economic mentality in its most mature form as follows: "Explaining the norms of behavior and behavior adopted by economics subjects and branches (producers, consumers or managers) in words and phrases and mostly the way of suggestion ... value judgments, preferences and tendencies" (Ülgener, 2006b:14). The critical point of the difference is that the tension between economic ethics and mentality does not express a complete contradiction. Ülgener warns that not understanding the difference between reality and normative can lead to wrong evaluations in mentality analysis. He considers economic mentality as "the internal and essential property of our actions and actions" and economic morality as "a follower of a certain rule of action, as the commanding factor where appropriate, above and against our behavior" (Ülgener, 2006b: 17). However, the behaviors and tendencies that dominate economic mentality is not entirely detached from the foundations of economic morality; in some cases, they even derive their legitimacy from these norms. The second important point is that the economic morality that dominates the Eastern civilization was not seen as a natural deterioration in the mentality of the disintegration period. The concept of basic values, which Ülgener defines as the infrastructure of moral conceptions, shows that the theme of "corruption", which is frequently emphasized in studies on Eastern civilization, is handled from a different perspective in Ülgener. He says, "Many of the core values are older than scholastic thought, systems of theology. Even when they want to be poured into other molds with those systems, they will not fail to announce their existence eventually" (Ülgener, 2006a: 59). For him, the prevailing economic morality in the East includes some elements that will come to the fore when the material conditions that give rise to the dissolution process arise.

Regarding the sources Ülgener used in mentality research, he considers two essential criteria. According to him, "the moral works that can be used in mentality should be handled in two parts, starting with narrow and closed professional groups and finally reaching a width that covers the cultural life of the period" (Ülgener, 2006a: 43). Bunlardan ilki esnaf topluluklarına ait eserler ve bilhassa fütüvvetnamelerdir. Ülgener

tries to capture the collective necessities of professional life, conditions of acceptance to art, relations between apprentice, journeyman and master through *fütüvvetnames*. However, as a second group, Ülgener is also interested in resources that will reveal "the intellectual and moral structure of a wider environment and perhaps an entire era" (Ülgener, 2006a: 45). Although these are very diverse, Sufism and Divan literature come first. The necessity of using *divan* literature, which he thinks reflects the general atmosphere of the age, instead of folk literature, in which concrete facts that leave deep traces in society come to the fore. In addition, *terkib-i bends, pendnames*, and *masnavis*, as they do not remain at the level of dogma, but extend to the base, constitute a priority for Ülgener than the primary sources that a privileged few can read and understand. Ülgener's preferences are not only the resources he has directed to see the mentality, which is the main thing he wants to see, but a duality that occurs when he reveals his own observation through these resources. This is a duality between economic morality and economic mentality.

3.1.2. A Conceptual Duality: The Period of Disintegration and Economic Morality

Ülgener based his methodology and historical analysis on a dual distinction. He takes one of the main features of the disintegration period as the tension between economic ethics and economic mentality. Accordingly, the economic morality of a medievalized world with its basic values is dominant at the bottom, and the mentality of the disintegration period to be built on this moral foundation is dominant at the top. The normative structure of one think that the lived reality of the other shapes the facial features of our people in the course of history, which either contradicts each other, or sometimes integrates (Ülgener, 2006a: 18). The increase in the tendency towards immoral ways of earning with the hindrance of livelihoods and the fact that moralists have become harsher and intolerant can be found in the expression of norms that have been repeated throughout the history of morality.

While analyzing the transformation in the economic mentality, Ülgener's main aim is to reach human reality. He thinks that he can grasp this reality through economically and taking the primary unit as artisan communities. Although he frequently states that the disintegration period mentality ensures the continuation of the class society and

reminds us that the word 'craftsman' (*esnaf*) and the word 'class' (*sınıf*) come from the same root (Ülgener, 2006a: 33). Ülgener avoids making a class-centered analysis parallel to Weber's line. In the turbulent times of the 12th and 13th centuries, tradesmen communities, which established a kind of "destiny partnership" with "half-religious ties," play a dominant role in Ülgener's analysis as the groups that most clearly represent the primary lines of the medieval economic mentality. Although these communities, which initially had charitable and warlike characteristics and had a political identity in the periods when the central authority was not established, lost these characteristics over time. They put at the center of the understanding of *'İnsan-ı kamil'* and brought asceticism to the fore with the dissolution period. The frugality and traditionalism that dominated medieval morality were not only limited to tradesmen communities, but were adopted by different classes, albeit it was based on different starting points. Following the change in the trade routes, the solidification that Ülgener tries to explain is handled through the tendency of tradesmen to close in line with the interests of tradesmen communities, rather than a clumsiness created by institutionalization. Taking into account the definition of economic activity explained above, Ülgener states that the expressions of the relationship established with matter, space, and time in medieval economic ethics manifest as an insurmountable distance between matter and the individual, restriction in relations outside the close circle, and prevention of anxiety about the future.

On the other hand, according to Ülgener, the value brought by the disintegration period is the mystical-contemplative perspective. The main reason for the restrictions on spatial constraints is the insecurity caused by robbers and other factors. As for a reason for the time constraint, Ülgener attributes it to the inadequacy of production techniques. The response of this situation, which he pulled out of moral considerations and dictated to the mentality of the disintegration period, was "to adapt the economic activity to the needs of the moment today- in order not to deprive people of essential and beneficial occupations" (Ülgener, 2006a: 80). As a result of all these, a mentality emerges that looks suspiciously at trade because it is an activity that requires relations with 'foreigners', that is closed to development, that emphasizes craftsmanship with its stagnant atmosphere, that prohibits competition, and defines and ensures that the profession is passed from father to son as a moral value. All this turns into a tool to explain the decline of Ülgener's cultural value environment, which is closed and stuck

in its own inner time, against the values of the age. Just like other factors, Islam has an important role in the formation of economic morality and economic mentality.

3.1.3. The Relationship between Religion and Society in Sabri Ülgener

Ülgener argues that the completion of the establishment of Islam and its opening to Sufism have clarified the upper and lower division of society. In the discussions in which Weber compares his views on Protestantism with the early mentality of Islam, it is seen that Ülgener thinks that early Islam has elements closer to the bourgeois economic mentality than early Christianity. However, the comparisons he made between Christianity and Islam, with a Weberian tendency, emphasize the determinism of religions in his views. For example, he takes "Christianity, as Max Weber said, was originally embodied as an itinerant artisan and tradesman religion, and after a long time, it changed its way and direction from the petty bourgeoisie to the well-off middle class people (bourgeoisie) of the cities." (Ülgener, 1981: 61) On the other hand, in Islam, the development is reversed, we are faced with a development line that starts from the well-off middle class people of the city and progresses to the circles of tradesmen and craftsmen, together with Sufism and sects, to the petty bourgeoisie in today's terms. Looking at its general lines, he does not mind to say that Islam is the religion of inter-city trade and great merchants, while Sufism, with its broad lines, reflects the world view of tradesmen and craftsmen (Ülgener, 1981: 88). Thus, it can be said that Ülgener's analysis depends on a chronosophic perception of time that can be evaluated in a Pomianian context. In another way, while he deals with the sociality of religions in a historical perspective, he also includes the relationship of historical time with ages and structures in his own approach.

However, in Ülgener, it is still possible to find a criticism of Weber's views on Islam. The main criticism Ülgener brought to Weber is that he did not apply his "ideal types" method while analyzing Islam. Ülgener (1981: 49) attributes this situation to the fact that Weber's primary purpose while looking to the East was to define Western civilization, that is, to adhere to a 'limited purpose.' He makes such critique[45] as such:

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[45] Here, Ülgener seems to criticize the following lines in Weber's *Protestant Ethics and Spirit of Capitalism*, which opens his historicist approach to the Eurocentrism debate: "The product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western

In terms of universal history, the western civilization that comes first for Max Weber and the sources that feed and form it. ... Everything was formed on one side; the other side is completely outside and far from it! Rational life, rational science, rational music, disciplined work and professional ethics... All of them are unique to the western world and foreign to others! When this was the goal, it would have been inevitable to some extent to show different cultural circles separated from one another by hard and dark colors between watertight walls. (Ülgener, 1981: 50)

As in line with Ülgener's general approach, the expansion of Islam to Sufism is handled with material conditions such as depressions, insecurities and wars, again without reference to any determining factors, rather than the emergence of an intellectual phenomenon and its reflection on the mentality. The result is defined as the prominence of authority and tradition factors that early Islam did not recognize. As Bryan Turner (1974/2006) stated, it can be taken as a situation specific to Islam. For Turner, "one of the interesting characteristics of Islam as a religion is that it has no genuine Church and no sacerdotal priesthood. In Islam, the so-called clergy (the ulama) do not officiate over institutionalised grace; their authority is not derived from the Prophet in a chain of succession, but rather arises from their knowledge of the Qur'an and *Hadith* (customary teaching) (Turner, 1974/2006: ii). With Sufism, this situation has changed and two extreme versions have emerged. The first of the two extremes of Sufism dominated by these factors is esoteric (heterodox) teachings leading to nihilism. The second is *Melamilik*, which is close to Calvinism regarding work and work ethic. This second teaching could not spread and remained in the background because it "emphasized philosophy and wisdom rather than *zikir* and ritual" (Ülgener, 1981: 86). On the other hand, esoteric teachings were widely accepted and became the dominant view in artisanal communities. Ülgener does not see this branch of Sufism as teachings that directly legitimize Eastern fatalism. It is decisive that they lost their essence to a large extent with their spread to the provinces; while some elements in their structure were pushed into the background, others come forth by the change of trade routes and insecure environment. Among the examples he gave in this sense, the most interesting is the meaning of the concept of "ibn-ul vakt"[46]

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civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value." (Weber, 1905/2001: 13)

[46] "As we shed the burden of meaning, we will finally be able to see the transformation into dry and bare schemes in the concept of time. We know that the measure of time when Islam allowed it to go beyond at least a year was narrowed down to the moment ("today") lived with Sufism. In the eyes of the Sufi, there is no other way to be one with the Hakk (Truth) but to fill the present moment with *zikr*

peculiar to Sufism, which emphasizes the spread of a time-consciousness peculiar to the present, and its transformation into a mentality among the people. As mutual factors strengthened and spread each other, they became the constant values of the economic mentality of the disintegration period. This transformation is also reinforced by the enthusiasm of the nobility in the economic mentality, who are proud of their origin and lineage, pursue arrogance and greatness instead of working, and despise being 'without a sheikh' (*Pirsiz olmak*)[47] (Ülgener, 2006a:137-143). This has led to the formation of the world of moral values and material values in a different way.

3.1.4. Question Concerning Subject: *Bağdatlı Ruhi* and *Ziya Paşa*

The primary purpose of Ülgener's mentality analysis studies is to catch the reality of human. In the pages where he primarily discusses his method, it is understood that the primary purpose of his method is to try to understand the unique human experience through literary and religious texts that show his mentality. In this context, terms such as economic mentality or "features, portrait"[48] that he uses for the human experience he is trying to reach, like an archaeologist, reveal that he does not only draw a specific situation experienced in a certain period with external historical evidence but also construct it with an inner reality residue. This is in line with the primary motivation of the German historicist school where he belonged. However, when delving deeper, it is seen that Ülgener did not carry out his studies in line with such a goal. Ülgener, who applies Weber's method in his work *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* with remarkable consistency, also adopts its philosophy of history and its collective active subject. On the other hand, Ülgener's main aim is to show that mentality can play an active role in historical processes, unlike studies that center on material conditions and

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and "*murakabe*". For this reason, the Sufi must be a person of the moment (ibn vakt), neither forward nor backward. It is remembered that to go outside of it would mean to openly contradict the manners of the tariqa." (Ülgener, 1981: 110)

[47] Ülgener compares Ziya Pasha and Bağdatlı Ruhi's terkib-i bends clauses and writes that "the almost unchanging rule of the feudal order is also valid here. Nobility, origin and lineage… From guild tradesmen to the followers of lodges and sects, it is a condition of standing and almost breathing" (Ülgener, 2006b: 34). Ülgener also states that the word *nursuz* (belated) and *pirsiz* (without sheikh) derives its power from this thought.

[48] As Ahmet Demirhan (2011: 159) writes, "although Ülgener started out by being influenced by the Weberian view of the 'ideal type', he tried to describe his 'portrait essays' with concepts such as body lines, portrait, character line, face or human type, even physiognomy and model. There are points where Ülgener approaches and diverges from Weber's concept of 'ideal type.'"

power based theories. In this respect Ülgener is cognate with one traditional interpretation of Max Weber in which his sociology and his philosophy of science represent a profound critique of crude materialism, especially of the Marxist variety. As Turner insists, "Weber's insight into the crucial role of legitimating beliefs in relation to 'interests' and specifically Weber's account of the charismatic break-through are treated as a direct attack on the sweeping claims of economic determinism" (Turner, 1974/2006: 22). The motto of Ülgener (2006b: 19), who defines his approach that avoids sharp distinctions between cause and effect as a non-acausal view, is that it is necessary to identify "not its priority and aftermath, but its juxtaposition". This corresponds to what Weber calls elective affinity (Weber: 1978: 341).

Ülgener's analysis highlights morality and mentality rather than religion. He does not accept the infrastructure-superstructure duality as a category. He considers both features of economic imbalance and the values that lost their connection with their roots during disintegration as structural features that shape Eastern societies and take a different form. In other words, it neither advocates a deterministic approach nor understanding history based on cause-effect relationships. In his own words, "The best thing to do is to stay away from pursuing the impossible, such as finding the first link of the chain or starting everything from there" (Ülgener, 1981: 107). At the same time, this does not appear as an accusation against religion and tradition, as we see in Berkes'[49] approach. Instead of saying that he derived a category called mentality from the works of Werner Sombart (1951; 1967), he instrumentalizes the effort to place the human being at the center of the analysis to uncover the causes of unrealized revolutions. When he tries to focus on the details or causes of the mentality of a period, for example, the lines in which he compares the two *terkib-i bends*[50] of Ziya Pasha and *Bağdatlı Ruhi* (Ülgener, 2006b: 29), written three centuries apart, are illuminating about Ülgener's desire to do this and how well he succeeded. Like all literary works, these two are essential for Ülgener, who tries to capture the human being, the world, and the mentality reflected in his work. Written in the late 16th and 19th centuries,

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[49] As will be discussed in the following pages, this is a criticism that Şerif Mardin brought to Niyazi Berkes. For further details, see Mardin (2013: 237-246).

[50] According to Ülgener (2006b: 32), *Terkib-i Bend* is a very suitable verse type for mentality analysis: "Starting with the indispensable wine and *saki,* the conversation is often ended by complaining about human behavior, disruptions of social life, and all kinds of problemsof the age."

these two works criticize society and its ruling class. Ülgener defines the differences in two different social configurations as "two sources and two behind the scenes: bureaucratized sultanate center in one, provincial feudalism mixed with *agha*s(landlords), mansion, and belief in the other," but cannot offer an analysis beyond that (Ülgener, 2006b: 29).

As an economic historian or a historiographer, Ülgener is content to reveal the differences between the two periods. However, their relationship is not related to the interpretation of the similarity or the depth of social conditions that reveal characters like Bağdatlı Ruhi or Ziya Pasha. Ülgener interprets one as the man of the bottom, the other as the man of the ceiling, the man of ambition and rank, and the man of renunciation and *rind*. When Ülgener needs to express exactly who Ziya Pasha is and what kind of person he is, he confirms what he meant by referring to what Tanpınar said about Ziya Pasha in the *19th Century Turkish Literature History*. Ülgener repeats Tanpınar's views on Ziya Pasha. He agrees with Tanpınar when he says that Ziya Pasha is "the most typical example of the second Tanzimat period" and that "his whole life and period lived in a strange duality just like the period he lived in" (Ülgener, 2006b: 37-38). However, Ülgener still thinks that Tanpınar has acted cruelly. Because, in Tanpınar's description, Ziya Pasha is "an intelligent and sociable courtier, fond of freedom, rind and subtle (*kalender*), respectively, but always ambitious and fond of a rich life, a great statesman by nature, but he is incapable of keeping the skirts of wealth, secretly mercurial, but frank and patient. He is described as a cruel, spiteful, but loyal person and always ready to forgive people. In short, he is distraught between his passions and ideas" (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 309). The social and personal comments Ülgener will say and make about Ziya Pasha consist of what Tanpınar did, but Tanpınar continues his analysis of Ziya Pasha from where Ülgener left off:

> *However, we cannot deny that Ziya Pasha also had a kind of "cynisme" despite all his noble and generous feelings, righteous thoughts and good intentions. In fact, tenakuz[51] is essential to him. He is a mabeynci in every sense. It is between reciprocal limits. Such as in is his art... One should record this discord, but only Ziya Pasha should not be held responsible for it. The truth is that Ziya Pasha, like his entire period, experiences hesitations and disagreements that spread to all areas of his life.* (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 311)

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[51]*Tenakuz* can be expressed as both a contradiction and a state of harmony.

Contrary to Ülgener's opinion, Tanpınar is not "too harsh, too ruthless or even cruel in his views on the pasha" (Ülgener, 2006b: 37). On the contrary, according to Tanpınar, all these features "do not prevent us from loving him" (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 311). In fact, he goes beyond whether he likes or dislikes him, and considers him together with the society he lives in, his class situation in the society ("a chamberlain[52]in every sense"), and transforms him into a social type as a man of *tenakuz*. As will be discussed further in chapter four, he will try to revive this social type "man of *tenakuz*", he created about Ziya Pasha, and we will see this social type as Ata Molla in *Mahur Beste* and as Abdüsselam Bey in *The Time Regulation Institute*. In this respect, Şerif Mardin's[53] criticism of Ülgener's comments on intellectuals can be handled in terms of Ülgener's entire work.

3.2. Niyazi Berkes: The Forgotten Sociologist of Modern Turkey

Niyazi Berkes, who has an essential place in the intellectual history of modern Turkey, deserves special attention in terms of coinciding with the foundation and institutionalization years of the Republic and being one of the first institutionalized names of the sociology tradition in Turkey. There are two reasons why Berkes is regarded as one of the first examples of institutional sociology. First, he is closely connected with the sociological circles abroad and new theoretical perspectives. Second, he chose to use these developments to understand current social history. These two situations went beyond the direct translation preferred by the previous generation, enabling them to reach multiple perspectives within a sociology discipline that they could generally grasp. Like Sabri Ülgener and Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Niyazi Berkes, born at the beginning of the 20th century, also witnessed the Ottoman Empire'sfinal moments as a declining political organization. As in the 19th century, it was a period when the discussions of how to save the Ottoman Empire were replaced by discussions of how we should build a new country and a new social organization after the war. In

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[52] The term *mabeynci* used by Tanpınar in Turkish is the original one.

[53] Mardin (2006: 256) emphasizes that in most of Ülgener's writings on intellectuals, he complains that our own intellectuals cannot fit the criticizing function into the framework of responsibility, that they either participate in the state function or that they imitate the West in a strict manner. Mardin thinks that these complaints of Ülgener are correct, but the explanations regarding his reasons are also incomplete and superficial. Mardin finds the reason for this superficiality in the absence of the "daemonic" analyzes that should be found in intellectuals.

addition, Berkes was born in Cyprus in 1908, and this place of birth accumulated in him what he describes as "indifference" from his childhood. The Turkish Cypriots, who still saw themselves as the people of the Ottoman Empire until the First World War began, were deeply shaken by the British State's declaration of the island as their property during the war. Berkes states that the people found themselves in a vacuum and lost their sense of belonging: "They were neither Turkish, nor Greek, nor English" (Berkes, 1997: 26). This state of being outside, his Simmelian foreign position, gave him the ability to look at things from the outside. Thus, it led him to analyze social transformation and defend the inevitable historical teleology he read as secularism. A substantial claim of his two books, *İki Yüz Yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz* (Why We Have Been Faltering for Two Hundred Years) and *Batıcılık, Ulusalcılık ve Toplumsal Devrimler* (Westernism, Nationalism and Social Revolutions), published in 1965, is related with the meaning and regulatory role of the idea of order (*nizam*) in medieval thought. Accordingly, the Ottoman Empire attributed the perceived failures in the military and economic field to the deterioration of an ancient order and believed that it would fix all kinds of social disorders by going back to the past. These two books, which will later be combined in *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu* (*The Problem of West in Turkish Thought*) in 1975, actually, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, which was written after he started working at McGill University[54] in Montreal in 1964, are Berkes' main works on the Turkish modernization process. He will present his modernization studies, which he sees as a secularization process, in his book *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, which will be translated into Turkish under the name of *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*.

3.2.1. The Development of Secularism in Turkey

Among all his works, Berkes' *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* has a privileged place in terms of its academic content and internal systematics. As Adanır (2000: 121) emphasizes, it reveals the basic principles of how to approach social, economic, and historical issues that carried the Ottoman society to the secular republican revolution by evaluating material, social and human issues objectively."

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[54] After the expulsion of Associate Professor Behice Boran, Associate Professor Pertev Naili Boratav, Associate Professor Niyazi Berkes and his wife Mediha Berkes from the Faculty of Language, History and Geography, Berkes settled in Canada and began working at McGill University.

Kayalı (2001: 124), while evaluating this work of Berkes, focuses on the instructiveness of modernization in Turkey rather than its impressiveness. According to Kayalı, the most essential aspect of the work is that it deals with cultural issues with their social and economic dimensions. In other words, "although at that time [especially] social, economic, and cultural issues were explained by superficial approaches," Berkes's work "presents in a meaningful, holistic way" (Kayalı, 2001: 124-125). For Adanır, Berkes was the first person to consider the period defined as Ottoman or Turkish modernization holistically, instead of the "complete break" theme in approaches to the period described as "Ottoman" or "Turkish modernization" (Adanır, 2000: 126). Berkes also noticed a misconception among thinkers on this issue. According to him, the mistake is not to see that the understanding of revolution in Western societies does not fit the conditions in Turkey and that Turkish society has not left the orbit of Eastern-type societies. Considering this misconception will form the basis of the fusion of theory and history that will emerge with a unique perspective on social history and temporality when discussing Turkish modernization. It will also create a perspective in which he criticizes the thinkers of the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the first years of the Republican Period. The work in which this critical point of view is put forward, as I mentioned above, is called *The Western Problem in Turkish Thinking*, a combination of two separate studies published separately.

As mentioned above, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* was presented to Turkish readers not as a translation of *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* in 1974, but supported by new contexts, examples, and themes in line with the work that has continued in the intervening decade. As Berkes clearly states in the preface of the work, this work was written to show and "prove" how the Republic's cultural, political, and economic formations have been shaped since the beginning of the 18th century. In his own words, "the main purpose of the study is to show how historical events necessarily flowed in the direction of the coming of the republican regime" (Berkes, 1974/2007: 13). Therefore, according to Berkes, the work is not a history book that tells neither the events from the beginning of the 18th century, when the Tulip Era took place, until 1923, when the Republic was proclaimed, nor what happened in the fifty years after the proclamation of the republic.

We learn from Berkes' autobiographical work, *Unutulan Yıllar* (Forgotten Years), how his thoughts on historiography and teaching have been shaped since his early years. Berkes (1997: 58) describes his interest in the history of philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at one point in the book and says: "I was interested in the history of philosophy… Over time, my interest in the history of philosophy also changed; I shifted to the history of science, then to the history of culture, and then to the history of economics. For us non-Western civilizations, the history of Western thought can only make sense within a broad knowledge of history. While teaching history, they taught us about wars, when sultans or kings were born and died or were killed. In particular, we could not grasp the reasons and meanings of sudden, sometimes gradual changes in thought forms and patterns" (Berkes, 1997: 59). Instead, Berkes tried to understand this historical narrative with a sociological content. Berkes also preferred the concept of modernization in place of secularism; he translated the concept of secularism from English into Turkish as "*çağdaşlaşma*."[55]Berkes follows the conceptual history and interpretation processes behind secularism, modernization, civilization, and modernization. Considering the usage of these concepts, especially in the Western societies where they emerged, this preference reveals how he handled the Turkish modernization process. While emphasizing why he did not particularly prefer the concept of *laicisme*, he reveals the central theme of this approach. According to Berkes (1974/2007: 18), the word *laicisme* is used in the language of the peoples where Catholic Christianity spread, especially in French, and originally means "publicization." Because in pre-Christian Greek, which is its source, the words laos (people), laikos (public) were used for *clericus*, that is people outside the clergy.

In modern French, *laicisme* means prioritizing people, rules, and officials other than the clergy and priests in worldly and even religious affairs. Berkes prefers secularism instead of this terminology because in the eastern societies of which the Ottoman Empire was a part, there was no historical process towards *laicisme*, due to the reasons arising from the structure of non-Christian religions. Therefore, for him, the problem is "a phenomenon greater than the separation of religion and state" (Berkes, 2007: 17). He understands and uses this as a process of civilization or modernization, just as we will encounter in Norbert Elias. According to Berkes (2007: 18), the term secularism

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[55] The English equivalent of the term is 'contemporaneousness', but it should be noted that Berkes was after a concept that was a combination of modernization and secularization.

means to be used in places where Christianity spread outside of Catholic Christianity, especially in English and German, which were under the influence of Protestantism, and it comes from Latin, not Greek. This origin also changed over time and took its current meaning. Actually, the word derives from the word *saeculum* and means 'age'. The Arabic word *asr*, which is the equivalent of age, was used until recently and before the term secularism. Although *asrilik* has the meaning covered by the word secularism, the meaning of 'to comply with the age' or 'to comply with the requirements of the age' was used badly in the hands of religious people in the pre-Republican period. Over time, *Asrilik* begins to mean snobbery, rootlessness, superficiality, and irreligion. Berkes states that Ziya Gökalp (he used this word as *muassırlaşmak*) perhaps tried to get rid of this troublesome meaning by finding an unknown word. He found the word *Zenîm* from Arabic dictionaries, which no one had heard or known until then. *Zenîm* was not even included in Gökalp's own writings, and the task of finding a hybrid term like *Laiklik*, whose meaning, origin, and spelling are unknown to the majority of the people, must have been done with the same concern. From this point of view, secularization does not involve "the church or churchman institutions and rules, authorities and their earthly opposites (*clericus* and *laicus*) confronting each other according to many criteria", but "it includes the problem of developing institutions and rules that comply with the requirements of the time in the face of traditional, rigid institutions and rules" (Berkes, 2007: 19). Thus, Berkes' intention to write the book, namely "to comply with the requirements of the age," appears as an aphorism that defines his whole way of thinking.

3.2.2. Religiousness: Constructing the Subject in Opposition to Progressiveness and Reaction

According to Berkes, the issue beneath the secularization process is a question of whether to change with age and adapt to the rhythm of the time lived or not. In other words, according to him, it is a matter of adopting the values of the age that he considers universal. This is why he sees modernization as a secularization process; something is changing, and society is reacting to it. According to him: "There is no society without values; however, some values, instead of changing according to the requirements of time, tend to solidify and calcify over time" (Berkes, 2007: 20). According to Berkes, this reveals three things. First, there is social cohesion among

people in society. The society, where people find it very comfortable and easy to live by following immutable rules, has hardened just like the hardening of the arteries of aging people. People prefer this situation. But no society does not suffer from the imperative of change. The fists of time, some people abandon the standards they are accustomed to, some openly or covertly violate them, while others begin to adopt new rules from the outside or develop new ones themselves. Conflicts arise in the inner lives of those who do, and there are countless manifestations of it (Berkes, 2007: 19). Thus, Berkes defines the parties of the said consolidation as progressives and reactionary. Religion also appears as an area where these two meet, especially as the order (nizam) that determines the boundaries of tradition is the guarantor of it. Berkes tries to reveal how secularization (*çağdaşlaşma*) dialectically leads to religionization and how what he calls reaction emerges with the idea of change. He argues that a fire of religiosity begins behind every modernization period. Therefore, he thinks that religionization and modernization are contemporary with each other. He explains the relationship between the two as follows:

> *The highest values in society also tend to disguise themselves as religious values, especially at such times. Religion is the last refuge of tradition, the last stronghold of defense. In fact, many habits that come from the origins of the old lifestyle of society easily acquire a religious quality. For this reason, the essence of the word secularization seems to be the task of saving the society from this fire of piety, as the word 'secularization' wants to express, and the meanings of the terms laicisme and secularism, although they come from different word origins, they fit together.* (Berkes, 2007: 20)

It is worth emphasizing that what Berkes means by religion is a high general value system with its stereotyped and unquestioned authority. Still, it is also an ideology to the extent that it is the shelter of tradition. Whether the religion in question is Islam, Christianity, or Judaism changes the historical results. Therefore, by Islam, Berkes does not mean a single and holistic body, but considers that a religion can take various forms around historical and social conditions. According to Berkes, Islam is a phenomenon that needs to be understood in three different ways, as he put it in his paper titled "Civilization, Religion as Ideology", which he presented at an international conference in 1959 and later published in a collection called *Philosophy and Culture – East and West*. According to him, "Islamism" means one of its three meanings, regardless of whether he is a Muslim or not. These are Islam as civilization (*Islamlık* as he calls it), Islam as a belief system, and Islam as ideology (Berkes, 1985: 53). What

makes Berkes' approach to Islam exciting and different compared to his age is that he tries to look at it from these three modes at the same time while perceiving Islam. According to him, in order for this view to be healthy, it is necessary to get rid of the other three views. The first of these is the view that Islam is not a multi-colored and striped tradition like the Western tradition. Still, a single historical tradition knitted with monochrome, "the belief that Islam is a Western civilization and even an Eastern tradition alien to it" (Berkes, 1985: 55). Third is the belief that "today's Islam can only be understood as a simple and closed tradition" (Berkes, 1985: 55). In the "History of Islam," which he considers as the coming together of various slices of tradition as a result of a point of view he has determined, each of these slices of tradition has also experienced golden periods to the extent that a sincere and moral taste has been gained and successes has been achieved. Islamic *Sharia* indirectly served the conservatism of the social order; Sufism has been the source of a humanistic worldview in works of art and literature; philosophy, the originality of science, and various sciences from mathematics to medicine have contributed to the glory of Islamic civilization and perhaps above all have served to form a noose between ancient and modern thought. [However] with the collapse of medieval civilization came periods of stagnation and decay, exaggeration or extinction of all, whether the dream and life conflict of the layman, the religious, the jurist, the Sufis, the administrator or the craftsman (Berkes, 1985: 55).

Berkes thinks that what he defines as "ideological Islamism" is all that remains of "historical Islam" when the collection of values reflecting various life traditions in the past has dried up. For him, "Islam as a civilization" collapsed in all of these traditions. Today, the belief that one of these traditions is tried to be revived by saying "this is Islam" has no reality. According to Berkes, when faced with a problem such as moving to a new stage in world history, what should be done is not to cling to the old traditions but to see that it is necessary to return to the ways of creating the new. However, according to him, it was a mistake to resist a trend in this directionand will fall into seeing even Islam itself completely wrong. This mistake is trying to resurrect Islam, which exists not as a civilization, but with a false logic. According to him, to the extent that this delusional effort fails to resurrect, it is "ideological Islam" that will emerge like a ghost. On the other hand, Berkes' thoughts on religion in general still remain secondary in terms of the meaning he attributes to tradition. As I have mentioned

before, religion holds an important place for Berkes as it is the stronghold of those who resist change and modernization, a belief system and a worldview with its civilization. For this reason, the main subject of *The Development of Secularizm* in Turkey is related to tradition, more precisely to the traditional time category. He states that the most important aspect of the Ottoman regime was tradition rather than religion. Therefore, tradition is preferred as a more comprehensive concept: "This broader concept encompasses both religious (i.e. Islam) and aspects of the sultanate caliphate, Eastern despotism." First, regarding Islam and the sultanate caliphate, tradition is expressed by an order (i.e., *Nizam, alem*, or *nizam-ı alem*) and is set by God. In the second aspect, this situation legitimizes the ancient legal theory. In other words, the state was established by order of God. Third, according to Berkes, the cause of these two situations is what Max Weber calls patrimonialism. That is, God not only established the world order, but also chose his sultan to protect and execute this order and made him his shadow, deputy, and caliph on earth (Berkes, 2007: 29). In short, and the Ottoman Sultans are in this way the caliph of God, not of the prophet; they accept these principles. For those who do this, the standard and ideal social order means a society in perpetuity. God has placed the sections of society separately and placed them in their places with the duties He has given to each of them. The name of this society is *reaya*, that is, herd. According to Berkes, it is because His duty is to protect the order of the world and social order. A number of assistant service officers are needed for this job. These are the service classes of the state, and together they form the military and civil bureaucracy. Berkes underlines that the expression "military" in the Ottoman idiom does not necessarily mean "military." It covers everyone in government service (Berkes, 2007: 30). It reveals an essential aspect of modernization.

The state model that Berkes described above is explained according to a kind of oriental despotic state model and thus it is emphasized that it is different from the Western tradition. According to him, this is the main difference between the Ottoman Empire and the Western tradition and the most complex issues of the modernization process. This feature is that the relationship between the state and society is shaped in an opposite way to the one in the Western tradition, that is, the service classes, which are the rulers of the sultanate state, are not representatives of social classes. According to the principles of this view, the state and society are separate, and the state does not

arise from society. The state is not dependent on the interest needs of the economic interest classes of society. Political sovereignty does not come from social roots; it was placed in society from outside (in fact, by conquest and power) by God (Berkes, 2007: 31-32). The duality that Berkes identifies here is the difficulties faced by the dual time consciousness, which society cannot solve and unite to establish a singular social unity.

3.2.3. Subject as Blind Spot in Niyazi Berkes' Analysis

With his generation's historical and social mentality and his dissatisfied academic personality who preferred quality questions to bottlenecks rather than hasty answers, Berkes looked at history and society from a broad perspective. He revealed how a cultural and social process, which until then was treated as breaks and blocks in an ahistorical style, includes temporal flows and dynamics from a historical perspective. To put it more clearly, Berkes tried to present Westernization as a theme of the nature of social and historical thought and change by following the laggards and newborns in the historical scene with a social and temporal evolution perspective. He preferred to see a social transformation that emerged in line with some revolutions in the West as a necessary element for every society within the scope of social evolution. From one point of view, this choice made him a full-fledged sociologist committed to sociology's claim to universality. In the context of the secularization process, he tried to reveal how the unique characteristics of the Ottoman Empire, which he examined in terms of its unique historical and social conditions, changed in the secularization process. From his point of view, it is specific and normal that "the process of modernization hit the Ottoman regime first in terms of this peculiar administration and legitimacy" (Berkes, 2007: 3). Because according to Berkes, the understanding of administration arising from the idea of eternal time in the Ottoman order is the most intolerant aspect of the Ottoman Empire against social changes. Therefore, this understanding was the first and most affected by the change in question. As the Ottoman principles of order and world order met with the progressive time perception of the West, it was inevitable that the institutions and traditions in which this order was represented would come under the pressure of the modernization process. Thus, Berkes analyzed the various results of the two centuries-old encounter with the West in the modernization of Turkey in terms of secularization. As a result, "the principles of the Ottoman system have been eroded one by one for two centuries" (Berkes, 2007: 33). According to

Berkes, this erosion naturally leads to the understanding of natural order instead of the concept of god, the understanding of the rule of law based on classes and conflicts and compromises instead of the state understanding that is not based on society, the concept of progress instead of the concept of tradition, and the concept of revolution instead of the concept of balance (Berkes, 2007).

For "two hundred years," the only reason why society has faltered has been the efforts of groups that opposed this development and which Berkes called reactionaries. The groups he calls "reactionary forces"[56] oppose social change and development for various reasons; they exist in every society. Although he does not give a full social definition of those included in this group, he emphasizes that their common feature is "the idea of an old order and the belief that all social problems will be resolved by returning to the old institutions" (Berkes, 1965: 14). So who exactly are these reactionaries? The weakness of Berkes' analysis is that these groups not presented as a social class or structure (social interests, genealogy), although the names are somewhat prominent. For this reason, in Berkes' analysis, the social and class causes of the reaction are rarely presented in the context of essential human experience and the value system that determines people's daily lives. As Mardin (2013: 238) states, this kind of argumentation is difficult to go beyond reproach.[57] Here, Mardin's integrated criticisms of Berkes in the context of his "responsible hunting" and " incompetence of Ottoman intellectuals" are essential (Mardin, 2013: 242). Mardin thinks that the problem that Berkes describes as "responsible hunting" in his analysis of social change stems from three reasons. The first is the lack of detailed structures in Berkes' analysis. The second is not to see social events as mechanisms with an autonomous internal dynamic. Third, it should not be forgotten that this feature can produce a new social structure (Mardin, 2013: 243). These three shortcomings bring about the inability of the Ottomans to show the development of Western societies and

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[56] "Reactionary Forces" is one of the subtitles of the book *Why We Have Been Faltering for Two Hundred Years*. As a matter of fact, in his book *The Western Problem in Turkish Thinking*, which is a compilation of the books *Why We Have Been Faltering for Two Hundred Years* and *Social Revolutions in Turkey*, we see that these titles have changed, and instead of the title of "Reactionary Forces", "Forces that Prevent Innovation" is preferred. At the same time, an important difference stands out in the content, and the direct explanation of the reactionary forces is replaced by the facts that give rise to the reaction.

[57] Şerif Mardin openly opposes the reproachful tone of Berkes' style and says, "I do not believe that historical developments can be synthesized through reproach."

their incompetence and reaction against the new with its responsible hunting. It should be said that these three shortcomings are related to the problem of the interrelationship of society with human consciousness. The construction of what we call reality as a reflection in this consciousness is socially constructed, the missing piece in Berkes' analysis is the social equivalent of human experience.

3.3. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar: Being at the Core of the Tension between Past and Present

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, another figure born in the early 1900s, focused on the problem of social change just like Berkes and Ülgener and, in his own words, was concerned with the causes and consequences of social transformation, which he called "civilization change." Compared to the other two names, Tanpınar, whose primary interest is the relationship between the past and present culturally rather than social structures, is intensely interested in the transformation of cultural unity and as Stephen Kern (1983: 45) says, the effect of the past on the present. The coexistence of the old and the new is a matter that emerges in Tanpinar'sliterary texts, newspaper articles, and independent writings. From the beginning, he dealt with the Turkish modernization process in a historical style, especially like his contemporaries Ülgener and Berkes, and tried to understand the content and limits of the transformation. Since his father, Hüseyin Fikri Efendi, lived in various geographies of Anatolia due to his profession, Tanpinar gained a unique experience not through social structures and institutions but through social and cultural fields.[58] As he expressed in a letter to a young girl from Antalya, he will say, "I came across myself in the Ergani mine one day when I was three years old" (Tanpınar, 2020: 394).

Tanpınar enrolled in the Faculty of Letters of Darülfünun in 1919. Here he meets Yahya Kemal and takes lessons from him. As it is known, the influence of Yahya Kemal on his thoughts is profound. In his work *Yahya Kemal*, written before his death,

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[58] See, Orhan Okay, "*A Life Story Inside and Out of Time*", (2010. Tanpınar's father, Hüseyin Fikri Efendi, who was a *Kadı* (Muslim judge?), was sent to Ergani Madeni District (*sancak*) in 1902, to Istanbul Fatih Şehzadebaşı due to his impeachment period between 1905-1908, to Sinop after 1908, 1910-1913, was appointed to Siirt between 1913-1914, again to Istanbul between 1913-1914, to Kirkuk in 1914, and to Antalya between 1916-1919. Tanpınar's mother died in Aleppo in 1916 during her journey to Kirkuk (Okay, 2010: 16-20).

he tells that when he met him in the first lecture at the Darülfunun, he was a "university student who did not know what to do yet~ did not have the chance to measure the ratio between his powers and his passions, sought his world in others, and chose only poetry as a positive job." In the following lines of the book, he explains that the thought environment of the 1920s was no different:

> *Turkish literature and intellectuals have experienced many offers since Tazminat, which brought them to certain limits, left them a little alone and a bit bare in this place, and saw most of them go bankrupt. In fact, the owners and followers of these offers were still with us. Fikret's moralism and absolute Westernism, Akif's Islamism very similar to him, equipped with all the scientific and technical weapons of the West, dressed with the morality of the Age of Bliss (Asr-ı Saadet), the Turkish Hearth's (Türk Ocakları) racism that changed a lot despite Ziya Gökalp. All of them still lived intensely in society with offers that made life more difficult than solving problems at many points, and they should always remain hesitant in the face of our realities. However, the inadequacy of almost all of these offers, which we will return to in more detail later, was more or less seen. It was necessary to reconsider the work and re-look at our realities.* (Tanpınar, 1962/1995: 19)

Tanpınar finds the window from Yahya Kemal to look at these facts again. Yahya Kemal is important for Tanpınar not only in terms of poetry and literature but also in terms of combining East and West as a threshold (*eşik)*[59], not as a synthesis of his personality. Yahya Kemal will be the example behind his turning to other perspectives instead of "hesitant" offers in terms of Turkish modernization. He started to work as a literature teacher in 1924 in Erzurum, where he was appointed after Darülfünun and was appointed to Ankara in 1927. The atmosphere that welcomed him there was very colorful and pushed him to write. His first article, "Clothes of the Past," was published in 1939. Tanpınar, who wrote his essential works in twenty years from the 1940s to the1960, was affected by the change in the society he lived in during the years of great social transformation he witnessed and tried to make sense of this change.

According to Dolcerocca (2017: 178), contrary to posthumous debates on Tanpınar's works (especially that of Mehmet Kaplan, Hilmi Yavuz, and Selahattin Hilav) express that Tanpınar's understanding of Turkish modernization was a sudden social transformation, a radical break from Ottoman society to the new Republic. However,

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[59] For Tanpınar, the concept of threshold ("eşik" in Turkish) is important in all his works. The title of one of his poems is"eşik" (Tanpınar, 2020/1976: 65)

Dolcerocca thinks that Tanpınar is still someone who emphasizes cultural and traditional continuity. However, she emphasizes that Tannpınar should be read not as a cultural theorist or philosopher but as a novelist and poet with his own aesthetic, and social and cultural interpretation should be made through his aesthetics.[60] (Dolcerocca, 2017: 178). In this vein, Dolcerocca (2017), Ertürk (2018) and Gürbilek (2011) do not see him as a thinker who quickly resolves our cultural disconnects and offers solutions to modernist ruptures. This expansion effort will reveal more clearly how Tanpınar's texts can be used as a source, especially in the sociological context, through the analysis of his novels and other writings. It is not difficult to see that Tanpınar, both as a personality and as a reasonable observer, enriches his own thoughts in terms of at least the possibilities of approaching the literary text in the context of a specific time and time experience. His most famous and the most quoted poem is "I am neither in time nor completely out of time" (*Ne içindeyim zamanın, Ne de büsbütün dışında*) (Tanpınar: 1976/2022: 23) corresponds to a fundamental aporia in the history of time debates dating back to St. Augustine. While this aporia and indecision can be considered as a confusion, it is also the unique method of the aesthetics and way of thinking of a literary man who wants to reach the unique reality of human experience. This method is also a "threshold" (*eşik*) and a kind of ordeal that he passes through while reaching this reality, which he defines as "inner human." This "threshold," which he tries to overcome with an aporia of time, aroused Tanpınar's belief that he was after a lost time and had the key to regain it, especially by referring to Proust, whom he was a good reader of. However, for my concerns here, his "conceptions of time", which is the primary threshold (*eşik*) of both his aesthetics and his approach to the world, will be meaningful as long as they are used as a key to reach human reality (and from there to social reality), which is the central area of interest of social sciences. This will also allow readers to read the contradictions they see in Tanpınar more consistently. This entails reading Tanpınar not as a cultural philosopher but as an aesthetic man who guides to return to the magical world of the past.

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[60] Dolcerocca (2017: 178), insists that "For the most important writer of the Republican period, there is still little written on his fiction outside such debates on the civilizational shift. The pervasiveness of this perspective in critical discourse on Tanpınar overshadowed his most powerful considerations on modernism. He is unduly considered a cultural theorist before a novelist or a poet: A Mind at Peace (*Huzur*), a notable work of philosophical fiction, a collection of his columns and essays (*Yasadigim Gibi*), letters (particularly to Y.N. Nayır) and diary entries have become the primary source for the writer's cultural concepts." On the other hand, Dolcerocca suuggest a different direction and argues that "the social element in Tanpınar's work cannot be read without the mediation of the aesthetic" (2017: 178).

3.3.1. The Concept of the Inner Man as a Literary Model for the Human Experience

The micro perspective that Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar uses to understand social reality is based on human experience, which he defines as "inner human." Human experiences, the subject of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's literary works, later shift to a social scientific ground.[61] His article titled *İnsan ve Cemiyet* (The Human and The Society) published in *Ülkü* magazine in 1944 gives an idea about how he approaches the subject of human. The main reference point here is Blaise Pascal:[62]

> *Dialectics tried to describe human beings. We all remember definitions ranging from the famous hairless and bipedal animal fallacy to political logic or mere morality, rather vague statements such as "man is a collection of contradictions, "man is a harmony", and sometimes even meaningless explanations such as a hand gesture in the dark. Pascal's definition of human beings as a'thinking instrument' is the most beautiful, perhaps most meaningful, of this kind of isolation, as expressed in the language of poetry.* (Tanpınar, 2020: 23-25)

According to Tanpınar, humans and society are two different aspects of a single thing, as in Simmelian sociology. Because, according to him, the entire universe lives in the consciousness of man, and for this reason, human thought is the creator of time and space, its own end, and even the gods (Tanpınar, 2020: 23). Tanpınar expresses this situation as *teessür şuuru* (the consciousness of sadness).[63] In other words, it has a self-reflection about its own destiny and the entire universe. However, according to Tanpınar, the smallness of a person in front of his own destiny turns into continuity when society (*cemiyet*) is in question: "Death, which is an end for the individual, is often beginning in society. For the true individual, death is nothingness. Nothingness has no quality, but death, which has a heroic or similar character, ceases to be nothing and becomes a being in a new form" (Tanpınar: 2020: 25). Tanpınar states that as the

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[61] See Ali Utku's (2022: 33) "*Inner Man as Yahya Kemal's Personal Story in Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar*", in which Utku reveals Tanpınar's assessment of 'Inner Man' and focuses on his entire work and his relationship with Yahya Kemal, and how this creates the possibility of Einfühlung (*Beddi Hulul*).

[62] Although Tanpınar does not cited direct source here, the thoughts conveyed by Tanpınar are from Pascal's *Pensees* (Pascal, 1661/1999: 5).

[63] The term *teessür* expresses not only the meaning of sadness but also the reflexivity of human thoughts.

individual leaves the individual life, the society maintains him and this is not a rejection of personality-specific features, but rather the appreciation of these features. In this respect, according to him, the place where history gains meaning is where the individual characteristics that sustain the social consciousness are transferred to the memories.

Tanpınar discussed the Turkish modernization process, which he defined as "civilizational change" in one of his articles, and discussed it together with the human factor (inner human), (*Medeniyet Değiştirmesi ve İç İnsan*). Here, too, Tanpınar explains how the situation he defines as the transition from one civilization to another creates a rift in public life, social life, and human being and what kind of duality problem this creates. In the preface to *Five Cities* (1946/2000: 25), he says he prefers "to live a life like all living and hearing human beings, not as an engineer against inanimate matter, but like a man of heart." He thinks that the things we love change with us, and because they change, they live with us as an enrichment of our lives. In this respect, the inner man is the relationship between the past and the present that continues in human beings as an inner time consciousness.

In his novel *The Time Regulation Institute*, Tanpınar deals with the human experience (subject, actor) with the metaphor of a clock.On the other hand, in *Mahur Beste*, which appeared as his first essay, the clocks he used to express fragmented time and different time chronotypes[64] appear with a more open and direct human experience in *The Time Regulation Institute*. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar does not pursue macro-social analysis. He puts the concept of time in the center and analyzes change and transformation through it. Tanpınar's sociological perspective, influenced by Bergson, Proust and Benjamin, is more suitable for microanalysis than macroanalysis. So much so that he is closer to the Simmelian approach by revealing social types in his novels. As a matter of fact, while struggling with dualities such as East-West, old-new, his approach to the issues he deals with in the context of 'civilization change' always proceeds through the above-mentioned micro approach. Thus, he constructed the human reality and experience and the social interaction areas that he derived from this experience. In this sense, he sees spaces as an element of human experience and examines them as a result

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[64]Here I use the concept of chronotype that Özen Nergis Dolcerocca uses to explain different time experiences and modalities (Dolcerocca: 2017: 182).

of an interaction people reproduce. His work, *Five Cities (Beş Şehir)*, is undoubtedly full of countless contexts in which we can read Tanpınar as a place writer or an urban sociologist. In one of these examples, he describes the entertainment life of Istanbul:

> *In old Istanbul, even when I was a kid, every class, rich or poor, had fun together. Moonlight bliss, Kâğıthane lands, Çamlıca trips, Bosphorus cruises almost made the city live together. It was a medieval practice that was scarce in entertainment. However, it has survived until recently with the help of shared tastes. The change in economic conditions on the one hand, the absence of this entertainment on the other, the fact that many new fashions and longings from the outside separate more and more every day, and a mass of just and unjust reactions to the past have made Istanbul, not a city where all its people have fun together.* (Tanpınar, 2000: 162)

The relationship between space and individual, considering the individual as a part of a particular social unity and expressing this social unity in the context of interaction includes a sociological perspective.

Although this sociological context is not expressed directly, it has attracted the attention of some Tanpınar commentators in line with the word "social theory" *(içtimai nazariyeler)* or just "social" *(içtima)* itself, interspersed among the novels. In fact, Tanpınar wants to understand the unique historical and social process called Turkish modernization, as can be understood from both his newspaper articles and his diaries. It is not associated with the past in a melancholic way but in the context of a kind of mourning work of and the possibilities it offers. With the opportunities provided by this mourning, he aimed to understand a society whose social transformation was always built on impossible foundations and where it was thought that everything was late, together with its past and present.

3.3.2. The Sources of Duality

Tanpınar thinks that Turkish modernization, which he calls "change of civilization", brings along a duality. According to him, there is a situation that makes the society he lives in suspicious of his works and the principles on which he gained momentum. According to him, this suspicion results in preoccupation with "little jokes rather than our important and vital issues" (Tanpınar, 2020: 35). It clearly states that we are in a crisis that "changes the nature of these important and vital issues and turns them into

a joke", which are the concrete facts necessary for the existence of society. For him, the apparent cause of this depression is the duality of moving from one civilization to another (Tanpınar, 1951/2020: 38). As I will discuss below, Tanpınar states the reason for this duality is based on ancient times. However, this duality problem, which he reads as the fusion of the new and the old, and which he often refers to with the concept of composition, turned into a crisis and a disease due to *Tanzimat*'s unplanned beginning, ignorance, lack of clear target and groping (Tanpınar: 1951/2020: 40). He is definitely not against the innovations that came with the *Tanzimat*; he is aware that duality is a Pascalian dilemma in which the inner man has to deal not only with society but also with the universe. But the problem here is to speak of a state of mind that does not believe much in what it is doing and in which there is always another and the other is present. Tanpınar is discussing a crisis brought about by the juxtaposition of the old and the new and the inability to transform one into the other.

On March 2, 1951, Tanpınar's article titled "Changing Civilization and Inner Human" was published in *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) newspaper, but "19th Century Turkish Literature History", published in 1949, is also essential to examine this duality in terms of language development. In this second work Tanpınar deals with this ambiguity from the perspective of the Islamization of Anatolia. He works with it as a linguistic principle to explain all the dualities of society. With a Heideggerian approach, he puts the issue of being outside the home, which is discussed in general, especially in *Mahur Beste* novel, to the center of the language problem.

> *There is only a period of four centuries between the Jahiliyya eulogies and the Qur'an, which is the starting point of today's Arabic literature, and the Shahnameh, which we can call the leading book in which Iranian literature realizes itself. Again, although there is only a century between the Qur'an and the Orkhon inscriptions, Yunus Divan, which is our first sign language document before Islamization, which is the understanding of the Anatolian dialect itself, has given turning points of language taste in all three dialects formed after the Mongolian invasion at the beginning of the 14th century. The Divans of Sir Nevai, Necati, and Fuzuli are in the 15th and 16th centuries. ... the main reason for this delay is undoubtedly the very history of our Islamization. ... This critical fact, the details of which we will not dwell on, together with other historical and social influences, created a stratification of taste and language that would last until the Tanzimat and, as a result, a kind of duality.* (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 1)

Continuing this discussion, Tanpınar mentions the importance of language in terms of being the source of the said duality. While describing the details of the duality that emerged in the language, he emphasizes that the Divan poetry developed around a meter and an *aruz* prosody from Persian, which has very different characteristics from the Turkish language and is subject to different laws. According to Tanpınar:

> *It is a remarkable fact in the history of poetry that an instrument so foreign to the structure of the language masters this way and gradually adopts the national taste or creates some tastes and languages that will take root around itself, expanding its sphere of influence over time.* (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 2)

Tanpınar sees the transition from religious and ascetic mystical literature, which provided the first centralizations in language development, to palace poetry and ghazal poetry, and therefore the dominance of classical Persian poetry in our literature, as an essential corner point. As an example of this transformation, which he describes as a radical change, he shows no relationship between the Divan of Yunus at the end of the 14th century and any poet of the 15th century, except for the basic elements of language. Because, again, a climate of pleasure has passed, and according to him, this climate is formed by the influence of *aruz* prosody and Iranian examples. According to him, this new climate of taste was formed in another language, and just like the situation in the change of the Civil Code, Turkish came to a country where it was foreign in terms of historical and social development.

> *In his memoirs, Kafka says that for a Jew, the German words for mother and father never fully convey the warmth expected from these words. Turkish poetry will describe this inner distance with its sublime aspect many times. It should be noted that the authors of this poem generally wrote in three languages, prose, and verse. The proliferation of language, which Heidegger calls "the house of thought," will naturally result in the disintegration of man.* (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 3)

The Heideger emphasis and the characterization of language as the house of thought and the association of these two with the concept of human disintegration reveal the strong relationship that Tanpınar tries to establish between language and human. While Heidegger expresses the human's ability to construct a world out of language, Tanpınar tries to reveal the duality created by an uncanny stranger who comes to this house and divides the inside of the house into two. To the extent that this is a climate change, "the inclusion of *tajwid* in religious upbringing and the instilling of Arabic

pronunciation into the dialect of the Turkish language, even to the origin of the letters, and the fact that the *madrasa* education is entirely in Arabic has ensured the complete acceptance of Arabic by all Muslim institutions, especially literary examples" (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 4). According to Tanpınar, this dissonance and clinging towards can only be overcome when poets such as Necati and Bâki find the pleasure of Istanbul Turkish in Istanbul, albeit piecemeal, and the emergence of the Istanbul dialect (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 5). On the other hand, while Tanpınar says that this newly formed Istanbul language taste creates a new world of imagination, he thinks that it reveals a system related to the social order as well as the poet's living conditions. In this respect, symbols are important and Tanpınar also thinks that the metaphor of the palace (*saray istiaresi*) emerges as the common point of all scattered works and that this also carries some meanings: The source of light and inspiration in the palace depends on a magnificent center, the ruler, his charm and will. Everything revolves around him, running towards him. He is prosperous and happy in proportion to his closeness to him.

In short, Tanpınar considers the dilemmas of the period he lived in and the society he lived in as a result of historical, and geographical factors that started much earlier. In this respect, his main problem is not a historical and social break created by the *Tanzimat*, the conflict of the old and the new, the Constitutional Monarchy or the Republic. According to him, the roots of existing dilemmas go back to society's disconnection and, therefore, literature from language. This disconnection is also discussed through the problems of language formation and the concept of ahistorical. The introductory part of the *19th Century History of Turkish Literary* is full of examples of evaluating old literature, and ancient poetry, through language, social and historical incompatibilities. Another critical issue for Tanpınar is that until the end of Islamic civilization, "his golden age, around which he was shaped, remained faithful to the age of bliss [*asr-ı saadet*]" (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 23). Therefore, all efforts of society and civilization have been in pursuit of this lost past and its values. On the other hand, all developments in human history are attributed to Islam, which is the essence of this civilization, and historical figures are presented as heroes of disbelief and Islamic struggle long before Islam. An important example of this is the *Şehname,* according to Tanpınar (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 23).

As a result, all information about history has lost its true face and emerged in an anachronistic manner devoid of time. According to Tanpınar, it is one of the examples of this anachronism that all the personalities of antiquity the ancient age, such as Alexander, Plato, Aristotle, Socrat, Calinos Bukrat, whom Islamic civilization admired, were accepted as the later discoverers of the unity of Allah. In conclusion, according to Tanpınar, the duality problem that started with language continued with an image of love that excluded Dionysus from the shadow of the palace metaphor, is the result of an anachronistic history of history that is perceived as the manifestation of Islam, without encountering a Christian-like confession.[65]

3.3.3. Question on the Subject: Hamdi to Hayri in *The Time Regulation Institute*

Tanpınar intends to reveal the duality problem of the mid-1940s more clearly. For this reason, he prefers the novel genre. His first novel, *Mahur Beste*, was serialized in 1944, one year after he was elected as Maraş Deputy. *Mahur Beste*, which started as the novel of an ecstatic, inactive character named Behçet, ends as the novel of many other characters. In this first novel, clocks are used as a metaphor by Tanpınar, but just like the characters he noticed in the novel and designed as a social type, they are not in front of the stage yet, but in the setting. It ends with a letter by Tanpınar to the main character, Behçet Bey, and the unfinished story in *Mahur Beste* is completed with the novels *Huzur* (Mind at Peace, 1948) and *Sahnenin Dışındakiler* (Those Outside the Scene, 1950). His latest novel *The Time Regulation Institute*, which featured clocks as the main metaphor for his approach to both time and human experience, was serialized in 1954. In the ten years since *Mahur Beste*, "change of civilization", "inner human" understanding and time experience are presented in more detail in *The Time Regulation Institute*.

Tanpınar's thoughts on time and experience are inherited from Bergson, and the concept of "continuity" (*duree*) he borrowed from him corresponds to an uninterrupted inner time consciousness (Bergson, 1896/1991). It is also clear that the concept of "lost

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[65] Tanpınar sees St. Augustine as a symbol of the question of time as the result of a Christian heritage that was divided in two and benefited from the historical possibilities of both Greek and Latin (Tanpınar, 1949/1988: 24).

time," which Tanpınar took over from Proust, and the "homogeneous empty time" criticism in the line of Benjamin, reflects his nostalgia for the past (Gürbilek, 2011:87). It is also possible to see thoughts along the lines with other figures. For example, according to Aydın, when Norbert Elias (1993: 43) insists that "if everyone does not adjust their lives according to the collective environment, all human relations will be severely disrupted and cannot reproduce themselves," "it is possible to think that Tanpınar imagined how this collective social existence could come together" (Aydın: 2013, 128). However, Tanpınar, in his novels and stories, is more after the subjective stories of people who lived in different periods. With different clocks, different temporalities, and the sociality these differences offer together, Tanpınar is concerned with expressing them in an ironic and tragic social context. It is entirely appropriate[66] to think that clocks are a conscious choice to express the "inner experience of time" that Bergson (1896/1991: 22) insists on separating from space; unset clocks show different times but still work.

To return to Benedict Anderson, his understanding of simultaneity emerged from the destruction of another notion of time. Anderson gives an example of this traditional and pre-national concept of time, citing Auerbach.[67] Anderson emphasizes that Auerbach's simultaneity is very different from ours, as in Benjamin's definition of the Messianic Time, it is the meeting of the past and the future in an immediate present. According to Anderson, the expression "at this moment?" has no meaning in such a perception of time. Therefore, the simultaneity of modern social life is "a simultaneity that is temporal coincidences and coincidences measured by clock and calendar" (Anderson, 2006: 24). It is interesting to see that the relationship between time and society in the late Ottoman Empire operated with a similar premodern idea of

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[66] Bergson bases his epistemology on the way we know ourselves over time. In his 1889 thesis, he defines the definition of time in the context of space as "an illegitimate concept" (Kern, 1983: 45-46).

[67] According to Anderson, "if an occurrence like the sacrifice of Isaac is interpreted as prefiguring the sacrifice of Christ, so that in the former the latter is as it were announced and promised and the latter 'fulfills' ... the former, then a connection is established between two events which are linked neither temporally nor causally - a connection which it is impossible to establish by reason in the horizontal dimension... It can be established only if both occurrences are vertically linked to Divine Providence, which alone is able to devise such a plan of history and supply the key to its understanding … the here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of events, it is simultaneously something which has always been, and will be fulfilled in the future; and strictly, in the eyes of God, it is something eternal, something omni temporal, something already consummated in the realm of fragmentary earthly event" (Anderson, 2006: 23).

simultaneity. Since such simultaneity was seen as a "circle of equity"[68] (*daire-i adalet)* before the 18th century, all reform projects proposed or implemented by the Ottomans merged as an attempt to return to the old order. According to Wishnitzer (2015: 23), this is the expression of a circular time in which the past and future of pre-modern times coexist, which Anderson emphasizes. Underneath all development concepts was the basic idea that the key to the future is in the past and that we can only understand this idea by thinking about circular images of the time.

When we look at the 19th-century Ottoman Empire, the clock and calendar were widely used, and the circular time understanding gave way to the idea of progress and the view that history was seen as a linear flow of time. However, Wishnitzer (2015: 23) thinks that, despite the importance of circular time images in the Ottoman Empire, it would be misleading to claim that the Ottoman understanding of time was only simply circular.In other words, it should be stated once again that "the reduction of Ottoman temporality to a single linear or circular, religious or secular, natural or social concept of time will not lead us to the right conclusion"(Wishnitzer, 2015: 23).[69]*Muvakkithane*s function as the sole provider of the desire for "synchronicity with the heavens" (King: 2004) for the determination of this cyclical time and the correct determination of the prayer time. As mechanical clocks spread throughout the empire in the 19th century, timekeepers began using mechanical clocks, among other astronomical instruments. Over time, they turn into watch repairers. At the same time, however, they began to engage in tuning mechanical watches, which remained a secondary instrument alongside the traditional methods of determining time. Thus, *Muvakkithane*s, an important social institution of Ottoman time perception and experience, became a place where traditional and modern emerged and met in a duality with the 19th century.

Tanpınar prefers to construct the decor of *The Time Regulation Institute* based on a *Muvakkithane*, as it is a virtual social space where the duality that he sees as a crisis emerges. As Anderson says, where traditional and cyclical synchronicity meets

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[68] Wishnitzer (2015: 23) insists that "the dissolution of this order was conventionally considered to be the reason for the decline of Empires in general, and of the Ottoman Empire in particular."

[69] Wishnitzer (2015: 25) also emphasizes that the daily use of the term afternoon is still valid in today's Turkey.

mechanical linear simultaneity, *Muvakkithane* is truly the right choice for a "storyteller" who wants to capture the unique human experience and sociality. Wishnitzer (2015: 32) quotes a passage from *The Time Regulation Institute*:

> *There were muvakkithanes at every step. However much in a hurry people were, they would halt in front of the muvakkithane windows, and pronouncing the besmele, take out their watches of all shapes and sizes, depending on their wealth, their age and their stature: gold watches, silver watches, niello watches, with chain, without chain, sometimes slim, sometimes as plump as a pin cushion or a baby tortoise, and proceed to adjust and set it, with a prayer that the time it measured be auspicious for themselves and for their families. Then they would hold it to their ears as if listening to good news of near and distant times. ... It had unique qualities extending in both dimensions of life. On the one hand it guided one's present and one's duties, and on the other opened the pure and faultless roads to the eternal happiness one sought.* (*Time Regulation Institute*: 24)

According to Wishnitzer, Tanpınar's text reveals the vital role *muvakkithane* plays in the plane between physical time and social time, religious life and social life. He says *muwakkit*s are a kind of social bridge between scholars and ordinary people, mosque and bazaar, educated elite and *reaya* (Wishnitzer, 2015: 32).

Tanpınar, who spent the first period of his life till the age of 19 in many parts of Anatolia due to his father's profession, is familiar with the ordinary people living there. However, he is well aware of the cultural core of the Ottoman Empire. The narrative of literary figures in the *19th Century Turkish Literature History* is full of rich examples showing how much Tanpınar is connected to this core with its historical, social, and internal temporal (inner human, *iç insan*) characteristics. However, it should not be forgotten that the duty of being a social and temporal bridge carried by *muvakkithane*s is also valid for Tanpınar himself. Transforming himself into a bridge in his literary works, Tanpınar directly interacts with the interactive environments created by human experience and the encounters of this experience in society and life. The characters we meet in *The Time Regulation Institute* become such a social type. Again in this way, Tanpınar is positioned not as the narrator of a social transformation story but as the narrator of the unique human experience by copying himself into his work with the possibilities offered by the work. Therefore, following the warnings of Dolcerocca (2017: 178) and Gürbilek (2010: 77-137), rather than reading Tanpınar as

a historian or man of culture, it is essential to position him, above all, a person of art and a poet with aesthetics.

3.3.4. Interpreting a Work of Art: Whether to Trust Hayri or Not

When considered in terms of the social and historical function or results of art, and especially literature, each work of art constitutes the range of the artist's ability to go beyond the time and "social reality" in which he lives in specific contexts. In this respect, the work of art is a bracket that the artist opens to human reality (or, more specifically, to the human experience that both creates and distorts this reality). As in Virginia Wolf's novel *The Hours*, when the limits of the work of art are exceeded for the artist, it can appear as a concrete suicide. At first glance, Tanpınar's attempt through *The Time Regulation Institute* is almost a suicide attempt. As it is understood after the publication of his diaries, it is suicide for an author to push the limits of art based on his novel and to question himself with heavy analogies believing that he cannot reach these limits. The suicide of Hamdi[70] (Tanpınar) in the role of Hayri, or to say *Mahur Beste*, is a tour he takes by transforming a story he wrote for Behçet into a polyphonic novel about many other characters. For Tanpınar, who thinks of art as life after death in his article titled *Human and Society* (1970: 11), it will not be challenging to think in this way. This venture creates Hamdi as a writer who "could not dare" anything other than an artistic and fictional venture. He turned Hayri, the protagonist of *The Time Regulation Institute*, into a narrator, an observer, and, when we pushed a little more complicated, a "sociologist" who can look at many characters not only with his own life but also with the temporal flows and blockages of his society. So here, what was impossible for Tanpınar or Hamdi turned into an opportunity in the context of art and for Hayri.

Approaching a work of art in this way, treating the same work of art as social reality or as a monograph of grand and superhuman historical narratives, presents some difficulties. The artist's ability to express his subjective thoughts and transform his position into an observer is controversial, as efforts to transform the experience and work into social and historical processes are complicated. As is always the case in such

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[70] Here, the similarity between Hayri and Hamdi is emphasized.

novels, the reader of Tanpınar is also condemned to find himself in a great movement with the help of what he has read before. The reader is confronted with the "sedimented reading habits and categories" expressed by Fredric Jameson (1994: 10), which are at the center of Tanpınar's readings: Turkish modernization versus failure to modernization. The first difficulty here is that a character in the narrative overlaps with an autobiographical representation of Tanpınar. The second difficulty is believing that all the characters are outside characters that are deliberately pasted into the novel. These two reveal the narrator's confusion. However, to avoid this confusion, it is necessary to focus on the relationship between the characters, not the narrator's relationship with the characters. For example, the parties to this debate are designed as social types whose sociopsychological details are presented throughout the narrative. Tanpınar's concern is not to explain something to the reader or find solutions to enormous cultural and social problems. However, it is his curiosity about how they would discuss any issue if the social types he first designed with great sensitivity had met in the normal course of life.[71] Pelvanoğlu[72] (2014: 166) expresses this situation as follows:[73]

> *The fact that Tanpınar, and especially Huzur's Hilmi Yavuz - Selahattin Hilav polemic in 1973 became one of the essential reference sources for Turkish modernization debates is about the discontinuity/deficiency crisis experienced by characters such as Mümtaz, İhsan, Cemal, Behçet Bey is a direct manifestation of Turkish modernization. It also stemmed from the fact that it was read as a "figurative" narrative. The historical aspect of these narratives, whether it is a plot or a typical Tanpınar malumatfuruşluk (some call it "aesthetics") material, has always been emphasized by the vast majority of readings, "forming ready reading categories" in Fredric Jameson's words.* (Pelvanoğlu, 2014: 166)

In the context of the categories mentioned above, Pelvanoğlu thinks that the "modernist difficulties/ambiguities" of the narrative in *The Time Regulation Institute* will be bypassed when it is decided that "the crisis and deficiencies of Turkish society

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[71] It is obvious because Tanpınar has detailed these characters so finely.

[72] Here, Pelvanoğlu constructs her own text as a discussion with Emre Ayvaz's "What Happened to Hayri İrdal" text, which questions whether we can trust Hayri İrdal or not (Pelvanoğlu, 2014: 171). Also see Ayvaz (basım yılı: 62-76), according to Ayvaz, Tanpınar is too identified with the main character and this situation has created an obviousinconsistency with Hayri İrdal's narration.

[73] I respond to the call made by Emrah Pelvanoğlu: "therefore, the 'social' aspect of Tanpınar texts needs new reading strategies that need to be updated" (Pelvanoğlu, 2014: 182).

in this historical flow can be understood and perhaps overcome through humor" (Pelvanoğlu, 2014: 178). He claims that Mehmet Kaplan and Berna Moran "have a direct connection with the public issues of Turkish modernization" and "cross the reading corridors they opened for the novel with their historicist interpretations" (Pelvanoğlu, 2014: 178). This claim is valuable because, in this way, the symbolic language and "special duties"[74] that Tanpınar tried to give to the words were understood like magic. Therefore, they could not fulfill the tasks they undertook to understand social psychological processes within the narrative integrity. In cases where the spell was broken, a whole narrative was quickly associated with a much larger event (such as the east-west conflict, the old new, the modern tradition), and then it was discussed which of these sides Tanpınar was closer to. However, in my opinion, Tanpınar is a storyteller who depicts the interactions of his characters, which he did not create but designed with the curiosity of a sociologist with intense observation. His concern is neither to understand nor to explain; his genuine concern is to convey, photograph and capture the "human experience" beneath the surface. However, it should be underlined that this can be done at the expense of a certain impossibility. According to toTanpınar, this impossibility is the "impossibility of the present" and, therefore, the impossibility of reaching "human experience", which, with Gürbilek's on-the-spot determination, led to a strange coincidence between Benjamin and Tanpınar. Gürbilek states that the "possibility" and "impossibility" that Tanpınar uses obsessively while talking about his life both in his works and in the context of his diaries are not a coincidence and this situation unique to the author, which he defines as "blockage" is not just a sense of impossibility, but rather the relationship between the idea of possibility and the idea of impossibility; Gurbilek thinks that Tanpınar is on an endless tide (Gürbilek, 2011: 87-88).

It is his indecisive and ambivalent position that makes it possible for Hayri, who is the narrator of the novel and also the protagonist of *The Time Regulation Institute*, to be perceived as an ironic and partly tragic character, just like the position of its author. One leg of this indecision comes from childhood, and the other from forgetting. Remembering blended with this forgetting is also an involuntary remembering (*mêmoire involuntaire*), just as Benjamin (1968/2007: 93) said for Marcel Proust. As

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[74] Intentionally not the "meanings."

Agamben (1978/1993) puts it, childhood is the field of absolute experience. In fact, this indecision is an effort to catch these inaccessible childhood memories in the emptiness of forgetting and remembering. As Derrida (1992: 3-68) argues, it is impossible to be a subject without experiencing the ordeal of this undecidability for the possibility of the subject. In the novel, which now has a general opinion that it is an autobiographical novel, Tanpınar both gave him the responsibility of telling the whole story and portrayed him as an irresponsible character. Micro examples also support this macro position in every event in which Hayri consciously conveys that he cannot control the flow of his life in the novel. Throughout the novel, Tanpınar updatesHayri with a fragmented self-peculiar to psychoanalysis, or with the Cartesian absolute thinking subject, as the philosophy tradition puts it, with a split that divides him in the middle with the help of the Kantian transcendent subject. By the fragmentation of the subject, he turned this rift into practice. In this respect, Hayri İrdal is an impossible character to be there. It is there, telling us what happened, and it is not there because what happened destroys the narrator as much as it is told. This destruction can be taken as an image of the notions such as "escape from oneself" and "finding oneself while getting rid of oneself," which can be considered as an important reason for the historical and social analysis that Sayar (1998: 225) attributes to the 1900 and 1910 generations in the Turkish modernization process.

In Tanpınar's entire writing journey, *The Time Regulation Institute* promises much more than what one might think as a storyteller. Tanpınar, who pursued *human experience* as a storyteller in line with Benjamin (1968/2007) and Agamben (1983), who thought that experience was lost, transformed Hayri's childhood into a narrative and reached childhood experiences, which according to Agamben, are the essence of experience. He achieved this by transforming Hamdi into Hayri at the dawn of a social universe where time and space are separated. This was made possible by the re-enactment of the characters Hayri/Hamdi, who suffered both as a child and in the novel, but the courage to analyze (especially for the author) is possible to reap the fruits of this exposure on another fictional/theoretical plane. Therefore, as a storyteller, Tanpınar is the one who emerges and disappears at every stage and in every situation (forgetting and remembering) of the holistic human narrative, from the small world of the interaction of the individual to the grand narratives of large structures, but he also

builds, destroys, and then reconstructs what we call history in pursuit of the human experience.

The transmission of this experience, which both adds meaning to all stories and adds their own unique chronology for internal coherence, will be essential for anyone trying (and curious) to make sense of the relevance of any micro-human interaction environment of much larger structures. This may seem meaningless, disjointed and lacking in content for others. Time as a tool is meaningful to the extent that Tanpınar can tell the story in terms of the meaning he attributes to it, ensure the chronological consistency of all stories, and access the experience in it. But the experience must not be coherent, meaningful, or authentic. Thus, since it does not have to be meaningful or meaningless, coherent or inconsistent, remembered or forgotten (which together constitutes experience), there cannot be anything that can be associated with an absolute subject. So, whether we can trust Hayri, along with the question of why we should trust Hamdi will remain an internal indecision for both Tanpınar and those who try to understand and explain the human experience with the help of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar.

3.4. Incorporating Conflicts in the Turkish Modernization Narrative

The primary purpose of examining the analysis efforts of Turkish modernization that emerged in the 20th century through a triple sample, as discussed above, is to explore the possibilities of incorporating the conflicts of the Turkish modernization narrative into the narrative itself, at the call of Andrew Davison (2002: 69). As Bhambra (2007) states in a post-colonial critique, all ideas of social transition that operate through rupture and difference left out the contradictions created by this difference and disconnection in terms of actors and structures. This has emerged as an effort to emphasize and reveal a duality that divides the social sphere into two. This emphasis on duality is also present in Tanpınar, as in Berkes and Ülgener (Dolcerocca, 2016, 2017; Ertürk, 2018; Gürbilek, 2011). In all three, the sources and consequences of duality emerge at different levels. As I mentioned above, the common point of all three is that they do not think this duality can be overcome with a short synthesis, as we cannot see in Namık Kemal or Ziya Pasha.

What Niyazi Berkes observes from the window he looks at is the conflict and conflict of duality in the form of reactionary and progressive. While trying to understand a process understood as Westernization in his age and course as secularization, he tried to understand the history of Turkish modernization through a ready-made universal sociological template. Although he thought that the process could not be attributed to a particular geography, he necessarily came to believe that an evolution that he thought was universally valid must occur according to the ready-made template in Western Europe. On the other hand, Ülgener's effort to analyze historical particularities with the method of historicist understanding since the 16th century emerged as an effort to apply and translate the ready-made form of social analysis and his theory, and eventually led him to meet in the same line with Berkes. The discussion of "not being able to" or "failure to happen" must necessarily involve a margin of injustice towards the object concerned, trying to explain or understand. As Şerif Mardin (2006: 251-260; 2013: 237-246) also emphasizes, this injustice has led to both the accusation of "incompetence" (*beceriksizlik*) by the actors and the structures created by the actors. Instead, chasing "what is going on" and dealing with the details of "how" will be a much more critical social scientific interest. As I will discuss below, this will happen by including"incompetence," which is one of the efforts that make Tanpınar different.

Tanpınar's effort differs from the effortsof Berkes and Ülgener as it requires a new relationship of history and time. Although helonged for the past in his cultural analyzes, defended cultural continuity and complained about the superficiality or duality of radical rupture, he tried to understand the relationship between the new and the old with a more dynamic and human experience dimension. He was not an economic historianor a sociologist and did not have a mission (as he did not feel obliged) to pursue concepts, structures, and subjectivities. But he embarked on an effortto tell a story to reveal his work from a place where all structures, concepts and subjectivities meet and fuse.

The elements that fill the content of the claim "the situation is different in Tanpınar" should be further elaborated in three contexts. The first of these is the effort to reach the human experience. Secondly, Tanpınar does not try to understand or explain a story, he tells it. At work, here is the importance of storytelling and its relation to experience, which Benjamin (1968/2007: 86-109) emphasizes. Third, as Kern (1983:

45) puts it, the temporality of "the effect of the past on the present" has always been Tanpınar's main problem. These three contexts that distinguish Tanpınar from his contemporaries are interrelated and, as a complete form, different layers of a new relationship between time and history.

3.4.1. Unique Human Experience: Inner-Human or Social Types

Although Tanpınar longed for the past in his cultural analysis, he defended cultural continuity and complained about the superficiality or duality of breaking with our roots. He made an effort to understand the relationship between the new and the old with a more dynamic way and human experience dimension. This makes it possible for us to see him as "a storyteller conveying experience," as Benjamin (1968/2007: 83) used the term "storyteller." In his article titled *Fundamental Differences between Orient and Occident* (*Şark ile Garp arasında görülen Esaslı Farklar*, published in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet* on September 6, 1960, near his death), Tanpınar writes that the difference between Occident (*Garp*) and Orient (*Şark*) is "the way to live the work itself and through it to settle well in reality."There are many reasons to think that the problem of duality, which is the result of the "changing civilization" (*Medeniyet Değiştirmesi*) he emphasized in 1951 and which has different counterparts in public life, society, and the individual, is answered by a glitch in human experience.[75] Whether it is an answer to the problem of duality or an explanation of non-modernization, the phrase "not experiencing personally what one is doing" (Tanpınar, 2020: 27) highlights the importance Tanpınar places on the unique human experience.

The unique human experience is essential because it emerges and disappears at the intersection of the present and the past, the individual and society. It is also the foundation or building block of all narratives and understandings. Therefore, following in Benjamin's footsteps, it would not be a radical view to read modernization as a change in human experience and to see the destruction and non-transferability of

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[75] Nurdan Gürbilek, while comparing Benjamin and Tanpınar, underlines the emphasis the two figures place on human experience: "Experience occupies a central place in the works of both names. Benjamin attributes the disappearance of the art of narration to the disappearance of experienceand the replacement of knowledge accompanying experience by information after the First World War. Tanpınar, on the other hand, complains that his personal experience, which he describes as "the quality of experiencing what he has done personally and settling in reality with it", is not sufficiently developed in the East." (Gürbilek 2011: 108-109)

experience as the cause of all dilemmas, misunderstandings, and superficiality. The human experience is the moment when every thought flashes for a moment, whether it leads to the past or the future. Therefore, it is a narrative that resists substantialization, meaning, and explanation, which we can only hear and feel. It is a point of departure, not the result of all claims to social or historical reality. When we consider the concept of interaction, human experience is not action but the interaction itself. Because if the experience is something that can only be transferred, it means that human experience naturally includes interaction. Agamben (2007(1978): 15) insists that history itself or the authentic history of cairologicaltime will emerge if it can be transferred. It should be noted, however, that when Agamben says "authentic history" he does not mean an exaltation of the meanings of truth in the sense that it is or ought to be true. It is a warning not to move away from the conditions of the goal that is tried to be reached as autopia. The following long excerpt is important for us to understand that Agamben has another purpose:

> *The moment has come to end the identification of history with a vulgar concept of time as a continuous linear and infinite process, and thereby to take cognizance of the fact that historical categories and temporal categories are not necessarily the same thing. It is a precondition of the review's proposed undertaking to reach a new point in the relationship between time and history-that is, first and foremost, a new and more primary experience of time and history. There must be a critical demolition of the ideas of process, development, and progresswhereby historicism seeks to reinsert the pseudo-meanings of the Christian 'history of salvation' into a history which it has itself reduced to a pure chronology. Against the empty, continuous, quantified, infinite time of vulgar historicism must be set the full, broken, indivisible and perfect time of concrete human experience; instead of the chronological time of pseudo-history, the cairological time of authentic history; in place of the total social process of a dialectic lost in time, the interruption and immediacy of dialectic at a standstill.*
> (Agamben, 2007(1978)

Referring to the above quote, Agamben's primary first caveat is that the temporal and historical categories do not necessarily correspond to each other. Secondly, he emphasizes that a new experience of time and history is not the result but the condition of a new form of relationship that is sought to be reached between time and history. Third, when it is possible to read process, progress and development as a holistic transition, it is necessary to critically demolish ideas such as process, development and progress that reduce history to chronology. However, reaching this new history-time, individual-society relations requires keeping in mind a certain refusal and at the same

time the idea of pursuing an impossible that resists any substantialization. This effort also means not forgetting that the fiction put forward to understand human reality constantly creates new contradictions and that the mental tools created for this purpose replace the goals set just before the start. This situation, which Derrida (1976/1997) calls "metaphysics of presence," which is the main target of his post-structuralist agenda, copies its own definitions of historicity and time into all structures. For this reason, as Agamben (2007(1973): 164) emphasizes, the construction of a new relationship between history and time and the meanings that historical time ascribes to the concepts of progress, transition, development, and the process should be questioned and demolished if possible. In this context, Bhambra's (2007) "connected historicities" or Chakrabarthy's (2002) "Provincializing Europe" projects are important suggestions of the search for a new relationship between history and time. I would argue, however, that such an effort already exists in the social science tradition seeks to capture universality, historicity, and the individual in human experience, not human action. In some respects, it is evident when Simmel (1971: 78) sees society as a sociaition in which social types interact with each other and defines society as a web of interactions in a dynamic context in which this sociation is constantly rebuilt.

There are many examples in Tanpınar's novels, especially in *The Time Regulation Institute*, that show that he designed social types in this direction and was interested in them beyond being a novel character. As will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, Tanpınar does not see himself as the creator of the characters in his novels. His author position is at the level of his characters. To put this discussion on the ground, the effect of the past on the present and how these effects can be understood should be revealed more clearly.

3.4.2. The Effect of the Past on the Present

Another critical issue for Tanpınar is the effect of the past on the present. The disjointed images of today will not make sense to him unless they are considered together with the past. He thinks that the idea of continuity and integrity disappeared after the *Tanzimat* (Tanpınar, 1951/2020: 41). He also thinks that civilization is a whole and according to him, it changes and transforms only with its institutions and values. He does not find them unnecessary and does not doubt it. He emphasizes this

situation by saying, "This is the real *taazzuv*."[76] According to Tanpınar, civilization must change along with all its institutions and values as life changes. However, social and civilizational changes can only happen due to crises, conflicts, wars, unrest, and leaps and only by human hands. Therefore, he thinks only a transferable human experience can be the source of change. The basis of Tanpınar's emphasis on human experience stems from his sadness that the past does not exist today, albeit like a ghost. These thoughts also coincide with Henri Bergson's thoughts on past and present and human experience, thought to have been greatly influenced by Tanpınar.

As Stephen Kern (1983: 45) points out, Bergson's discussion of the metaphysics of time is the one most preoccupied with issues of value and experience in discussing "the importance of the influence of the past on the present." Bergson (1896/1991: 149) wrote in his 1896 work *Matter and Memory*, "either, then, you must suppose that this universe dies and is born again miraculously at each moment of duration, or you must attribute to it that continuity of existence which you deny to consciousness, and make of its past a reality which ends and is prolonged into its present." Thus, Bergson bases his theory of knowledge on the ways we know ourselves over time. It is Bergson's greatest desire to evaluate time independently of space. On the contrary, as Kern (1983: 46) highlights, Bergson considers every counter-evaluation as "vice" and "bastard concept." In his 1888 thesis, Bergson makes a call and addresses a brave (*bold*) novelist:

> *Now, if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental absurdity, under this juxtaposition of simple states an infinite permeation of a thousand different impressions which have already ceased to exist the instant they are named, we commend him for having known us better than we knew ourselves. (...) the very fact that he spreads out our feeling in a homogeneous time, and expresses its elements by words, shows that he in his turn is only offering us its shadow but he has arranged this shadow in such a way as to make us suspect the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it...* (Bergson, 1888/2001: 133-134)

Kern (1983: 47) believes that this passage written by Bergson can be read as an appeal to Marcel Proust. He says that Proust answered that call twenty years later. Beginning

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[76] With the word *taazzuv*, Tanpınar means expressing a formal situation with the understanding that organs and limbs in a body cannot be doubted. This means that the form can be changed but not removed.

to write *Remembering the Things Past* in July (1909), Proust will appear as the bold novelist of a "lost time." Tanpınar, who was influenced by Proust like Bergson, also appears as a brave novelist of Turkish modernization. Tanpınar's novel opens a curtain, in tune with Bergson's call, and appreciates the endless influence of thousands of different impressions that disappear as soon as they are named. Everyone who looks at the past with great longing approaches Tanpınar with laudatory expressions because he has given us thousands of impressions that will disappear as soon as they are told. In other words, to the extent that he could reach the "reality of the moment," which is the smallest part of the time, he could show us the continuity of the past and the present, which seem separate from each other when viewed from a distance. In the smallest divisible part, the present and the past are together.

How to capture the moment and what method it requires (or whether there is one) are important distinctions? Kern (1983: 47) states that this situation is different in Bergson and Proust. While Bergson thinks that the past can be caught with a conscious effort, Proust argues that the past cannot be recaptured with a conscious effort. Thus, Proust emphasizes the value of the ahistorical, unconscious and accidental, which we can make sense of in a Nietzschean and Freudian context. According to him, "the past is hidden somewhere (…) in a material object beyond the reach of the mind, in a material object that we cannot predict (in the feeling that material object will give us), and we should expect to encounter by chance the object that we can catch again" (Proust, 1914/2005: 47). At this point, Proust's proposal will be possible with the possibilities offered by "involuntary memory" as a passive effort. As Kern (1983: 48) and Benjamin (1968/2007) separately emphasize, this is the context that Proust puts forth through the concept of *memoire involontaire*, which incorporates the ahistorical and unconscious into the story insofar memory deals with forgetting as well as remembering. This is what Derrida[77] (1993/2006), conveys in the famous sentence of Marx and Engels (1848/1970: 29) in the *Communist Manifesto*, with the image of a specter that is both here and not here: "A specter is haunting Europe -- the specter of Communism."

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[77] Wendy Brown puts it in "Politics out of History" (2001),through the image of the specter, Derrida wants to reveal that life and death are not opposites. According to Derrida, the focus is neither on life nor death, but on specters, because the specter is something in the middle of both the past and the present, something here and not here Brown's long excerpt provides more details (Brown, 2001: 145).

Such Derridian specters are everywhere in Tanpınar's *The Time Regulation Institute*. The characters, places, and objects that appear in the general plot and flow of the novel are constantly presented as both existing and nonexistent. They appear as objects, spaces, man, and moments, and are constantly defined by the Derridian (1992:3-67) concept of "undecidability."[78] The place where Seyit Lütfullah, one of the important heroes of the novel, lived and the way this ruin was presented, *The Ruin*, when read together with Seyit Lütfullah's ghostly image, can be seen as a reflection of the Proustian "*memorie involontair*." It should also be underlined that *the Ruin* is a social representation (or a more appropriate form) of Georg Simmel's interest. The truth behind Tanpınar's ability to tell the story of Seyit Lütfullahover a broad period, covering not only the past but also the present and the future, is precisely because he put forgetting next to remembering.

3.4.3. Listening the Narration from a Storyteller

It is more instructive to listen to the narration from a storyteller than to listen to someone who tells many things at once, or to understand something by comparison. When Benjamin (1968/2007: 83) says that the storyteller is "the person with whom the honest man confronts himself", he means that the story of all dualities can only be told to the extent that a person can confront his unique duality. This is what Tanpınar did in *The Time Regulation Institute*: confronting himself (Hamdi) through the character of Hayri. Walter Benjamin attributes this task to himself when he says who the storyteller really is, based on the fact that the storyteller no longer exists; the latest example of storytelling is Nikolai Leskov. Benjamin (1968/2007: 257) recalls a German proverb that says "the one who travels has something to tell", that in the eyes of the public, the storyteller is someone from afar. By an interesting coincidence, Tanpınar says in his letter dated January 27, 1944, to Mehmet Kaplan, who was both his student and a critical commentator, "I went on a journey called *Mahur Beste*."

Mahur Beste, Tanpınar's first novel, is also where a critical break occurred that will enable us to see him as a storyteller. In the letter he wrote to Behçet Bey at the end of the novel, which he designed as a complete representation of the context of

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[78] Derrida defines the notion of undecidability as the ordeal of attainingany subjectivity (Derrida, 1992: 3-67).

"incompetence," he apologized for forgetting him: "As I first thought, you do not belong to a single time. You are not living in an indivisible time. You spend your time just like me and everyone else ... For you, the present is (*hâl*) the moment of remembrance. For the rest, you are completely indifferent." This dialogue with Behçet Bey creates a break in Tanpınar, and Tanpınar admits that he misunderstood something: "Then the dream of a house with a closed door disappeared by itself. In reality, the house completely burned down, and you were left outside. That's where the mental flavor I found in you comes from" (*Mahur Beste*: 155). This confession is reminiscent of the situation Georgy Lukacs (1971: 29) said for the novel in *The Theory of the Novel*: "Time can become a founding element only when the ties with transcendental home are severed." It is also interesting that Lukacs describes the situation and dilemma of being inside and outside the house in the context of the "fire"[79] metaphor (1971: 29). The breaking moment of Tanpınar's transformation into a storyteller in the Benjaminian sense is hidden in this dialogue. In the continuation of the letter, he adds that the realization that Behçet Bey did not have a homeland to which he could return allowed him to find a new method in his art. The moment Tanpınar realizes that Behçet Bey has no home to return to prompts Tanpınar to seek a new and founding understanding of time and history.

This breaking moment turns Tanpınar into a storyteller. The duality of home and outside turn into the impossibility of a lost time with the metaphor of the burnt house. With the realization of the impossibility of going back to the past, it does not remove the effect of the past on the present but removes the past from being a utopia as the address of improvement and re-establishment. However, how the past continues in the present is a natural and regular situation when conveying the effect of the past on the present. On the other hand, an effort to revive the past in the present would be a political attempt to regulate this nature. Therefore, the disconnection between the past and the present cannot be overcome either by synthesis or by return. In this respect,

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[79] As Lukacs (1971: 29) discusses, "the world is wide and yet it is like a home, for the fire that burns in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars; the world and the self, the light and the fire, are sharply distinct, yetthey never become permanent strangers to one another, for fire is the soul of all light and all fire clothes itself in light. Thus, each action of the, soul becomes meaningful and rounded in this duality: complete in meaning-in sense-and complete for the senses; rounded because the soul rests within itself even while it acts; rounded because its action separates itself from it and, having become itself, finds a center of its own and draws a closed circumference round itself. 'Philosophy is really homesickness,' says Novalis: 'it is the urge to be at home everywhere'."

the experience conveyed by the storyteller is an effort to reach a flow in which all dualities continue to exist. This is revealed when Benjamin also presents the "storyteller" as a consultant.[80] Benjamin writes that "every real story (...) contains, openly or covertly, something useful, (and) the usefulness may, in one case, consist in a morale; in another, in some practical advice; in a third, in a proverb or maxim" (1968/2007: 86). This advice is also in line with the possibilities offered by the time of salvation, which Benjamin emphasized in *Theses on the Philosophy of History*[81] (1968/2007: 254). This is the time experience[82] conveyed by the storyteller, who knows that in every situation there is a time to refer to the past. This consciousness of time is, for Bergson, not only a time to be fully understood but also a time of consultation where we "constantly relearn how to live it right" (Bergson, 1896: 132).[83]According to Bergson, absolute knowledge gained by intuition is not only a better way of knowing reality, but also its condition. Therefore, our ability to integrate the past into the present is the only source of our freedom.

This situation clearly emerges in the lines where Hayri/Hamdi talks about "freedom" in *The Time Regulation Institute*. This passage, which can be taken as a summary of the entire history of Turkish modernization in the context of "freedom," is as follows:

> *The political pursuit of freedom can lead to its eradication on a grand scale— or rather it opens the door to countless curtailments. It seems that freedom is the most coveted commodity in the world: for just when one person decides to gorge upon it, those around him are deprived. Never have I known a concept so inextricable from its antithesis, and indeed entirely crushed under its weight. I have been made to understand that in my lifetime freedom has been kind enough to visit our country seven or eight times. Yes, seven or eight times, and no one ever bothered to say when it left; but whenever it came back again, we would leap out of our seats in joy and pour into the streets to blow our horns and beat our drums.*

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[80] Benjamin describes giving counsel this way: "if today "having counsel'~ is beginning to have an old-fashioned ring, this is because the communicability of experience is decreasing. In consequence we have no counsel either for ourselves or for others. After all, counsel is less an answer to a question than a proposal concerning the continuation of a story which is just unfolding" (Benjamin, 2007(1968): 86).

[81] According to Benjamin, "to be sure, only a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past-which is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments. Each moment it has lived becomes *a citation a l'ordre du jour*-and that day is Judgment Day" (1968/2007: 254).

[82] As I emphasized earlier, this is also the "cairologic time" of Agamben (1978/1993).

[83] It is important here that Derrida begins *Specters of Marx* in the same way as Bergson: "Someone you or me, comes forward an says: I would like to learn to live finally" (Derrida, 1993/2006: xvii).

Where does it come from? And how does it vanish with such stealth? Are those who bring us freedom the very ones who snatch it away? Or do we simply lose interest from one moment to the next, passing it on to others as a gift, saying, "Here you are, sir. I have already had my share of pleasure from this. Now it's yours. Perhaps it will be of some use to you!"? Or is it like those treasure troves that sit gleaming at the back of fairy-tale caverns, only to turn into coal or a pile of dust at first touch? I must confess I've always found freedom an elusive concept. (SAE: 21-22)

In these lines of Tanpınar, freedom is expressed as an elusive concept and is described with the voice of a social type like Hayri İrdal, who is also designed as elusive. At the very beginning of the novel, the relationship between Hayri İrdal's intention to write all these memories and the notion of forgetting also should not be forgotten. It should also be noted that the story told by Hayri, Tanpınar's ghostly and indecisive character, continues to give advice (in the form of *involuntary counsel* from a caiorological time) rather than willingly for those of us who live their own future in today's chronological time period.

CHAPTER IV

LOCATING AHMET HAMDİ TANPINAR'S WORKS IN THE MODERNIZATION DEBATE: LOST TIME BETWEEN OLD AND NEW

Locating Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's work within the Turkish modernization discussions basically comes up with two difficulties. The first of these difficulties is the noise created by the readings about Tanpınar after his death. These readings locate his works within the grand narrative of currently existing modernization categories. On the other hand, another difficulty is the noise in the historical and sociological explanations of modernity. The fact that structures, processes, and dualities constantly shape the debates here creates difficulties in understanding any historical and social particularity in its temporality and the authenticity of human experience. Despite these two difficulties, Tanpınar's work is always in a different trend. For Tanpınar, it is not the dualities that emerge in processes, transformations, tradition, and modernity but the endless continuity of instant images and the diversity of human experience that emerges under all conditions, as Bergson has stated. In this respect, as stated in the previous sections, the unconscious, ahistorical elements in his works are more appropriate to be read as the conscious addition of ahistorical elements into the historical narrative rather than the forms of an allegory or irony after the lost temporality of a past. Thus, Tanpınar's work, especially his novels, avoids the reductive and chronosophical elements of historical time that permeate discussions of modernity. In order to capture the human experience, he tries to tell the story of the inner man, with the expression of Tanpınar, with an approach based on the inner time of the human.

As Benedict Anderson puts it, "simultaneity" is an essential parameter for realizing the nation-state and the idea of social unity that forms it (Anderson, 1983/2006: 24). The most important indicators of this simultaneity are clocks and calendars. But the idea that clocks and calendars laid the foundations for a city's mental construction with the people and environment in which they lived long before the imaginary establishment of a nation had been a pressing issue for Simmel. In his *Metropolis and*

Mental Life (1903) at the beginning of the 20th century, Simmel expressed the mental state of human experience in the face of the rapidly changing manifestations of the city in terms of punctuality and clocks. As he highlights, "Through the calculative nature of money, a new precision, a certainty in the definition of identities and differences, an unambiguousness in agreements and arrangements have been brought about in the relations of life-elements just as externally this precision has been affected by the universal diffusion of pocket watches" (Simmel, 1903/1971: 328). For Simmel, "If all clocks and watches in Berlin would suddenly go wrong in different ways, even if only by one hour, all economic life and communication of the city would be disrupted for a long time" (Simmel, 1903/1971: 328). The inconsistency of the city clocks mentioned by Simmel will be the reason for Tanpınar to write the story of *The Time Regulation Institute*. When asked in an interview, "how did you find this person?" Tanpınar, in response to the question, says: "I did not find him; he came himself. One day I missed the ferry due to the inconsistency of the city clocks, I suddenly encountered him under the clock of Kadıköy pier, and he never left me" (Tanpınar, 2002: 234).

The metaphor of the clock is essential for Tanpınar, right at the beginning of *Mahur Beste*, there are the shadows of the clocks throughout The *Time Regulation Institute*. Clocks that technically measure time and are based on a social consensus on the unit of elapsed time form the basis of our collective consciousness. While appearing as a metaphor in Tanpınar's novels, clocks become a tool and symbol of the disintegration of social cohesion in cases of "change of civilization" and how different time experiences are lived simultaneously through different clocks. What is essential for Tanpınar is to show the division, duality, and dilemmas in a time of social transformation, based on his own life story, and to portray the point he is most curious about, "how the new comes into existence from the old" (Tanpınar, 2020, 40) perhaps not on a theoretical basis, but with a literary modeling. Contrary to a determination made as a result of macro explanation attempts made in this respect, it is not Tanpınar who is in a dilemma, but the narrator who has to paint the current interactions of the society he lives in and that society.

For this reason, it is necessary to return to the moment when Benjamin announced Nikolai Leskov as the last storyteller and reveal its relation to the concept of

experience. To begin with, it is not surprising to see that Tanpınar, as a storyteller, has some external similarities with Leskov. For example, the experiences of both of them have traveled to the margins of the culture and beyond, and have memorized the knowledge of the journey. However, as we can analyze the special meaning Walter Benjamin gives to storytelling, we can reveal that there are more internal similarities. The first similarity is being restless:

> *No matter how familiar the name may sound, the storyteller has no power in our lives. It has long since moved away from us, and it is getting farther and farther away from us. Introducing someone like Leskov as a storyteller does not mean bringing him closer, but rather increasing our distance from him... an experience we can gain almost every day shows us what this distance, this angle is, and informs us that the art of narration has come to an end. It is as if one of our faculties that we are sure we will not lose, our ability to share our experiences, is taken away from us.* (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 83)

The cause of the unrest is the fact that storytelling is lost. Its disappearance is because the experience ceases to be a form that can be transferred. Benjamin presents the reason for this disappearance as a distance problem. Ultimately, this distance, which raises the problem of loss of experience, is also presented as a possibility of experience. Its loss has ended the story of experience, of which experience is the primary raw material. Gürbilek (2008: 27) emphasizes that Benjamin considers storytelling as a form of communication specific to craftsmanship. Narrativism has disappeared because the conditions that existed only with craftsmanship have disappeared.[84] What are these conditions, again according to Gürbilek, the ability of people to share their experiences, the chain of tradition that transfers an event from generation to generation, the memory on which it rises, and the wisdom based on the knowledge of the past and far away. It is possible to find most of these features expressed by Gürbilek at *The Time Regulation Institute,* especially in the character of Nuri Efendi. The meaning Tanpınar gives to watches is reinforced with Nuri Efedi, a watch repairer and *muvakkit*, opening the doors of another temporality. As an inaccessible and unrealizable representation of the past, Nuri Efendi, represents the time of salvation in which every moment of the present can be referred to the past in an Benjaminian vein (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 254). However, it should be noted that Tanpınar is not

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[84] Just like the position of Nuri Efendi, who is portrayed as an old-time craftsman, within *The Time Setting Institute.*

someone who tries to reach the "time of salvation" of the past in a way that can be captured in the image of a craftsman. At the novel's very beginning, the death of Nuri Efendi also appears as a symbol of the inability to recapture the magical time of the past. For Tanpınar like Benjamin, it is essential "to articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it "the way it really was" (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 255). On the contrary, Tanpınar takes the history again like Benjamin as a "subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by, the presence of the now [Jetztzeit]" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 261).

In addition, Tanpınar tries to show how the inner time experience and thus the situations where human experience is interrupted transform into other experiences through the character designed with social aspects in detail in many parts of *Mahur Beste*. As Özen Nergis Dolcerocca (2017: 183) puts it, it is similar to the subjective chronopathologies produced by writers such as Joyce and Proust, whose examples are problematic with modernity and its singular, empty and progressive time, brought about by a modernist reaction, and in terms of my preferences here is that Tanpınar creates a context that can be read as Simmelian social types. Simmelian social types appear in Tanpınar's work in various ways. However, it is possible to encounter these types in Tanpınar's works in relation to his philosophy of history and his understanding of time. In this respect, this situation begins with *Mahur Beste* and becomes more important point in *The Time Regulation Institute*. Tanpınar avoids the short-circuits and disadvantages of historical time in both of his novels through social types. Thus, what Tanpınar wants to tell is not a great modernization story, but the traces of a cultural transformation in human experience, which he calls a civilizational change. He begins to tell the story of Behçet Bey, as the first social type he designed in *Mahur Beste*, a man who is passive and lives like a remnant of the past. This man is not loved by his father, wife or others, and has limited social skills. However, while telling the story of this passive man, Tanpınar builds other characters and realizes that another story can be told in a different way through those characters.

4.1. The Social Types of Abdülhamid's Society: *Mahur Beste*

> *The secret of Time must still be there*
> *because it was the mirrors above us*
> *that were visible when we looked.*[85]

Mahur Beste is Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's first novel. Tanpınar was in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey as a CHP Maraş deputy at that time. During this period, *Mahur Beste* began to be serialized as of the 56th issue of *Ülkü* magazine dated 16 *secondkânun* (January) 1944. In his letter dated January 27, 1944, Tanpınar writes, "We went on a journey called *Mahur Beste*."[86] The expression journey is significant here. *Mahur Beste*, Tanpınar's first novel with its ups and downs, evokes a journey. While thinking about this journey metaphor, Ekrem Işın writes, "Each of the fragmentary layers that make up the text draws the route of the only possible journey on the cultural geography on which the author has stepped, almost shaped between imagination and reality, and witnesses a journey with an uncertain destination by following the human portraits stretching throughout the tragic history of Ottoman modernization." According to Işın, the novel:

> *...is a memory that records the fragmented identities wandering through the life of 19th century Istanbul, the individual passions pushed into the subconscious and the real reason that surrounds them all, namely the social shocks caused by the "change of civilization." On the other hand, every tragic phenomenon entrusted to this memory owes its existence beyond the author's will, its integration with similar ones and forming different meanings sets to a single reason, the lack of a strong backbone or carrier system of the narrative. As such, Mahur Beste was planned to revolve around a center devoid of gravity; but because its trajectory is constantly changing, its drift toward chaos is an expression of an inevitable cosmic aspect.* (Işın, 2000: 580)

According to Işın (2000: 582), the point that draws attention here is the historical perspective that this loosely woven narrative pattern adds to the character series, each of which has a separate feature, and in this way, its undisputed success in creating an East-West axis discussion. On the other hand, the success that Ekrem Işın mentioned is also based on the fact that the social-type analyses of the characters have been done

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[85] A section from the poem *Mirrors and Time* by Hilmi Yavuz (1998: 118).

[86] For the text of this letter he sent from Ankara to Mehmet Kaplan (Tanpınar, 2014: 224).

very well. Because the basis of social type analysis is not the isolated characteristics of individuals but the situations that occur when interacting with each other. Tanpınar also fulfills the role of narrator without missing this interaction dimension.

He chose different social and historical backgrounds for his first three novels, *Mahur Beste*, *Huzur* (*Mind at Peace*) and *Sahnenin Dışındakiler* (*Those Out of Scene*), which he wrote as a river novel or a trilogy. He wrote the narrative of the 1940s with *Mind at Peace*, the occupied Istanbul with *Those Out of the Scene*, and the first period of Turkish modernization with *Mahur Beste*. As the *19th Century History of Turkish Literature* tries to express, the intensity of the characters in ecstasy and dilemma brought about by the transition and transformation shows itself in these three novels. However, when viewed from a sociological perspective, the issue of the combination of novel, subtext and characters creates another aura that permeates all three of Tanpınar's novels. At first glance, it is a kind of analysis of social types, and in particular, Behçet, the main character of *Mahur Beste* (and his inertia, as in the case of Hayri İrdal at *The Time Regulation Institute*), is especially useful to describe the ambivalence of the individual who is not active enough in the face of modernization and development. is a chosen character. In Behçet Tanpınar's first novel, which is revealed with its passive and inact features, it appears as the first important autobiographical point of departure as a means of expressing the helplessness and inertia in him. Here, Tanpınar appears as a "storyteller" and what gives him a sociological perspective based on this appearance is the analysis he tries to make through these characters and their interaction. The concept of interaction plays an important role, especially in *Mahur Beste*, in terms of character scenarios that are built in a way that interacts with each other. When Simmel says that "where a few individuals interact, there is society," he tries to emphasize that the individual is influenced by other individuals while at the same time being influenced by them. Therefore, in this approach, the issue is no longer the actor or the structure; it is the "human experience" in which the two are intertwined and based on mutual determination. According to Simmel:

> *A collection of human beings does not become a society because each of them has an objectively determined or subjectively impelling life-content. It becomes a society only when the vitality of these contents attains the form of reciprocal influence; only when one individual has an effect, immediate or mediate, upon*

another, is mere spatial aggregation or temporal succession transformed into society. (Simmel, 1971: 24)

Here, the interactional dimension of sociability is as essential for Tanpınar as it is for Simmel. He attempts to photograph this sociability from a wide angle by designing the main character (i.e., here, Behçet) in a passive position that will reveal the interaction between the characters objectively. As a matter of fact, the characters that appear throughout the novel are also told through their distances from Behçet Bey. From this point of view, *Mahur Beste* is the first version of the story (on the way to becoming a storyteller) that Tanpınar has been trying to tell all his life. In this way, he will attempt to build the characters through his own experiences. Here, in terms of literary genres discussion, it is necessary to refer to Oğuz Demiralp's determination about this 'novel' in order to set an example: According to Demiralp, it is debatable whether *Mahur Beste* is novel in terms of its fiction and material:

> *Ahmet Hamdi told Behçet Bey, "I wanted to write about your life. The novel is something else.' If we believe this statement too much, we will get a result like A. Hamdi's aim to write a novel. Moreover, Ahmet Hamdi did not write the life of Behçet Bey alone. It is certain that the author intended more than a simple life story. However, he encountered an unexpected obstacle: Behçet Bey's unsuitable personality.* (Demiralp, 2001: 111)

Behçet's unsuitable personality is actually the carrier of his naivety and the symbolic relationship that Tanpınar is trying to establish with the past. In this respect, it is debatable how much later Tanpınar encountered Behçet Bey's personality as an obstacle.[87] Moreover, from another point of view, the novel itself is written in the context of this naivety and the inconvenience, and to expose it. This personality is both an opportunity because Behçet Bey, who cannot be included in the life and spends his life in "clocks, book bindings and antiques" and is disconnected from the interactions that comes with it, serves as an excellent lens to understand the other personalities revealed in the novel. At the same time, in a higher context, he represents the disconnection of the past in the temporal flow. At the very beginning, in the section titled "thoughts between two sleeps", Behçet's personality is described through the metaphors of "sleep" and "dream" while getting to know him. Here, the state of

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[87] This context will be discussed later, especially with the question of whether Mahur Beste is a novel or not, under the title of "The Forgotten Man as a Social Type: Sabri Hoca."

sleepiness peculiar to the Eastern people and the state of being disconnected from the realities of life allows some to read Tanpınar as a proto-orientalist[88] writer, to the extent that it can be read as the passivity of the Eastern man, which forms the basis of the orientalist discourse. In this respect, the transformation of other characters in terms of this notion of passivity, as in the character of Hayri İrdal in Tanpınar's other novel, in *The Time Regulation Institute*, also needs attention. However, it should be stated that the situation here is the need for antimatter, which is necessary for the fictionalization and storytelling of the whole interaction. This has given birth to the antiheroes we encounter, especially in these two novels of Tanpınar. Right at the beginning of *Mahur Beste*, the narrator says the following about Behçet:

> *What a strange sleep he had slept… It was as if he had been awake all night, however, although he was always disturbed by the left arm on which he was lying, he could not move, and had passed this hour with all the strangeness and torment of a troubled dream, which constantly changed and became more and more depressing as it changed.* (MB: 7)

On the other hand, this state of sleepiness, independent of the remedies for his current troubles, the stuck between reality and dream, has many implications for the reader regarding the fictionalization of Behçet's character. These allusions are significant for Tanpınar, who has taken the issues of civilization change and old-new conflict (or incompatibility) as the basis of his thought. Another context that will be important for Tanpınar in terms of dream[89]is that dream and sleep represent another temporality. This is a fragmented time depicted in Behçet's character in the sense of temporality. In *Mahur Beste*, as Mehmet Aydın emphasizes that Behçet's fragmented personality, which does not fit anything new, was specially chosen by Tanpınar, expressing that Tanpınar wishes to settle a severe reckoning with Behçet Bey. This reckoning emerges

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[88] Talal Asad, in his work, *Formations of Secularism*, reflects on this agency and pain in particular. He offers two explanations for why the secular view is concerned with pain while dealing with an agency: first, pain in the sense of suffering is seen together with religious subjectivity and is generally seen as hostile to reason. Second, pain in the sense of suffering is something secular agency intends to remove from the world. Here, in agreement with Grossberg, Asad states that agency and subjectivity are separate things (Asad, 2003: 67-92).

[89] In Tanpınar's own words: "sleep and dream are the children of the night, that is, of a completeness that likes to abolish itself; oblivion, sudden recollections, tranquility and representation in things, participation in the mundane life of matter are possible in its enchanted zone. We live and move because the sun is in our blood. We sleep because we find the night and its order in ourselves. We dream because it speaks to us at night" (Tanpınar, 1943/1977: 30).

in the correspondence at the end of the novel, and according to Aydın, while he comes to terms with the hero of the novel, who is described as an obscure personality, Tanpınar also settles accounts with the past and wants to remind his reader that people like him have no place in the new life (Aydın, 2013: 156).

> *We are children of a world that Freud and Bergson shared together. They taught us to look for the secret in the human mind in human life. For that reason, in a place where I had to find only a flavor, I preferred to learn some secret things and break the magic of the shape with an explanation. Honestly, this has been a misfortune for you and me, Mr. Behçet. You have been deprived of the masterpiece that you should have inspired. On the other hand, I left my world, which I love so much because I followed you. I don't have any past longing. Even so, you took me away.* (MB: 154)

Mahur Beste's Behçet is not a character chosen by Tanpınar to remind him that he has no place in the new life, as Demiralp argues, nor that Tanpınar encounters Behçet Bey's "unfavorable personality halfway through," as Aydın mentions. It is precisely a dynamic problem that represents the disconnect between the past and the present. Just like a clogged vessel, it evokes a physical pathology where the flow is cut off, and Tanpınar wants to understand and explain why a heart attack does not occur in this blockage.

On the other hand, it can be said that it is fictionalized like an auto-psychoanalytic "fact story", just as it can be said for Tanpınar's other novels. *Mahur Beste*, which apparently consists of seven separate parts, consists of three parts as temporal division[90], from the point of view of the flow of the narrative. The first part consists of the section titled "*Thoughts between Two Sleeps*." In this section, Behçet Bey's ailments and symptoms are explained. In addition, the distances of other characters in Behçet Bey's life with him are conveyed. For example, his relationship with his father İsmail Molla and his wife Atiye Hanım is the most important issue of the first chapter. The second part covers the part from the first part of the novel to the letter that Tanpınar wrote to Behçet Bey. In this section, the case story (history of the case) is given as reconstructed. And in the first episode, the other characters in Behçet's life, who are told between two dreams in a bed at an advanced age, are detailed in a past narrative.

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[90] Here, this distinction is not the normal division of the novel, but a segmentation made by Barış Özer in terms of temporal flow (Ozer: 2009).

The third part consists of the letter part. However, it should be emphasized that the moment Sabri Hoca enters the novel, it is the middle of the novel and he divides the novel into two parts in terms of my own reading style here.

In the *Thoughts between Two Sleeps* section, the old Behçet Bey, lying motionless in bed between two sleeps or dreams, contemplates the past and generally symbolizes the longing for the past. As a matter of fact, the dreams he sees also appear as a reckoning with the past. The common point of these dreams, some with his father İsmail Molla and some with Atiye Hanım, is basically the problematic relations that Behçet Bey established with the events in the past. The meaning of dreams today is that "the harmony of his life has been disturbed" and that he is experiencing "the sharp torment of those who have made a great mistake and neglect against his soul." The narrator underlines that Behçet Bey could not get rid of this feeling all his life. This symbolic situation manifests itself primarily in Behçet's inactive character, who cannot get out of bed and who settles accounts with himself and his past: "The old one was such a far away, such a legendary realm; there, Behçet Bey could imagine himself as he wished, under the magical light of this realm that changes and beautifies everything" (MB: 10). Behçet Bey, who is the representative of this inert and passive past, is also not an art enthusiast or collector, according to the Narrator. "He was just a poet"[91](MB: 18). For him, original and even rare items do not have a great meaning. What he wanted from all items was that they be a frame for his dreams, to open a door for him to escape[92]. Little did he want to own things he chanced upon. Because Behçet Bey, without moving from his place all his life, "Escape, go!" he shouts.

In the form mentioned above, the character of Behçet Bey, the lover of "a nostalgic past without reason," always comes to mind Atiye Hanım, who is his wife and carries the meaning of the future and symbolizes the future. However, thirty-five years ago, Atiye Hanım said goodbye to her young and beautiful life, with the expression of Behçet's opening sentence, "with the excuse of a small and meaningless illness, just to fulfill the woman's stubbornness" (MB: 8). In other words, the past and the future

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[91] Probably, Tanpınar thinks that this kind of relationship with art can also be active and productive. However, he just wants to underline a kind of exposure and self-existence.

[92] This is the moment when the "escape time" expressed in the letter part first appears.

separated from each other thirty-five years ago. The first part contains a dialogue about how this separation happened. Atiye Hanım:

> *A few hours before her death, she called him to sit her side and said, "Sir, here I am dying. It's bad, but what should we do?" Then, when she saw her husband burying his head in the bed sheets and crying, on her patient face, with a more meaningful smile, told Behçet Bey that there was no place for too much grief, that a woman was the least necessary thing in this "darülmihen." (and) She added that he could be busy with his books, watches, and bindings, as he wanted from now on that no one would bother him anymore.* (MB: 15)

Through Atiye Hanım, who is remembered as a troubled marriage in this part of the narrator, Behçet Bey wants to clarify further the idle situation in the house of suffering called *Darülmihen*.[93] At the same time, as a manifestation of Behçet's distant relationship with women, a problematic relationship with Atiye, which is symbolized by a pathological laughing incident on the first night of their marriage, is depicted. As Behçet Bey thinks about the death of his wife, some ideas come to mind. In his ten years of married life, he did not understand his wife's feelings what he didn't understand, still couldn't understand, was that his wife had waited years for death for such a simple thing and was thrown into his arms as soon as she saw it. However, (as a past without a present)[94] Behçet Bey was still alive and would live on.

> *The old clocks were good-faced, good-hearted patients who needed to be cared for and healed, and books, when they were well skinned, suddenly became younger and looked like well-dressed women. In many friends' assemblies, instruments were made, songs, sets and semais were sung. In the antique shops, there was a pile of items carrying the traces of the past, the unlived time, and the value of their beauty increased with these traces, carrying the sum of time and human experience in their own existence like a holy magic.* (MB:16)

It is interesting that while Behçet Bey was thinking about his own inertia and passivity, with the help of the narrator, he talked about the "human experience" at this very moment. Because this expression appears as the only logical and positive explanation that can be found in Behçet Bey's all negative attributes or as a result. This reinforces

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[93] Tanpınar tries to reach an understanding that he attributes special meanings with the word "*darülmihen*." This word, which can be roughly translated as the house of suffering, is the spatial representation in the novel of the dichotomy of passivity and agency, which I tried to express through Talal Asad.

[94] To the extent that the "bein devoid of present" here has a meaning for Tanpınar, it also has an important relationship with the concept of "human experience."

the "strange" meaning it gives to the past, as it is not a representation of the past and the past, and as a disconnected link between the past and the future. When considered in terms of human experience, the former is also, according to Behçet Bey: "the blessing of time." In other words, by passing through people's hands and entering human life, things gain a different warmth from their nature and become almost human. Apart from this, oldness could not have any other meaning, according to Behçet Bey. The fact that the narrator, who is preparing to understand a disjointed story of the old and the new, suddenly utters the expression "human experience" in this introduction, which is positioned like the left key at the very beginning of a musical note, is a sign that can be better understood throughout the whole narrative, especially when the lives of the characters around Behçet Bey are detailed.

From the moment the concept of experience emerges, a flow begins that includes mirrors, clocks, and especially the concubines of Tarıdil Hanım Efendi and Behçet Bey's adolescence dreams until the end of the first chapter. This flow is caused by a Mirror that he learns was taken from the Necip Pasha's legacy. Behçet Bey looks at the "Mirror" in his bed but sees the mirror and the past reminded of the mirror, not himself. The mirror causes in him memories of masculinity and first sexual experience or non-experience. Behçet Bey remembers the rose that was thrown into the boat while passing by the Necip Paşa Mansion on a boat.

> *Behçet Bey, (...) did not realize which of these (women) had thrown that big and red rose into the boat, right at his feet, while he was passing by the mansion in a boat one night. The things he knew were these: These girls were very beautiful. This rose was as fresh as if it had not been plucked yet, and as soon as it was thrown, the coy laughter ringing in the window of the mansion contained an invitation to pleasures that he had never tasted or known before.* (MB: 19)

It seems that Behçet Bey refused the invitation of the pleasures he did not taste and avoided the experience symbolized by the "red rose." "In this old Bosphorus night, among the heavy scents of jasmine and roses, he could not turn his face to the soft, ready-to-bleed, plump object that he could not bend over at his feet. As he remembered this red rose that he could not plant, Behçet Bey still felt afflicted and helpless despite the intervening sixty years. The concept of experience, which is injected into the story in a way blended with sexual experience, will show itself precisely in interaction environments, in fact, in the field of human interactions that generally occur around

Behçet Bey. In fact, as mentioned later, it will cause Behçet Bey to be pushed out of the novel.

4.1.1. Two Father Only Son

In *Mahur Beste*, after the first part of the "Between two sleeps," in which Behçet Bey's extended time is told, the second part, in which a series of heroes forming Behçet Bey's past, is told. The story's plot is formed through the effects and distances of these heroes on both Behçet Bey's and each other's lives until the Letter part at the end of *Mahur Beste*. Thus, as the first significant character, we first meet Behçet's father, İsmail Molla. And again, as I said before, this acquaintance is the introduction, in a Simmelian way, of one social type in the context of its interaction with others. The central interaction here is on the reciprocal relationship between father and son, which is a basic form of social interaction. The İsmail Molla side of this relationship is hopeless and pessimistic:

> *(...) İsmail Molla Bey could never forgive the fact that his only son, on whom he had once gathered all his hopes, did not resemble him. That's why he had completely changed his life after he had given up hope that his son would grow up the way he wanted. He even told it with a strange pleasure to those who knew him closely. In life, one would want most of what he wanted to do to be done by his children. It was a natural thing. But now Molla ate what he had left to her, as she understood that Behçet could not do anything and could not enjoy any blessings at this large table. "After my child doesn't look like me, it's okay or not, it's the same for me." Heused to say his word from time to time.* (MB: 28)

On the other hand, Behçet Bey's side of the situation is also dark in terms of the relationship with the father. Because basically, Behçet Bey has a feeling of guilt for not being a son as his father wanted him to be. In addition, there is a state of ignorance. Behçet Bey loved his father very much, but barely knew him. He had not once tried to measure the strange and harmonious arrogance that dominated his whole personality. Rather, he grew up in the *harem* with his mother and nanny, believing that his father liked them, and adopted their dull and desperate views as he was.

The same experience problem is also in question between İsmail Molla and Behçet this time. Behçet does not know his father because the relationship between them has not turned into an experience. Therefore, Tanpınar associates this situation with the

fact that Behçet never measured his father's smugness. The relationship between Behçet Bey and his father deteriorates traumatically when İsmail Molla, who is described as a crucial breaking moment, discovers Behçet Bey's room in the attic where he works, binds books, and repairs clocks. To put it another way, the encounter of İsmail Molla with Behçet's room destroys his last hopes until then:

> *Mistress and Nanny looked at each other, at first with the cowardice of an accomplice, then they both replied, "I think he's in the attic." Molla, who had high hopes for his son only by the memories of his own youth evoked by the word "attic", immediately climbed the stairs. Behçet was really working in the attic. But this work was not at all what Molla Bey had hoped for; with his back turned to the light coming from his broad sheen, his hands scuffed and painted, his weak shoulders fluttered upward like a shadow on a huge vise he could not turn. On a hot summer evening, in the shadowy light pouring in through the open window with both wings, Molla Bey compared his son more to a large, injured spider squirming, caught in a web he had spun, rather than a human being. This attic room looked like a genuine bookbinding shop, with a table running along the wall, and all kinds of tools, pots of glue and glue, hangings of colorful cloth, marbling paper, and leather here and there.* (MB: 30)

The expression of a wretched spider entangled in its own web is undoubtedly the clearest and most revealing expression of İsmail Molla's view of his son. The moment that İsmail Molla encounters his son's workshop in the attic ends with the two of them embracing. This embrace is the first and is presented by Tanpınar as a realization that two different fortunes accept each other. However, "Molla Bey cannot (still) love Behçet Bey after tonight", "because in order for İsmail Molla to love something, he must like him" (MB: 32). In this way, *Mahur Beste* describes the situation of İsmail Molla in the period of time until he was suddenly appointed as the judge of Mecca and then corresponded with his son. In the meantime, the sudden decision of İsmail Molla to be appointed as the judge of Mecca is also interesting, and it has some meanings in terms of the "*ilmiye* class" structure of the period. İsmail Molla, who is one of Mahur Beste's social types of *ilmiye* origin, is presented as an outstanding example of a solid moral understanding during the reign of Abdulhamid II, by Tanpınar. Thus, in the words of İsmail Molla Tanpınar himself, he is the representative of "the temperament that is very restrained but also reckless" (MB: 27). And he has to face the consequences of these character traits. According to Tanpınar, the period in which he lived was a period when Abdülhamid II and his close circle corrupted public morals. For this reason, İsmail Molla's life away from the Palace, the distance from the Palace, results in the fact that Abdulhamid II did not welcome him and he was appointed as the judge

of Mecca by the Sultan himself means that he was removed from Istanbul. Tanpınar's thought on this punishment was that "a Palace could forgive many visions; but it could not forgive the *istigna*, the isolation." Işın (2001: 586) takes this expression as extremely important in terms of emphasizing the obstacles that a personality independent of political authority will face, in its solitude, to manifest its morality, especially in times of collapse freely.[95] During the appointment of İsmail Molla as an exile, he is shaken by the sudden death of Şefika Hanım, his wife and Behçet Bey's mother. After waiting for a while at his wife's grave, he returns to Istanbul. Another surprise awaits him in Istanbul. His son Behçet Ata will marry the daughter of Ata Molla, Atiye Hanım. Behçet Bey, meanwhile, became a member of the Council of State. This marriage, which was a sudden decision of Abdülhamid II, was a way the Sultan found so that Atiye Hanım would not marry one of his own princes. Atiye Hanım's father, Ata Molla, was never satisfied with this marriage, so a new dissatisfied father was included in the story of Behçet Bey.

Ata Molla, who Tanpınar described as a "*dessass* enthusiast,"[96] is another representative of the *ilmiye* class. As I mentioned before, while Tanpınar tries to reveal the father-son relationship as a micro experience, he tries to reveal the Ottoman ilmiye class as a macro interactional experience, in other words, their positioning in the bureaucracy and thus the general social environment of the Abdülhamid period. Ata Molla does not want a son-in-law like Behçet Bey, and he is sure that he is not a suitable groom for his daughter Atiye. So how was Ata Molla drawn, and what does it represent? In a place where Ata Molla and İsmail Molla are compared, Tanpınar describes his character as follows: "Ata Molla Bey and İsmail Molla Bey met from childhood, but they did not make love. This was not the result of longstanding family envy; these two men, over whom their time passed like a chalk eraser, were distinguished from each other by their temperaments" (M.B. 40). In Ismail Molla, everything would go towards the big and powerful. It was not necessary to look at it with Behçet's eyes to see it like a plane tree; it was enough to go to his council, listen

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[95] Işın (2000: 589) thinks that this situation coincides with Tanpınar's criticism of Abdullah Cevdet Pasha in the *19th Century History of Turkish Literature*.

[96] This expression, which means a passionate trickster or fraudster, basically corresponds to a social type in Ata Molla's character, who at that time would try all kinds of ways to gain a place and a fortune with it.

to his conversation, realize that you are bothering him. "Ata Molla was quite the opposite: he liked to be hidden, crawling and biting those in front of him. Like his grandparents, whom he could count for seven or eight generations, he was innately scheming, mysterious, and cruel" (MB: 41). Like a spider, it likes to wait for its prey by weaving its web where it is, and it is almost uncomfortable in the open, under the sun. The relations of Ata Molla with people were the relations of subtle calculations, whispered suggestions, and descending to rise and strike during the course. With thin, long-fingered hands, a large, bony head, a slender body, a large yellow nose that covered his bloodless face, it was as if he had been made for it.

As Ekrem Işın stated, Ata Molla, who was always stuck with money but did not stop living in luxury, "introduces us, in the most general sense, the true face of corruption in the ilmiye class... He belongs to a family." In the words of Tanpınar, his family members "were stuck with the state treasury like leeches and left there with destined death only on condition that they leave their place to each other." According to Işın (2000: 588), this determination of Tanpınar is a striking explanation of the classical wealth accumulation in the Ottoman upper layer, because this material accumulation, which lacks its own production dynamic, begins to dissolve with the decline of the *ilmiye* class in the modernization period. Ata Molla tries to survive by selling the real estate he owns, but fails. On the other hand, a difference between the Abdülaziz and Abdülhamid periods, which is also mentioned by Tanpınar in *Mahur Beste*, causes this wealth to erode.

> *But in the reign of Abdulhamid, there were no brilliant Ihsans like the reign of Aziz. This period was satisfied with releasing its members in their attempts. Apart from that, the ihsan was replaced by "medal." On rare occasions, legendary figures of Abdulaziz's time would return for services unknown to all. The rest were small gifts between five liras and fifty liras. Poor Ata Molla used to go mad with his anger when he saw that every application he made lately provided nothing but a medal given to him, if not to his wife, or to one of his son-in-laws. His drawer was filled with well-shot gold or silver coins of all kinds, with red, white, and green ribbons, and a heap of medals that looked at him with diabolical irony from among the creditors' bills.* (MB: 43)

This dissatisfaction and loss of welfare turns Ata Molla against the period in which he lived. Tanpınar adds to this self-interested oppositional attitude, "the need for a secret action in an era when everything is in the palm of a single man." According to Tanpınar, if Ata Molla had not been created in a negative character, this period of

hostility would have taken him forward, combined with organizations working against tyranny and thrown him into the forefront of the ideas of his time. However, the opposite happens and Ata Molla returns to the past and turns into a melancholic character loaded with longing for the past. He begins to miss the old Istanbul, and with a curiosity for history. His life seems ridiculous and meaningless when he thinks about the times when the "ulema class" (*İlmiyye Sınıfı*) dominated the whole state, changed the landscape of the city with a single word, deposed the rulers, and took the heads of viziers. As a result, "He does not like this Istanbul without janissaries, cavalry, cauldron, and revolution, does not like this ruler who has turned the *ulema class* into a *Fetvahane* cat and ruled the country alone in his palace, he sees everything around him as small, vulgar and meaningless." (MB: 44)

In the first phase of abstraction, the dissatisfaction towards Behçet Bey emerges differently for the two Fathers. Behçet Bey's dissatisfaction is a dissatisfaction for İsmail Molla in the sense of the discontinuity of his own self, power and pleasures. It is also indirect for Ata Molla, he works through his daughter and works as an unworthy groom to his daughter. These two types of dissatisfaction also spread to the way the two people view their own times. It also manifests itself in the context of Experience. *Mahur Beste* is the story of the actual situation of people who could not find what they put in place yesterday, along with many social and administrative incompatibilities, at a time when the human experience was conceptually destroyed. Tanpınar finds and extracts an experience whose story can still be told within these incongruous and inappropriate characters. Tanpınar achieves this by expressing this "experience without experience", sometimes ironically and sometimes funny. Indeed, irony is a good way of explaining that something that is not there is actually there. Just like the ironic statement made by İsmail Molla to the sudden death of Ata Molla. When Abdülhamid II sees and recognizes Atiye Hanım's husband in the palace, he realizes the gravity of the situation and orders Atiye Hanım to be given a consolation "medal." When this became news in the newspapers of the period, Ata Molla could not stand this sadness and had a brain hemorrhage. As I have stated before, the dissatisfaction knotted in the character of Behçet Bey is the disconnection of present and future hidden in his wife's name (Atiye=Future). However, the whole story tries to tell that this disconnection also corresponds to an experience.

4.1.2. Marriage Years as a Non-Experience

The story of Behçet Bey's marriage years begins with the placement of a matching problem in the narrative. Behçet Bey is short, Atiye Hanım is one and a half inches taller.

> *He raised his eyes to the young woman again. Why was she so tall? Was it necessary for his wife to look down upon him like that? "If she reached out her hand, she would caress his chin" he thought. He took a step back, as if he wanted to get rid of this mess. Atiye Ham's laughter ended these thoughts that made Behçet Bey drenched in sweat as if he had been under a shower.* (MB: 57)

This matching problem, this discord, symbolized by the height of Atiye Hanım (or the shortness of Behçet Bey), the anxieties formed in the depressed atmosphere of the first wedding night in Behçet Bey's head, all of them are interrupted with a laugh. And Behçet Bey carries this smile as a trauma throughout his life. This disharmony over length and brevity, combined with the laughing effect, fills a sexual content for Tanpınar in the direction of speaking the unspeakable through a phallic image. Again, the choice is ironic, and this time it places the phallic image at the heart of a great debate of old-new duality and incompatibility. Here, Tanpınar's clear intention is undoubted that he wants to be able to talk about what we cannot talk about in this old and new issue. The situation that Tanpınar wants to talk or express will eventually emerge in the letter he wrote to Behçet Bey. While explaining his presentlessness, Behçet Bey describes the "present" as an observation tower for seeing the past and the future (M.B: 155). Thus, this image, which can be understood differently in many layers, illuminates an entirely different past, present, and future issue. It is quite obvious that he approached the issue in this way during an essential break in his intellectual life, namely in his forties. With the character of Behçet, unwanted by his father, unwanted by his father-in-law and ultimately unwanted by his wife, he actually tried to explain the situation of many social types in the face of old and new. If we go back to the first night of marriage, the situation is different for Atiye:

> *Why was she laughing? The young woman did not know this either. Maybe she laughed because she couldn't cry. She had come to this room from such a distant place to this strange man whom he never knew he would love... All the dreams of her youth, the fairy tales she listened to in his childhood, the novels she read, a lot of thoughts, long conversations with her peers, everything had prepared her for this night. ... Tonight and this man ... These were things so foreign to her that she couldn't even tell if she was liked, let alone to like him.* (MB: 57)

As a symptom of a trauma that divides time and disrupts the flow, it is an indication of a greater civilizational disharmony that is tried to be explained both through Atiye and by Atiye. And we find the author's general approach to the issue in "she laughed because she couldn't cry." This "smile" reverberates throughout Behçet Bey's character and makes him a symbol of all the failures of his life. And by making him feel that another time and happenings are flowing in the background:

> *In the distance, a ferry to the Golden Horn sang bitterly. A dog barked. A few dogs answered him further afield. Outside, Istanbul night is heavy and sickly, full of delusion and fog. The night went on as he knew and was accustomed to. Behçet Bey knew these voices very well. How these voices had accompanied him through his sleepless nights? He would no longer sleep. Insomnia is for people who can dream. However, Behçet Bey got rid of all kinds of dreams. Tonight, with this laughter, the door of all those dreams, those dreams of happiness was closed.* (MB: 59)

Dream (*Rüya*) is a magical time that we encounter in other works of Tanpınar. It symbolizes both inner depth and the discontinuity of a more outer flow. Like all shy ones, Tanpınar says, "Love is a unique dream in Behçet Bey's life too." He is talking about an uplifting love that he started to read before he entered Mulkiye (The University of Administrative Sciences), making every moment a different flavor. Love is a transformative and revolutionary flow, like a dream. Behçet Bey also desires this love, and this desire is described with obscurity and as an unthinkable vein by Tanpınar:

> *A friendly and beautiful woman, whom he has never met in a place he does not know, but with whom he is familiar with all the riches, from the color of her hair to the sparkle of her eyes and the simplest voice of her voice. She would fill his whole life with light, color, and poetry, like those steamboat lights that disappeared after she had dressed her long-legged. Saxon work, dark grass-green lamp, the pile of things scattered here and there, in a brand new outfit, rang silently in the crystal (billur) of the ceiling chandelier.* (MB: 59)

Atiye cannot correspond to this flow and from the following day of the traumatic first night's "smile," she embraces her new home and new life: "The upbringing she was brought up taught her to love the husband that fate will bring her." (MB: 61) Moreover, when her first child dies three days after their birth, she becomes more and more attached to Behçet with her sense of motherhood, which she cannot satisfy. In this case, it is not very difficult because her husband has a lot of child-like sides. In addition, he has no difficulty in loving Behçet Bey, as he is a person who can "love

those who are weaker than himself" by nature. The fact that the first child was born and died with great difficulty leads Atiye to give birth to Behçet Bey. On the other hand, Behçet is more equipped than Atiye to get used to marriage. In Tanpınar's words, he "looks only at himself, like all shy ones, and measures everything with his own values" (MB: 61). He finds his wife superior to him and lives as far away from her as he can to avoid being crushed. His love for her is presented as a mixture of many emotions: "hatred, jealousy, the desire to forget, adoration to death."

> *As soon as he came home, he would either be closed in endless papers, papers, or buried in their bindings, watches, old manuscripts and miniatures. It was a kind of self-condemned exile for him. From time to time, Atiye would break this isolation, come to his side and sit down. "What a beautiful thing!" He would take the work or work in his hand and ask for his explanations.* (MB: 62)

It is important for Tanpınar, who is trying to understand and explain many things at the same time and simultaneously but in different layers, that this marriage, which cannot get into the flow that it should, and we understand that it is disconnected from its most basic nature, still continues. Marriage without marriage is also explained at great length, and the details of how this non-marriage marriage is possible are presented in detail. Rather than this disconnection between husband and wife inside the house, Tanpınar's focus of expression is again a multi-human interaction network established with intense social and psychological elements. Therefore, İsmail Molla is included again in the sociodynamics of non-marriage marriage. Since "without İsmail Molla, Atiye's life would have been truly unbearable with this hardworking spider-like husband" (MB: 63).

İsmail Molla gets closer to Atiye, ready to compensate for the inadequacies he has seen in his son Behçet for a long time and the "human experience" of knowing a woman's soul well. Atiye also fills the material and moral gaps[97] in her marriage by making use of her father-in-law's knowledge and experience. In place, this relationship turns into another experience in which both of them become very close to each other, but Tanpınar does not persistently give the details. For example, the lines in which

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[97] What kind of a relationship is the relationship here and whether Tanpınar is trying to talk about something that cannot be talked about can be a separate topic of interest. Because the way of expression preferred by İsmail Molla and Atiye, especially when describing this relationship through their musical tastes, is at a level that sometimes evokes a sexual relationship.

Atiye's musical taste is mentioned and İsmail Molla's contributions to this taste can be evaluated in this way.

The young woman did not play or sing, but she loved music. While listening to music, she was as if she had left herself to an angel who ruled all luck. Molla Bey both loved this state of hers and was afraid of the consequences of a sensitivity that could be called morbid. However, he did not hesitate to deepen it. According to him, the essential thing was that the human soul embraced what we call time and strongly transferred its traces to it, as if biting a fruit. Above all thoughts of happiness and disaster, a fortune had to complete itself. Suffering was the daily bread for man, and death only a woman, neither of which could be escaped. The main issue was to live deeply and to self-actualize, to give a personal refreshment to mortal life. The young woman loved music. That might consume him; But if it was destined to be consumed with him in something so beautiful, why should he run away from it?

> *How many times had he seen his daughter-in-law, whom he loved like a daughter, suddenly change her face while listening to an old composition, shudder, and struggle internally as if she wanted to catch something impossible to catch. When the composition was finished, this state would also end, and the young woman would remain where she was, almost as if she had melted into the music. In fact, this melting was to find oneself, to find the real happiness. One could not be himself without hearing this eagle's claw on his skin. That's why he never once thought of depriving the young woman of this one and only happiness of her life.* (MB: 64)

Here, this relationship is of key importance. Because İsmail Molla has a function that transforms Atiye into another character and enables her to realize herself and heals a kind of blockage. Ultimately, he turns her into a sage and a kind of politician. However, the same Tanpınar also has to explain the meaning of this relationship for İsmail Molla. Therefore, he is well aware that a phenomenon cannot be understood without another phenomenon – although the situation here seems to be that one pathology gives birth to another.[98] İsmail Molla also met many women throughout his life, and just as a man, women seemed to be an imposition of nature and a new image of a woman was formed in him. This was the 3rd time in İsmail Molla's life and this was due to Atiye's upbringing. Because Atiye knew a man and especially an old man. When she was three or four years old, her mother got sick and could not be busy with

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[98] Like Durkhemian postulation that a social fact can only be explainde through another social fact.

her children again, she spent her whole life with her father and lived by being attached to him. The fact that she was brought up in the shadow of an active male image and close to him resulted in her "delighting in seeing the man doing his life in the action of the outer world."

That's why he talked to his bride about almost everything. He would tell her about the past times and the affairs of that day, he would tease Abdülhamid, he would imitate the great viziers of the time, he would tell about the *Fetvahane* and a lot of people he worked with for a long time, he would interpret the news she read every morning to him, and he would show her the bad side of things. Atiye without saying, "I'm a woman, what's all this to me?" she would listen to him carefully. Sometimes İsmail Molla would talk about his own life, memories, what he heard and what he saw.

Through this interaction, Atiye regains a flow, an uninhibited time she partially missed in her husband Behçet Bey. Atiye would lose himself in the crowd of these conversations, as if listening to a fairy tale or reading a book, and embraced their life and fortune. In one of these conversations, in the presence of Behçet Bey, İsmail Molla tells the story of the musical piece *Mahur Beste*, which gave its name to the novel. "Mahur Beste is the work of Atiye's younger brother-in-law, Lütfullah Bey's father Talat. Talat Bey, a mechanic captain, wrote this work after his wife (Fatma Hanım) left him" (MB: 69). Behçet does his best at that moment so that this love story, in which everyone is ultimately unhappy, is not told. Because he is afraid that Fatma Hanım will set an example for his wife. This fear she sees in Behçet Bey causes Atiye to feel pity for her husband more than ever before. Until that evening, Atiye, who was afraid of causing suffering to others for her own happiness, believing in the thing called "time" and not giving up on the coincidences that time would offer to people, at that moment loses her faith in the thing called "tomorrow." "Tomorrow" is a magical opportunity for Atiye above her will, her appetite for life, the miraculous climate it creates within us. She loses her belief in this because of "the anger, pain, fear and misery that flows from her husband's face" that night. It is essential that the hope for tomorrow is lost and that *Mahur Beste* caused this destruction. The narrator presents this return of Atiye as a turning point in the novel. This turning point is when Behçet Bey is pushed out of the story and thrown in another direction. When Atiye loses this reasonless and contentless belief, she becomes more attached to Behçet Bey instead of

leaving him. And she turns into a "political subject" just like in the stories of other women that İsmail Molla told him, but with a different content: "since the door of love was closed to them, then other doors had to be opened" (MB: 70).

The expression of opening other doors is precisely the moment when Nietzsche and the meaning he attributed to the concept of "*unhistorich*" are injected into the novel. As stated before, Nietzsche (1873/1957) states that forgetting is as much a constructive element of history as remembering. Here, the hopelessness of tomorrow invites us to the field of oblivion in the sense of forgetting an expectation. Here, on the other hand, "politics" or "political subject," which begins when it enters the field of oblivion, is now outside of its own story and corresponds to an active subjectivity and an active time experience that can give new ways and direction to both itself and the flow. Just as Nietzsche already says that "tomorrow" is only possible with the possibility of forgetting, Tanpınar also wants to tell about the birth of Atiye, a time experience that can transform his own story in this renunciation. In other words, a flow inhibited by "smile" found its way by wandering other paths. And this "Novel", which is not a novel, turns into a narrative that Tanpınar also forgot about Behçet Bey after this stage, that is, it ceases to be Behçet Bey's story. In fact, we can better understand how this state of forgetting builds an active individual through the new character in the novel in the next chapter: Strange Revolutionary Sabri Hoca (*Garip*[99] *İhtilalci: Sabri Hoca*).

4.1.3. Forgotten Man as a Social Type: Sabri Hoca

As it is generally known, Georg Simmel's formal sociology works on the unity of form and content, and while he says that forms actually deserve sociological attention as great content representations, he also conceives them as something other than structural wholes and universal patterns. The middle man, the marginal man or the stranger are his famous social types. Certainly, this attempt is something he does to deal with what Coser calls (1977/2003: 340) the "fallacy of separateness" and to reveal different sides of something that is one rather than an approach that constantly produces dualities. Social life can only be understood in the context of this interaction, just as social action and reaction come together in a single concept of interaction.

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[99]The word *garip* is used here as it carries both the strange and the poor meanings in Turkish.

It is essential in terms of the flow of the narrative that Tanpınar suddenly forgets Behçet Bey in Behçet Bey's story just before Sabri Hoca appears on the stage, and Atiye forgets hopes for Behçet and her belief in the future just in the meantime. And the use of all these to describe what kind of a being is in an inability turns the "novel", which had no pretension to be a novel till that time, into a novel. This discussion is important because the discussion of *Mahur Beste* as a literary genre, especially as a discussion opened by Oğuz Demiralp, finds its meaning here. This discussion embodies and gives meaning to many sub-problems, from the choice of *Mahur Beste* as a name to the inclusion of Sabri Hoca in the novel, from the narrative being the story of Behçet Bey. So who is this Sabri Hoca? The answer is a strange and forgotten man. Tanpınar said, no one could have recognized him as a human being as quickly as him. He instilled safety in everyone he saw and would wholeheartedly adopt every job spoken to him, provided that it was not immoral. But he never thought of taking advantage of this interest, he used to live in a strange exception with his dirty clothes, hair, beard, and torn robe. Sabri Hoca is located near Midhat Pasha during the reign of Abdulaziz. He is located in the Talebe-i Ulum, and even Midhat Pasha and his friends hold one of the secret reins that manage these fifty thousand people who will fill the streets of Istanbul with crowds when necessary through Sabri Hoca. Sabri Hoca is a man who has gone in and out of every event without adding anything important from his personality to any event he has been involved in, without making even his closest friends accept him. He is obviously a tool. He intervenes, gives (without) something to people, but is neither hopeful nor transformative in himself. He can be expressed precisely as a catalyst.

There is one feature of Sabri Hoca, which is presented above all his features and as the reason for all of them, and that is his interesting connection with forgetting and being forgotten. Sabri Hoca, as a social type that he placed in the middle of the political life of Istanbul during the reign of Abdulhamid, will actually carry out the most active opposition among many characters who have been in opposition to and suffered from a social and political environment created by Abdulhamid since the very beginning of *Mahur Beste*, or will rightly speaking, it is a social type that will help "turn dissatisfaction into action." Tanpınar attributes the morality of rebellion, revolutionism and this awareness of being active, which are not found in other characters but in Sabri Hoca, to his actually forgotten nature: "Our ideas are ours when we have the power to

carry them" (MB: 85). He describes Sabri Hoca in the context of being forgotten in such a way that this oblivion, this unnoticedness, which starts from his childhood years, is engraved in his character as the ability to forget everything.

> *His fortune was to be forgotten, unnoticed. It was as if he had the secret of not being seen, the kind of magic cone in fairy tales. Everyone forgot about him several times a day, whenever the opportunity fell. Everyone, from his mother and father to the court committee investigating the Suavi Case, to the witnesses heard in this case, had forgotten. Despite his shabby life in Istanbul and the many meaningful and dangerous words he used here and there, Abdulhamid's jumalists forgot him. In Zonguldak, where he was exiled almost by accident, the police and administrative authorities forgot about this exile so much that he came back to Istanbul in the third week, and then went to Odessa by jumping on a ship. He toured the European centers for three years. He saw Petersburg, Vienna, Paris, and returned to his hometown. Despite lots of internal and external records, no one even said to him: "Where do you come from? You were in exile in Zonguldak...."* (MB: 75)

When Tanpınar tells about the house where Sabri Hoca was first forgotten, in the family house in Giresun, we understand that the first person to forget him was his father. His father, who is a member of a rich family in Adana, is the first person to forget Sabri Hoca. Contrary to Behçet and İsmail Molla, the relationship between his mother and his father, who forgot to pay alimony after leaving Sabri Hoca, and Sabri Hoca, is not exactly an experience. Later, his mother remarries and gives birth to several more children; this time, his mother forgets Sabri Molla. Such a whole family life turns into a non-existent experience. He meets the street at an early age and develops himself: "How and where did he learn to read and write; No one knew this, but he used to write all the letters of the neighborhood towards the age of ten or twelve... When he came to Istanbul, he knew Arabic and Persian well. Besides, he had lots of ideas about life that he didn't reveal to anyone" (MB.76). For this reason, Sabri Hoca's first nickname would be *Dilsiz Hoca*. Another nickname would be "broken ear Sabri Efendi" when he lost the upper part of his right ear after a fight with a knife. However, when he entered the masonic lodge and began learning French, the nickname Dilsiz Hoca would changed to the Dinsiz Hoca (without Religion).

The way Sabri Hoca is handled by Tanpınar in the context of great forgetfulness, starting from his childhood years, is accompanied by his contextless, disconnected and disconnected life experience. Tanpınar wants to construct the meaning of the social

type he tries to draw by putting forgetting and disconnection side by side in this respect in a way that includes every moment of the character's whole life. While Sabri Hoca is included in the novel as a "strange revolutionary", Tanpınar is in his mind after a portrait of a revolutionary or the reasons that brought him into being. For this reason, his forgetfulness, indifference and ability to jump from thought to thought and from experience to experience in a contextless way are presented by Tanpınar in a close relationship with his revolutionary and activist side. Let's listen to Nietzsche again at this stage. Forgetting is as much a factor in the formation of historical knowledge as remembering, and even has a founding character. This constitutive quality stems from the link of forgetting to action, as Nietzsche mentions:

> *Forgetfulness is a property of all action, just as not only light but darkness is bound up with the life of every organism. One who wished to feel everything historically would be like a man forcing himself to refrain from sleep or a beast who had to live by chewing a continual cud. Thus even a happy life is possible without remembrance, as the beast shows: but life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness.* (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 6-7)

According to Nietzsche, as I have said before, if the past is not desired to be the grave digger of today with this border, it is necessary to know how great the plastic power of a person, a nation, a culture is, in order to determine its forgotten border. While Nietzsche details what he wants to express with "plastic power", this power firstly develops in its own unique way, and secondly, it "transforms the past and foreign, reshapes it, heals wounds, replaces the lost, and gives a new form from within itself to the broken forms. It is the power that gives" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 7).

Tanpınar designs Sabri Hoca like Halit Ayarcı in *The Time Regulation Institute* by blending it with the meaning Nietzsche gives to *plastic power*. Its effect in the novel is also a plastic force that can be produced by complete oblivion. For this reason, just as Nietzsche describes, he is self-righteous and all the details about his life are at a level that can be understood only in their own causelessness and contextlessness. In a short time, concepts such as "liberty, tyranny, working hours, financial and constitutionalism" began to remain in his language. And it begins to take place in the social events that follow. The first event is the right to demand, which ends with the dismissal of Mahmut Nedim Pasha. However, the main event is the Ali Suavi event, where Tanpınar also wants to explain the Ali Suavi event in terms of its social

dynamics through the character of Sabri Hoca. However, Sabri Hoca's story, which consists of perfect oblivion, is also haunted by a disturbing element: Remembrance.[100]

As a matter of fact, after participating in the Ali Suavi incident, after hiding in Istanbul for a while, he goes to Anatolia and finds himself in his father's house in Adana. However, he stays here without introducing himself to his father. Every day he wants to tell his father that he is actually his son, but when he wakes up in the morning, he gives up. According to the narrator, there are two reasons for this. The first is the disconnection, because they both live in such separate realms that it is impossible to fill the space between them with a fatherhood and sonship that will remain only in words. The second is pride: to call him "I am your son" would be to sell what he and his mother suffered for some welfare to this rich man. Thus, Sabri Hoca's not remembering himself to the father who forgot him causes this encounter to remain as an incomplete confrontation that cannot be experienced. He does not remind his father of himself, but when he sees his father's prosperity and wealth, his mother and his brother who died of tuberculosis come to mind. He returns from Adana remembering them.

> *But now, in this warm spring-scented country, in this notable mansion, his father, who did not know him, was almost in a corner, next to his half-brother, who looked at him from above, so arrogantly that he tried to squeeze two mecidi in his hand, he remembered them for the first time, the misery in his mother's life, the pain, the pain in his brother's tuberculosis. He could see her gnawed face as it was. Where had these dreams been concealed to visit him so strongly today? Why had he lived unaware of them until he came to this house?* (MB: 83)

"This trip to Adana causes a complete revolution in him" (MB: 84), and after his return, a "remembering" is added to his story of "forgetfulness" and "forgetting." He thinks he's taking with him an awareness that he thinks he's gotten the indexes of his own life from his father's house. However, Tanpınar insists on emphasizing that this is not the case. According to the narrator, "He is not a person who can maintain an enthusiasm and he is not as free as the revolution that broke out in his head would like." His attempt to face his oblivion, this sudden look back and remembering "the misery of his mother and brother" makes him despair. It distances him from Action

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[100] In this respect, while Tanpınar tries to create in his mind the social type of an intruder in the Simmelian sense, he also designs it not as an ideal type, but only in the concrete reality of the social type, with the obstacles that appear in concrete reality.

and leads him to a mental and conceptual passivity: "Instead of opening the engine to broad and warlike thought, to the war in its light, it gets stuck on a few words that look like piers very close to each other. He thinks he has all the keys as he makes them jingle in his palm. However, according to Tanpınar, "he remained undecided and helpless on a threshold he could not jump, neither backward nor forward. This threshold allows us to see Sabri Hoca as a character living only in the present and turns him into a hopeless politician trapped in a world of mere words, instead of being a revolutionary.

4.1.4. Interaction of Two Social Types: Sabri Hoca and İsmail Molla

Tanpınar, after designing Sabri Hoca as a social type of oblivion, encounters him with a character like İsmail Molla who thinks that the past still continues. Tanpınar designs a discussion between them. Through this discussion, he wants to enter into the debate of old-new incompatibility and civilization change, a big issue of a reading style often attempted by *Mahur Beste*. Sabri Hoca was designed to talk about supra-individual concepts and ideas and as the only character who can think of the new with the metaphor of "forgetfulness" affixed to him like a badge by Tanpınar. Tanpınar also prepares an environment of interaction to make Sabri Hocaspeak, who was called *Dilsiz* Hoca at the time and chooses İsmail Molla[101], the only character who "safely" survived the first episode of *Mahur Beste* as his interlocutor. The dialogue between the two evolves into an East-West debate in a supra-individual social and cultural context, sometimes with Behçet's intervention. Sabri Hoca is not interested in an ideal type of a revolutionary, but in the social type of a "strange revolutionary." Sabri Hoca is a character in which two opposite concepts such as revolutionism and despair, come together. This renders him inactive at the point where he will act and condemns him to the bondage of concepts in the mental world:

> *Even if all the temporary conditions that made the society's destiny were overcome, there was a wall deep inside that was impossible to overcome. This was the mentality that every civilization instilled in individuals as a legacy, and which continued from father to son as a social instinct. It was very difficult to change it. However, as long as it remained as it was, it would appear before us*

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[101] Because İsmail Molla, unlike Sabri Hoca, is a character that can correspond to the saying "our ideas are ours to the extent that we have the power to carry them" (M.B. 85).

again, taking on a thousand and one forms at every step. Here Sabri Hoca was struggling in the despair of these thoughts. (MB: 86)

He fell into silence again, but now only one sentence comes out of his mouth to explain everything: "We are in despair, we are in despair, oh you don't know, what despair we are in ..." Another evening when he was hopeless, İsmail Molla comes for dinner and has a conversation with Atiye and Behçet. A deep conversation begins with İsmail Molla in this environment. The conversation's first topic is the obsession of the *Committee of Union and Progress* (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) about the abolition of Abdülhamid.

> *They can't see the real target. They are only busy with Abdülhamit. They think of nothing but destroying it, overthrowing it. Abdulhamid is the only man ... There are thirty million men here ... We all know how he destroyed this country. But the issue is not that, the issue is that this love of freedom, this hostility to tyranny seems to make one forget what should be considered. We are all busy with Abdulhamid. Except for the five or ten people around the palace, the army, the officer, the people think of him morning and night. We are coming to the attraction by counting his evil deeds... There are two voices in the country: Long live my Sultan! Down with Abdulhamid!* (MB: 88-89).

Sabri Hoca thinks that the problems will not be solved with Abdulhamid's departure because the social and historical reasons that gave birth to Abdulhamid are much more important. İsmail Molla, on the other hand, believes that with the abdication of Abdülhamid, everything will be fine because society has a living life. Behçet Bey listens to this discussion silently. For a while, Sabri Hoca turns to Behçet Bey and asks him "my son Behçet, do you know what bankruptcy of a civilization is? Human decays, and do not remain; It is a set of spiritual values that make a civilization human. Do you understand the magnitude of your problem? (M.B. 91). Because of Behçet Bey's interest in books, he associates this situation with *şiraze*: "People are left without *şiraze* among us." When we look at the world, we see it separately. When we are alone, he says, we think differently. Behçet Bey only answers, "Have we changed a little in eighty years", but Sabri Hoca thinks that the change will not be more or less. Change is a concern of all or nothing. This is why it is necessary to go deeper and change the mentality that builds society. The reason for this necessity of change is that the house representing the civilization of the Orient was burned down: "Then the mansion itself burns down. Now we are like the people we see in the wreckage" (MB: 95). Sabri Hoca evaluates all the eastern world as a ruin.

After listening to Sabri Hoca for a long time, İsmail Molla responds with a speech on the importance of life itself and the belief that it will continuously renew itself despite small changes. İsmail Molla is presented as a social type who is self-confident in life and does not live as a burden on his past. He has neither forgotten nor is very attached to the past; "I am not attached to the Orient, nor to the past, I am attached to the life of this country. Is it Muslim, oriental or Turkish? I don't know" (MB: 95). İsmail Molla confronts the unity of life before Sabri Hoca's discourse, which is based on the duality of the East and the West. Contrary to Sabri Hoca's opinion, the issue is not about being backward from the West. The problem is being behind in the life next to us and what it demands. In most cases, this discussion, taken from *Mahur Beste* as Tanpınar's views on the Orient, is a debate that Tanpınar revives without taking a side. In other words, Tanpınar is precisely this debate itself.

4.1.5. Tanpınar's Letter

Tanpınar ends the novel with a letter at the end of *Mahur Beste*. This letter, written to Behçet Bey, the novel's main character, is both a cause and a consequence of the sudden and rapid ending of the novel. Thus, Tanpınar tries to get into the narrative and transform the author's position into a character in the novel. This part, which roughly contains the content of an apology from Behçet Bey, basically creates an opportunity for Tanpınar to tell the story he wants to tell more smoothly and with the consistency of a full storyteller. In this section, besides the basic character traits of *Mahur Beste* that I tried to explain before, I would try to reveal the meaning of this Letter part, which was placed as a scissors stroke at the end, in terms of Tanpınar's literary intentions and also in terms of being a complement to the sociological context that he tried to construct.

However, it is necessary to summarize the meaning given to this letter by various Tanpınar commentators and the discussion atmosphere created by the letter, especially in terms of the incompleteness of the novel. These debates have progressed in two primary contexts. The first is the context in which Emre Ayvaz is involved. In this context, Ayvaz insists that Tanpınar ended the novel "because he felt very much identified with character and after a point, he felt as if writing an autobiographical book" and wanted to continue a historical panorama lingered in Tanpınar's subsequent

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two novels. And again, according to Ayvaz, he will return to a character with Behçet Bey characteristics in his latest novel, *The Time Regulation Institute*. Ayvaz thinks that Hayri İrdal is a better-designed and refined Behçet Bey (Ayvaz, 2012: 67). To put it more clearly, "Hayri İrdal is Behçet Bey's awareness of his puppetry" (Ayvaz, 2012: 67). Here, it is essential to approach the notion of awareness expressed by Ayvaz with restraint and to emphasize that what Tanpınar is trying to do is to make a story he is trying to tell fully tellable. Another approach to the Letter section at the end of *Mahur Beste* is the opinion that Tanpınar has lost his way and that it is not possible for Behçet Bey to continue the story through his passive personality. According to Oğuz Demiralp, an essential representative of this view, at the end of Tanpınar Mahur Beste, Behçet was frightened by his passive personality and wanted to teach him a lesson. However, it is clear that the letter is a turning point for Tanpınar.

On the other hand, it is crucial to think more about the letter. In the letter to Behçet Bey at the end of the novel, which he designed as a complete representation of the context of "incompetence," he apologized for forgetting him: "as I first thought, you do not belong to a single time. You are not living in an indivisible time. You spend your time just like me and everyone else... For you, the present is (*hâl*) the moment of remembrance. For the rest, you are completely indifferent." This dialogue with Behçet Bey creates a break in Tanpınar and Tanpınar admits that he misunderstood something: "Then the dream of a house with a closed door disappeared by itself. In reality, the house completely burned down, and you were left outside. That's where the mental flavor I found in you comes from" (MB: 155). This confession is reminiscent of the situation Georgy Lukacs said for the novel in *The Theory of the Novel*: "Time can become a founding element only when the ties with transcendental home are severed" (Lukacs, 1971: 29). It is also interesting that Lukacs describes the situation and dilemma of being outside the house in the context of the "fire" metaphor (Lukacs, 1971: 29). The breaking moment of Tanpınar's transformation into a storyteller through the Hayri in the Benjaminian sense is hidden in this dialogue. In the continuation of the letter, he adds that the realization that Behçet Bey did not have a homeland to which he could return allowed him to find a new method in his art. The moment Tanpınar realizes that Behçet Bey has no home to return to prompts Tanpınar to seek a new and founding understanding of time and history.

4.2. Setting the Clocks Now: *The Time Regulation Institute*

The Time Regulation Institute was serialized in 1954. It is Tanpınar's last novel, and it was published as a book shortly before his death. Because it contains essential parts of a grand narrative, it has been regarded with greed as a solution to many of the social problems at the center of the great Turkish modernization debate, especially with its flow and internal inconsistencies. However, just as a novel, Feldman (1998: 37) emphasizes that the novel's complex structure makes it unique in Turkish literature in a way that it will not have another example until the 80s and 90s. It is possible to say what Benjamin (1968/2007: 201) said about Marcel Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* (1913) for Tanpınar's *The Time Regulation Institute*: "All great works in literature establish a new genre or it is also said to have destroyed an old one, which is true; in other words, all great works are special cases." We are now faced with one of the most incredible of these cases." This emphasis on the complexity and uniqueness of the novel has become the focus of attention of many foreign critics after the novel was translated into English and published by Penguin Books in 2013.

On the other hand, the analyses made include separate praises and evaluations in terms of how the novel describes the modernization process, its symbolic setup, and its narrative style, that is, its satirical structure.[102] It is not surprising to see that these new and exogenous interpretations also include or reproduce the significant generalizations put forward by Oğuzertem and Pelvanoğlu and "ready reading categories"[103] that also appeared in the early interpretations of the novel in the 70s and 90s. In the comments, the weighted average of these short-circuits briefly appeared in the form of funniness brought about by the inability of society to adapt to modern times. These interpretations and ways of reading, together in the 2000s, provided the conservative reader[104] of Tanpınar, who criticized Western modernity, "the necessary setting to

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[102] It is a debate whether the novel is an irony, an allegory or a mere comedy. See also (Moran, 2012), (Oğuzertem, 1995/2018), (Ertürk, 2018).

[103] For this, one can look at the writings of Dellaloğlu in various contexts in which he questioned Tanpınar's conservatism. Especially to article titled "Tanpınar's Conservatism Issue" (Dellaloğlu, 2012: 85).

[104] Pelvanoğlu thinks that especially the readings from Kaplan and Moran, the context that determines *The Time Regulation Institute* is constructed with a conservative criticism attributed to Tanpınar, and

stage the divine comedy of the Republican revolutions, which they did not dare for a long time." In addition to all these, *The Time Setting Institute* has undoubtedly gained its special place among Tanpınar novels, in addition to other stylistic and narrative features, in terms of the complex relationship of the individual and society with temporality, with a particular context. However, it should be noted here that I did not use the concept of time as a major tool brought with it by the "ready reading categories" in the sense Pelvanoğlu mentioned, and I specifically avoided it. I will return later to the extent that we can explain that this avoidance is possible with the help of the multipleness of temporalities in the novel to witness a temporal change that the author constructs through the character of Hayri İrdal himself.

Like in the *Mahur Beste*, *The Time Regulation Institute* also has a narrator issue that has spread to a genre problem. As it has been said before, with the letter at the end of *Mahur Beste*, Tanpınar established a link between the novel and reality, and through this mediation, he made himself a part of the narrative. By including himself in a kind of narrative and talking to the hero, he transformed himself into a hero in the narrative. But at *The Time Regulation Institute*, the situation is different. Here, as the interpretations made on the similarity between Hayri and Hamdi try to express, it works on both the similarity and the difference between Hamdi and Hayri. As a clue, this place allows considering the novel as an autobiographical novel or as a *Bildung Novel* but also opens up another possibility. It is the reading of the novel with a deconstructive approach. In that case, just as in the relationship that the deconstructive strategy establishes with meaning, the "meaning" that the narrator first observes and then conveys is subject to a loss of meaning, in each process of the narrative, so that it finally takes its place in the text as something that is both there and not there. This is just like Heidegger's grammatological relationship with the word of being: In the words of Sarup (1993: 33).

> *...in order to understand Derrida's thought and strategy as deconstruction in an approx clear vein, it is compulsory to grasp the concept of "sous rature" a term usually translated in English as "under erasure." The concept sous rature implies an important initial position in a deconstruction reading. Derrida derives this notion from the texts of Heidegger, "who often crossed out the word*

Hayri İrdal's observations are based on the evaluation of this criticism as if it were a "figurative" narrative in metaphorical mode.

Being and let both deletion and the word stand because the word was inadequate yet necessary." (Sarup, 1993: 33)

Perhaps the reason for all the attention and discussion that the novel draws on it, and the multitude of disagreeable opinions about it, is, first of all, due to its structure that shakes the subject/narrator position, which blocks any interpretation channel from the beginning, like a black hole that does not leak any light. As I will try to argue over the details of the novel here, it creates opportunities for the subject/object distinction in the social scientific methodological sense as well as it destroys the distance between the narrator/narrative[105] in terms of literature. Thus, the universe of the narrative turns into a social scientific raw material, or more accurately, a social monograph. For Tanpınar, who knew that he was a good reader of Nietzshe, this situation creates a tragic result as much as the text makes it funny. For example, in his work written for his master, Yahya Kemal, in a place where he quotes Nietzsche, he has the same problem when trying to unite the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo.

Nietzsche's great discovery, the Dionysus - Apollon encounter - or merger - occurs spontaneously again. Dionysian humor demands surrender to our instincts, passions, or moods close to them. It is a raging nature despite the harmony of creation. The Apolonian humor, on the other hand, is this harmony itself or, with its face in us, reason. It wants the dominance of thought. (Tanpınar, 1995: 172-173)

For Tanpınar, including the author as both the narrator and the understander in the text is an attempt to perfect the attempt to get rid of a duality, which he tried to do through a letter in *Mahur Beste*, as I mentioned in detail. In *The Time Regulation Institute*, events revolve around Hayri İrdal, who is the main character and narrator of the novel. Hayri is a character depicted with his ordinariness and simplicity: "Yes, I neither like to read nor write. While this is the case, I am trying to write my memories in front of a big notebook this morning" (SAE: 9). Hayri İrdal begins his memories with a confession of sincerity, which is essential for the intelligibility of the work in general:

Because I am Hayri İrdal, first of all, I am a supporter of absolute sincerity. Why write an article when one hasn't said everything clearly? On the other hand, this kind of unconditional sincerity inevitably requires scrutiny and elimination. You

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[105] It should also be noted that the same distance can be interpreted as Tanpınar's inability to keep a distance from his book for Emre Ayvaz (2012: 69), as a reader of the *Time Regulation Institute*, and that there are other examples of these interpretations. See also Berna Moran (2012).

will agree that it is impossible to say everything as it is… Rather than leaving the word halfway because sincerity is not the only thing. (SAE: 10)

This statement is both a promise of sincerity and a confession of sincerity simultaneously. And to what extent can we trust Hayri is also the center of discussion (Pelvanoğlu 2014; Oğuzertem 1995/2018). While leaving the character of Hayri/Hamdi in the text and setting it up as a situation that has been crossed out, he also makes Hayri promise a sincerity-like confession. The novel begins with such a definition or confession of sincerity and consists of four parts. These chapters are "Great Hopes", "Little Truths", "Towards Morning", and "Every Season Has an End", respectively. According to a common opinion, and especially according to Berna Moran, the first part deals with the Pre-Tanzimat period, the second part deals with the Tanzimat period, and the third and fourth parts deal with the beginning and the rest of the Republican period. It should also be emphasized that Moran's periodization of the novel's fiction may not be entirely outside of Tanpınar's intention. However, this periodizations and historicizations of the novel include some short circuits and misunderstandings I mentioned.

In the first part, Hayri emphasizes that his narration is to tell the strange lives of people such as Seyit Lütfullah, Aristidi Efendi, Abdusselam Bey, who have a profound effect on his own life, especially Halit Ayarcı and Nuri Efendi, and perhaps their contribution to his own life as the biggest reason why he wrote this memoir. Even though it is the work of Halit Ayarcı, Hayri thinks that the *Time Regulation Institute* is the fruit of his own life (SAE: 21). Thus, he explains the main reason for writing his memoir in terms of his history. The most important part of his story, which started from the third part of the first chapter, is undoubtedly what İrdal said about freedom, which he described as "the main privilege of his childhood."

We use this word [Hürriyet] only in a political sense. Unfortunately, those who consider it a political thing will never understand what it means, I'm afraid. Freedom in politics is the key or the door that remains wide open to a mass of unfreedoms. Unless it is the scarcest blessing in the world; and if a single person wanted to fill his stomach with it, the people around him should definitely go hungry. I have never seen an object that comes with its opposite and disappears under its opposite. I heard that it came to our country seven or eight times in my short life. Yes, even though no one told me that he is göne, he came seven or eight times and we burst out into the streets with our joy because it came. (SAE: 22)

These inner thoughts on freedom (*Hürriyet*), which evokes an ironic language rather than a satire (but neither satire nor irony) and for today's sociability, which he talks about. At the same time, he interprets Tanpınar's thoughts on time experience and the transformation of this experience. In this section, where an interesting example of thinking about freedom[106], especially thinking in a sociological context, is exhibited, the narrator tries to understand the idea of freedom together with history, memory and time as well as society. The *Hürriyet* narrative continues as follows:

> *Where does it come from? How does it suddenly go away? Does the giver take from us again? Or do we all of a sudden leave, "Here you go Sir, I've got my enthusiasm now. Do we give it as a gift, maybe it will be useful for you? ... I finally came to the conclusion that no one needs him. ... If we were really in need, if we really loved, we would never let him get out of our sight once again, on one of his frequent visits. What travels? He is not there the day after he arrives. And the funny thing is, we get used to your absence very quickly.* (SAE: 22)

What Hayri tells about political freedom is essential. He tells this through a dialectical comparison with a freedom, which his childhood bases on another temporality that can be read as absence and self-indulgence. Childhood freedom, on the other hand, is described in this contrast as the experience of another temporality, more grounded and not given by anyone. This "freedom" is essential in the sense that Jean Luc Nancy explores, but also in another context, as an experience that cannot be talked about and should be forgotten. Although it was not emphasized by Hayri, Süha Oğuzertem (2018: 329) thinks that this freedom is also related to neglect and indifference. According to him, in a philosophical, political and temporal direction extending to the neglect of Hayri's son Ahmet, Tanpınar manages to say many things at the same time (with the possibilities of a symbolic language) while describing a childhood experience of freedom. In particular, while emphasizing its relationship with neglect and indifference, he acts within the philosophical sense of the unspeakability and inexpressibility of the experience of freedom. The harmony of this freedom is disturbed by a wrist watch that Hayri's uncle gives to him as a circumcision gift. However, Hayri will also consider this day as the day he was born into his new life.

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[106] It is important to share Jean Luc Nancy's (Nancy, 2006: 88) thoughts on freedom here. For Freedom, according to him, does not allow to be presented as the center of a subjectivity that unfolds in complete independence without any obstacle, which is the ruler of itself and its own decisions. What could such independence mean but the impossibility in principle to enter into even the slightest relationship – and thus to exercise even the slightest freedom?

Tanpınar's basing the transformation in Hayri's life on both a wrist watch and the day he was circumcised have important implications. Emphasizing one of these implications here will also illuminate why we want to trust Hayri in the triangle of childhood, experience and history.[107]

Where Nietzsche[108] develops and discusses the concept of "unhistorich", he considers childhood as an ahistorical mode of existence (or, as he puts it, "once existed") and describes its relation to time as follows: "a fence of the past and the future, without an undeniable past yet." He sees the child playing in blindness, very happy among them, as if the thought of a lost paradise overtakes him. And he adds, "but now the child's play must also be disrupted: only when the time comes, he is called out of domain of forgetting. That's when he learns to understand the word once upon a time" (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 6). According to Nietzsche, this is the moment when history begins. He sees the expression "once" as the code where historical time began and at the root of this beginning. But the important thing here is what happens after this beginning.

On the other hand, Agamben (1993: 60), in line with Nietzsche, thinks that infancy is the transcendental experience of the difference between language and speech that opens up the space of history for the first time. He thinks that the existence of such a thing as infancy, that is, of experience as the transcendental limit of language, excludes the possibility of language presenting itself as integrity and truth.

> *If there was no experience, if there was no infancy, language would undoubtedly be a 'game' in Wittgenstein's sense, its truth coinciding with its correct usage according to logical rules. But from the point where there is experience, where there is infancy, whose expropriation is the subject of language, then language appears as the place where experience must become truth. In other words, infancy as Ur-limit in language emerges through constituting it as the site of truth. What Wittgenstein posits, at the end of the Tractatus, as the 'mystical' limit of language is not a psychic reality located outside or beyond language in some nebulous so-called 'mystical experience', it is the very transcendental origin of language, nothing other than infancy. (Agamben: 1978/1993: 58)*

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[107] Tanpınar seems to imply the end of childhood with the perception of time, another example of which we remember from Nietzsche. This point is important because it would not be surprising that Tanpınar, who we know as a reader of Nietzsche, has placed such an emphasis on the relationship between time and childhood in his novel. Also see (Tanpınar, 2007/2015: 158)

[108] "The term "unhistorich" is the field of forgetting for Nietzsche and he thinks that it feeds people more than history, in this sense, it is similar to Freud's concept of "unconscious" at about the same time.

In Agamben's sense, the break with childhood is both a break with experience and a break with language's claim to truth. Or, on the contrary, "this is precisely the case of one's childhood - above. The period that we have identified as the origin of history and experience acquires its real meaning when placed at the basis of the distinction between endosomatic and esosomatic heritage in the human species"[109](Agamben, 1978/1993: 56).

Hayri places his childhood precisely on this distinction and therefore begins by describing his childhood and remembers, for example, freedom in his childhood as a complete experience. For this reason, the basis of all the events that will continue throughout the narrative is formed by the heroes he knows from his childhood. The flow of events that occur in the later parts of the novel is provided in a mutual interaction with mutual truth and childhood experience. However, since one side of this flow comes from childhood experiences and the other comes from the world of reality and facts, he has to confess sincerity at the very beginning of the novel. In this way, we should not forget that *The Time Regulation Institute* is actually an attempt to write Hayri's memoirs, as well as an experiment on how childhood or human experience can be transformed into historical knowledge.

Hayri/Hamdi says that in addition to his wrist watch, there are three more clocksat home, and each of these clocks refers to separate temporalities in which Tanpınar fictionalizes the novel. The first and most important of these clocks is a large standing wall clock inherited from the great grandfather *Takribi[110] Ahmet Efendi*, which is called *Mubarak* with the meaning that spreads to the whole of the novel. This watch is also described as Menhus by Hayri's father, because it reminds of a strange "mosque charity" project, which was the will of the great grandfather, who was never able to "fulfill" and was always a burden. This clock also has quirks in terms of its operation:

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[109] The opposition between nature and culture, which continues to be the subject of such lively debate between philosophers and anthropologists, immediately becomes dearer if it is translated into the familiar biological terms of endosomatic and esosomatic inheritance. From this perspective nature can only mean the inheritance transmitted through the genetic code, while culture is the inheritance transmitted through non-genetic vehicles, the most important of which is undoubtedly language (Agamben, 1978/1993: 56).

[110] Can be translated to Turkish as *approximately*.

it is said to be "a special time of people living in isolation." Apart from this big clock, there is also a small clock, also called the "secular" clock. This is a desk clock. This clock is not religious and otherworldly like the first one. When his special spring (*zembereği*) is set, he plays a very fashionable folk song of that time at the beginning of the hour. Hayri emphasizes that there is a similarity between this watch and radios. The third and final hour is the one in his father's bosom. This clock, on the other hand, is either completely broken[111] or constantly breaks down. The constant deterioration of this clock brings Nuri Efendi, who is the most important of his father's friends, into Hayri's life.

4.2.1. Great Hopes Little Expectations: Social types of Hayri's Childhood

The first part of the novel, in which Hayri İrdal's childhood (or infancy) is told, is also the land where interesting characters take place and where his roots in the novel are buried. This chapter, which is a kind of expression of Hayri's childhood, tries to overcome an impossibility that I have tried to discuss in detail above through Agamben and Nietzsche. Childhood as an absolute experience is childhood because it cannot speak, language is the domain of concepts and consciousness. There can be no experience in consciousness, and there can be no consciousness in experience. Tanpınar jumped into a childhood universe that absorbs everything like a black hole, as Hamdi, but turned into Hayri with a deconstruction that also depicts the change of a dimension. As Hayri, everything he tells from the multi-dimensional inside the black hole reaches the reader, that is, those outside that childhood (like Hamdi's transformation into Hayri) by transforming and deteriorating formally. As a result of this attempt, it is also a deconstruction. Thus, Nuri Efendi and his *muvakkithane* in the first part of the narrative turn into the *Time Regulation Institute*, and Abdüsselam Bey and his "house" are transformed into a lost house that is tried to be kept alive and filled. On the other hand, Seyit Lütfullah came out of that childhood as the spiritism society, that is, with its structures deteriorated. The transformation of Naşit Bey into a member of the Committee of Union and Progress is interesting. For this reason, what happened in the other three chapters after the first chapter of the novel has deep significance in terms of the social experience represented by the characters in the first chapter and

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[111] The fact that this clock, that is, his father's clock, is completely broken, is compatible and related to the image of the Father in Hayri's narrative, which emerges with the continuous unsuccessful attempts.

their interactions with each other. To put it more clearly, the emergence of the social types interacting with each other from the childhood universe builds the comic, satirical and ironic language of the novel unintentionally.

4.2.1.1. Nuri Efendi: Owner of Fairy Tale Time

Nuri Efendi is both the most important and the least ironic[112] character among the characters described in this part of the novel. For Hayri, the reason why the wrist watch that his uncle gave him changed his life is that he started working in Nuri Efendi's *muvakkithane* as a result of his love for the watch that started with it. Nuri Efendi is a character that Tanpınar uses to describe the past without a doubt. He owns the time. Through this character and his *muvakkithane*, the meaning of both the clocks and the broken clock in the symbolic world of Tanpınar in terms of old values is revealed. For Tanpınar, Nuri Efendi is not only the hero of Hayri, but also of himself, in reality and at a point where fictionality becomes impossible. As will be seen later, it represents a vast and flowing time in which all the other characters also situated. At the same time, it is because of this flawless flow that it not only rules the clocks, but also provides a fairy-tale social space for all the other characters in his *muvakkithane* where they can interact with each other. For this reason, his social side is repeated several times by Hayri. However, he also receives lots of praise expressed by Hayri.

> *You know, in those fairy tales, it's like the old folks who give you three strands from their beards and get lost when you get bored... Nuri Efendi's speech was very sweet... Some of my acquaintances considered him a great scholar, some half-saint (evliya)... he was a good watchmaker... he worked like a connoisseur for the pleasure of the job.... There was no need to rush... He was more like a watch doctor than a watchmaker... He didn't really distinguish between watches and people anyway... He used to say, "God created man on his own image, and man invented the clock like himself"... The watches he fell on the most were those that could be called broken scraps... He would put it together, make a working watch and call it Muaddel... then he would look at this watch and say, "how similar to us"... he was meticulous in the timing of the clocks... according to him, a clock that didn't work, was broken, was like a person who got sick. It was a social crime and was a terrible sin... that was his social side... he was the owner of that time...* (SAE: 31-59)

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[112] His only flaw is Nuri Efendi's relationship with Seyit Lütfullah, which is linked to Nuri Efendi's "*tecessüs.*" In other words, it is the curiosity to understand and analyze that also makes him a watch repairer.

Nuri Efendi is described here as an old sage, an image of the past that has not been fragmented and has the opportunity and knowledge to re-integrate all kinds of fragmentation by Tanpınar. If there is no compulsion, Nuri Efendi forms the basis of social interaction of all the other characters, in line with the possibilities given by the sociological reading preferred here. Finally, Tanpınar kills this hero right at the beginning of the novel in 1912. And by designing the new *Muvakkit* Asım Efendi, who replaces him, in a way that does not resemble him at all, he tries to reveal that something more is dead together with Nuri Efendi. Clocks are just a machine in Asım Efendi's hand and he does not want to see them in relation to humans as Nuri Efendi did. To put it more clearly, Nuri Bey's social side is lacking in Asım Efendi.

So, what exactly is Nuri Efendi's social side? This situation is also included in the novel by being associated with clocks. Therefore, the fact that Nuri Efendi is a *muvakkit* is also important in terms of Hayri's characterization of him as "the owner of time." In order to express this, it is important to historically understand the social function of Muvakkithane in the Ottoman Empire, as analyzed by Avner Wishnitzer (2015: 30).

> *Clocks were not considered inherently incompatible with this scheme, but were rather quite easily absorbed into it. As mechanical timepieces became more widespread during the eighteenth century, muvakkits throughout the empire began employing them alongside their traditional tools. In addition to their training in Islamic astronomy, many muvakkits acquired expertise in horology and became skilled clock repairers. But as the calculation of prayer time and the Ottoman hour system was bound to the revolution of celestial bodies, mechanical clocks remained subordinate to traditional methods of time reckoning. The muvakkits continued to perform their duty, relying on their traditional instruments of celestial observation and setting the mechanical clocks in the muvakkithane accordingly.* (Wishnitzer, 2015: 30)

Wishnitzer thinks that the timekeepers add a social function besides these functions, and Tanpınar successfully expresses this situation in *The Time Regulation Institute*. This social function in:

> *Tanpınar's text demonstrates the crucial role played by muvakkits in the interface between the physiotemporal and the sociotemporal orders, and between religious and social life. In fact, it was the inseparability of these realms that the muvakkit reflected more than anything else. The muvakkit was charged with the calibration of social time to the rhythms of nature, but it was more than just that. The muvakkit was the connecting link between cosmography and daily*

life, between the world of the learned and that of laymen, between the mosque and the bazaar, between the literate elites and the reaya (flock). By determining prayer times and setting timepieces, the muvakkit disseminated hegemonic temporal culture and translated it into "usable" time, time that could be used to structure daily routines. (Wishnitzer, 2015: 33)

The role of muvakkit, underlined by Wishitnizer, as an interpreter between different social classes and spaces, clearly affects Tanpınar's description of Nuri Efendi's social type. Everywhere Hayri describes the relationship between Nuri Efendi and Saatler, the reader encounters a special character who translates both the social and existential experience of man as a clock.

> *He didn't really separate the clock from the person anyway. He would often say, "God Almighty created man in his own image, and man invented the clock in his own likeness..." He would complete this idea many times as follows: "Man must not let go of the clock. Just as if God leaves man, everything will be destroyed!" His thoughts about the clock would sometimes go deeper: "The clock itself is space, its walking istime, its setting is human. This shows that time and space exist with man!"* (SAE*: 32)

Among the friends of Hayri's father interspersed in the first part of the novel, there are also characters such as Abdüsselam Bey, Seyit Lütfullah, Aristidi Efendi and Naşit Bey, who are described in detail. These characters are definitely not on the same level as Nuri Efendi. However, Hayri's acquaintance with all these characters and, indeed, social types are also due to their coming to Nuri Efendi's *Muvakkithane*. For this reason, Nuri Efendi's muvakkithane functions as a social space in which this inventory of characters, which plays a role in Hayri's entire story, interacts. For this reason, according to Nuri Efendi, other characters are depicted as irrational fairy tale heroes who are both detached from the past and half or eclectic (*terkip* or *muaddel*) disconnected from the present. For this reason, Nuri Efendi, from Hayri's point of view, "is like the old folks who, in fairy tales, give you three strands of their beard to call you for help when you get bored.

4.2.1.2. Seyit Lütfullah: Strange Man

As a matter of fact, in Hayri's narrative, Seyit Lütfullah is an important character emerging from the fairy-tale-like time presented by Nuri Efendi. Hayri describes Seyit Lütfullah as "he knew the secret of continuing a fairy tale." He is someone who is

believed in everything he says, but it is also stated that he is a very liar according to Hayri. In addition, the fact that Seyit Lütfullah's residence is a ruined madrasah is undoubtedly the result of his tale's amorphous presentation, which reminds of the madrasahs in history, but whose structure is distorted. Hayri/Hamdi also mentioned this amorphous view of him in the place where he first described/destroyed him. However, in his youth he was considered more beautiful" (SAE: 42) Another important aspect of Seyit Lütfullah is that he was after the treasure of Kayser Andronikos. Hayri/Hamdi draws his caricature with an interesting theatrical narrative:

> *Seyit Lütfullah was something else altogether: a ghostly shadow in the void, a mask on loan, a living lies. Imagine the lead actor in a fantastical play who (still wearing his costume and cloaked in his assumed personality) springs off the stage to continue his performance in the crowded city streets. Seyit Lütfullah was such a man. He inspired his little coterie to all kinds of pastimes and passions, taking people who would otherwise have led rather mundane existences and turning their worlds upside down. But with him it was never clear where his strange beneficence ended and his lies began.* (SAE: 41)

It is interesting that when Hayri/Hamdi attempted to draw his caricature in the novel for the first time, immediately after stating his opinion about him and stating that he was a liar, the reader understood that he was also a preacher in a mosque. However, he is such a preacher that Seyit Lütfullah is a character that can be understood only as a factual, false and false "religion" without expressing it openly.

> *He was not from Medina, as most people claimed, nor was he a descendant of the prophet Mohammed. Infact he probably adopted his name somewhere along the way. According to Nuri Efendi, he took the name Seyit, given to descendants of the prophet Muhammad, when he was engaged to a woman during his time in Iraq. But he actually hailed from the province of Baluchistan[113] in Afghanistan. He left his native land when he was still quite young and, after traversing the Orient, arrived at last in Istanbul, where his beautiful and moving recitations of the Koran at the Arab Mosque attracted much attention. Which made it possible for him to marry the daughter of a gardener who tended the grounds for a rich family in Emirgân, and even afforded him the opportunity to proselytize at a local mosque. Those who had known him from his first appearance described him as a morally upstanding and rather fanatical exponent of sharia law who, in his sermons and deliberations, would vociferously berate his flock. According to what my father reported, the man prohibited most everything in life save prayer, going so far as to place restrictions on eating, drinking, and sometimes even speaking.* (SAE: 41-42)

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[113] In the Turkish text it is seen as "aslen Bülûçtu" which means being from Baluchistan and being nomad at the same time.

This life story, that is, Lütfullah's nomadic life in terms of its basic features, his groundlessness and the disconnection of reality he presents, and therefore his lying, allows us to read his ghostly and corrupt existence as Simmel's Stranger. Seyit Lütfullah, as Simmel (Simmel, 1971: 143) states, a stranger is thus being discussed here, not in the sense often touched upon in the past, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. Seyit Lütfullah also came and stayed. He seems like he could leave at any moment, but with his existence, he has transformes the existing social interactions and carries it to another dimension. If it is understood that the flow of the whole novel is related to the treasure of Kayser Andronikos, whom Seyit Lütfullah has convinced everyone, it will be clear that Seyit Lütfullah is a Ghost or a Stranger who travels all over the novel's plot. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that the ground of social interaction with Nuri Efendi, Abdüsselam Bey, Pharmacist Aristidi and Hayri's father is not the same in terms of ideal factors. Because the reason why he is interested in this treasure is a condition of marrying his lover *Aselban*, who lives in an abstract realm. On the other hand, this treasure corresponds to different meanings or interests for other characters. For example, one of these interests is to meet the expenses of AbdüsselamBey's mansion, which functions together with the private image of a house, and the large crowd of people in it, and to ensure the continuity of the mansion. On the other hand, for Pharmacist Aristidi Efendi, who is completely on the side of positivist science, it is a condition for the continuity of his pharmacy, which operates with the presence of the crowded people in Abdüsselam Bey's mansion. However, in a way, Lütfullah's relationship with Aselban also increases the belief and respect for Lütfullah as another experience (or an experience without experience) for the people around him, with the effect of the different situations that he puts him in.

> *Just one thing darkened[114] Lütfullah's happiness: he could travel to the world beyond only at Aselban's invitation. When none was forthcoming, he would wander, sometimes for months on end, through our worthless world, as worn as the rags that clothed him, as ruined as the ruin in which he dwelt. Ill-tempered and belligerent, he avoided human society, for he was given to violent bouts of rage that seemed very much like epileptic[115] seizures; these horrifying episodes*

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[114] Tanpınar prefers the word "stain"(*leke*) here, which is not used in the English translation of the book. A "blot" is especially important in terms of interest as a choice belonging to Lacanian terminology, and especially in terms of illuminating the psychic existence of Seyit Lütfullah.

[115] The expression epileptic has important implications with Curse (*Beddua*).

clearly took a toll on his constitution. His chest pumping with pride and his mouth spewing foam, he'd sputter a string of strange and indecipherable profanities, inviting damnation upon his enemies, threatening to murder and destroy them with his own grisly hands. "I . . . Ah, yes, I . . . I . . . Does the individual not know who I am? The individual knows not who I am? I shall rain misfortune upon the head of this individual." Lütfullah's opponent was always an "individual" or at least addressed in the third person: "Is he aware that I shall burn him to a crisp?" (SAE: 46)

Seyit Lütfullah has many different meanings in terms of both Tanpınar's own life story and the sociological construction of the reality of Hayri's society. These meanings are respectively the theological origins of religion, the constitutive nature of social interaction as a form of social experience of religiosity, and the psychic relationship of religion with the perception of consciousness and reality as both a beginning and a result of human experience. For example, the expression Epileptic in the above passage can be read as the uncontrolled act of a religious sheikh: falsely representing a religion. On the other hand, it can be read as a trance state at the moment when a prophet of a true religion says, for example, that he is interacting with God (or any supernatural power). To think that Tanpınar keeps his corridors open for all these reading possibilities here is possible by taking into account the functioning role of Seyit Lütfullah as a social type. And in this way, the path of how social experience changes and transforms in the relationship of reality with ideal factors and that it can still create a final plane for social interactions is kept open in a situation where it has different meanings for individuals. From this point of view, Seyit Lütfullah is designed in the novel as a person of another plane, just like in *Mahur Beste*'s Sabri Hoca and Simmel's Stranger, that is, in an uncanny content disconnected from the symbolic language of existing social relations. The disconnection brought about by "forgetfulness", which is the basic raw material of Sabri Hoca's character, is the same as Seyit Lütfullah's leaving his hometown at an early age, and it has consequences there. However, unlike *Mahur Beste*, since forgetting, being forgotten and recollection are transferred directly to the narrator or Hayri/Hamdi, who wrote this whole memoir, in the *Time Regulation Institute* (and to this extent), only the human experience for its characters is the result of forgetting and remembering. Their common product (mental) ideal factors remained. Thus, the abstract meanings of these factors that are formed and lost at the time of social interaction and their concrete functions that continue this interaction have become visible in the text. The civilization debate between İsmail Molla and

Sabri Hoca, which took place at a concrete and primary level in *Mahur Beste*, has spread to its entire narrative in *The Time Regulation Institute* and has created the whole fiction of the novel with purely human experience whose winner and loser are uncertain.

4.2.1.3. Abdüsselam Bey: In Search of the Lost House

The image of the *lost house* reaches the universe of the *Time Regulation Institute* from *Mahur Beste*'s Letter to Behçet Bey. Abdüsselam Bey is a mixture of both Ata Molla[116], İsmail Molla in *Mahur Beste*. Abdüsselam Bey has a bureaucratic representation in *The Time Regulation Institute*, as well as being the representative of the Ottoman İlmiye class. At the same time, as the founding subject of a rich and crowded mansion image, it also contains important social implications for the continuation of the Ottoman neighborhood life. As a matter of fact, in Hayri's words, Abdüsselam Bey's biggest obsession is the continuation of this mansion life as a social integrity that gives meaning to the Ottoman urban life. In the novel, Abdüsselam Bey's mansion clearly works as a symbol and represents the Ottoman State as a cultural, social and political reality in various layers.

> *Abdüsselam Bey was a very rich, friendly man who lived with a whole tribe in his mansion with twenty or thirty rooms. The peculiarity of his house was that anyone who entered or once made the mistake of being born in it could not go out again. Always polite and elegant in his white starched shirts, this old master of Istanbul, thus unwittingly stack into his mansion a lot of people who came to his mansion from all corners of the empire; including the groom, bride, a few aunts and uncles, countless children, maybe as many children as mother-in-law, old aunt, aunt, young nephew, had eight or ten servants.* (SAE: 38)

On the other hand, the diversity of the mansion is also important in this sense. The expression "come from all over the empire" implies the cultural diversity in the geographies of the empire, together with the fact that one of Abdüsselam Bey's wife was Tunisian and the other was Circassian. As a matter of fact, the structure of the house continued with this cultural diversity and crowd until the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy. A couple of grocers, a confectioner, a butcher, and Aristidi

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[116] As will be remembered, İsmail Molla is a self-confident and well-to-do man. Ata Molla is who lost all his wealth and prosperity as a result of the changing economic and social conditions during the reign of Abdülhamid.

Efendi's pharmacy make their living from this mansion. The inhabitants of the mansion remained in the mansion a little after the constitutional monarchy, and after the war, only Ferhat Bey, his son-in-law, remained in the mansion. As a matter of fact, after Hayri returns from the military, he will live with Abdüsselam Bey in this house and marry this well-behaved Emine. Abdüsselam Bey is very upset about this situation of the mansion and cannot understand that how the idea of freedom (Hürriyet), which he associates it with this situation and loves so much, has left his house without people and children (SAE: 40-41). In this case, Abdüsselam Bey, together with the image of the lost house, reflects the Ottoman cultural life, more specifically the 19th century. It represents the mansion life, the ilmiye class. Abdüsselam's brain transformation also haunts Abdüsselam Bey with a home neurosis that was lost in the form of the transformation of the Ottoman state. The solitude in his house brings to mind the loneliness in Abdülhamit's palace, especially with the depictions in the second part. And every way he attempts to restore it at least turns Hayri's life into a nightmare. Abdüsselam Bey and his mansion reminds Behçet Bey of Tanpınar's metaphors of "staying outside the house" and "burning the house" that Mahur mentioned at the end of the composition. Tanpınar had associated this distinction with whether there was a house to return to or not. In this respect, every time Abdüsselam Bey tries to return home with the mourning of the lost house, that is, when he tries to turn the house back into its old rich and crowded state, this remains a melancholic reaction and causes other problems. The course of the novel then continues with the ghostly story of the dead Hala, who did not die, and with the exile of Seyit Lütfullah after he declared himself the *Mahdi*, after the gold quest that ended after the death of Aristidi Efendi. These events are interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War and the enlistment of our narrator Hayri.

4.2.2. Little Truths: Dr. Ramiz, Coffeehouse and Spiritual Society

The second chapter, entitled "little truths", begins with Hayri's return from the military four years later. Although Hayri does not want to see "any of his old acquaintances in order not to fall into the trap of his past" again, Abdüsselâm Bey, the only survivor from his past, finds himself instrumental in getting a job and marries Emine from his mansion (SAE: 80). Emine and Hayri start to live in Abdüsselâm's mansion. Although Abdüsselâm Bey's mansion is now dismantled, Abdüsselâm Bey still desperately tries

to prevent the dispersal of the people of the mansion. For those living in the mansion, the mansion is a complete prison due to the intense interest of Abdüsselâm Bey. Although Emine and Hayri plan to leave the mansion, they cannot succeed and become the last people living with Abdüsselâm in the mansion. With the death of Abdüsselâm Bey, Hayri's life becomes absurd. Abdüsselâm Bey became demented towards the end of his life and wrote wills stating that he left all his inheritance to Hayri's daughter Zehra. This is because Abdüsselam Bey thinks that Hayri's daughter is his own mother. The main symptom of this thought is that Abdüsselam Bey named the newborn baby Zehra, who is his own mother, instead of Zahide, Hayri's mother.[117] This is important because, according to Hayri, the series of disasters that would lead him to first meet Dr. Ramiz and then Halit Ayarcı started with these meaningless mistakes.[118]

> *The old man first laughed at this mistake as much as we did, then he got upset and started accusing himself. Towards the end, this sadness turned into a real remorse. He thought he had stolen our child from us. He would certainly be held accountable for this work in the Hereafter. On the other hand, he became attached to Zehra, whom he started to call "mother" because of this name similarity. He began to think about the future of the child. And the house was filled with wills donating his current wealth to my daughter. How many wills did he write a day? God knows this place. In the last three years, every part of the house has been filled with carpets, rugs, under the pillows, desks, drawers, and his wills. Although Emine and I tore a few of them every day, after her death, an armful of wills was issued.* (SAE: 89)

After the death of Abdüsselam Bey, the first disaster takes place. First, a lawsuit is filed for the rejection of the will. In this case, Hayri is accused of breaking an old man's trust. Just as the case is over, another absurd event occurs this time. At a drinking table, Hayri makes fun of a friend, Sabri Bey, who oppresses him about Abdüsselâm Bey's legacy, telling him that Abdüsselâm Bey has the Şerbetçibaşı Diamond. The Şerbetçibaşı Diamond is a piece of the treasure of Kayser Andronikos, whom Seyit Lûtfullah sought by contacting the other-world. However, Hayri sees the way to the courtrooms again. This time, Hayri, who is accused of theft, decides to tell all the truth in the courtroom. He says that his aunt's husband, Naşit Bey, who made this accusation,

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[117] Here, Süha Oğuzertem's comment on the symptom of this naming error is important. In other words, it is the correct identification of the symbolically drawn from Tanpınar's mother to Hayri's mother and from there to Abdüsselam Bey's mother and Emine. This should be kept in mind (Oğuzertem, 2018: 327).

[118] Indeed, it is certainly not meaningless.

actually made such a slander to prevent him from his aunt's inheritance. Later, Hayri, unable to contain himself, tells all the facts about her aunt and Naşit Bey. She cries out that her aunt was resurrected after her death, that her aunt started to live her day after her resurrection and that she married Naşit Bey, that Naşit Bey was a very poor man before marrying his aunt, and now he is a war rich man. After all these, Hayri İrdal is sent to forensic medicine on the grounds that his mental faculties are not in place.

Hayri İrdal meets with psychoanalyst Dr. Ramiz in forensic medicine. Dr. Ramiz with a deep devotion to psychoanalysis sees the solution to all his problems in psychoanalysis. A father complex is diagnosed in Hayri. Dr. Ramiz prescribes dreams to Hayri that he needs to see for his recovery. Finally, he tries to teach Hayri psychoanalysis. After being discharged, Hayri continues to meet with Doctor Ramiz in a coffee house. This coffee house begins to occupy an important place in Hayri İrdal's life. The coffeehouse is described by Hayri as an environment where people from many different social strata come together and a wide variety of issues are discussed. Among the topics discussed are "History, the philosophy of Bergson, Aristotelian logic, Greek poetry, psychoanalysis, spiritualism, everyday gossip, lewd adventures, tales of terror and intrigue, the political events of the day". But in all these subjects the discussion is as if "all gathered up into one swollen conversation that burst like a spring deluge, carrying away everything in its path, as surprising as it was senseless, one topic seething forward before the other was finished" (SAE: 131-132) However, as Hayri insists, these conversations do not turn into an experience in any way and everything is discussed superficially and without going deep. Therefore, according to Hayri, this coffee shop is a swamp of absurdity: "No matter how serious it starts, here it is. Every job ends with the most unexpected results." Everything that could emerge as an absolute reality outside of this coffeehouse "suddenly takes the form of the slightest possibility here, it would be a mockery of luck after a lot of commuting. In short, it was the swamp of the so-called absurdity." (SAE: 142-143) A new story can only be accepted into the repertory "only once it had been reduced to a base sexual escapade, a tale of pederasty, a piece of slapstick shadow-puppet humor, or the replica of an middlegame." Tanpınar presents the coffeehouse and the people in it and the subgroups formed by these people as the subject of an important social and temporal discussion with Hayri's narrative. World regulators (*Nizamıalemciler*), Eastern Plebeians (*Esafili Şark*) and irregulars (*Şiş Taifesi*) are the three groups that

make up the social strata in the coffeehouse. Those who discussed serious matters: they were known as the "world regulators". They are the aristocrats who busied themselves with the regulation of the world. Below them there was a larger group called the "Eastern Plebeians". They were "armed with only just enough culture to be active members of the coffeehouse commune, they had little to say about life's simple pleasures or even the hardships of making ends meet, preferring instead to indulge in an innocuous flair for the comical by drawing attention to the imperfections of others around them" (SAE: 132). Finally, there were the "irregulars"; devoid of social refinement and utterly ill at ease in the urban environment, they were men still in thrall to their primal urges. As it constitutes a field of absurdity, it also constitutes the field of action and thought that does not turn into experience. However, Tanpınar underlines that this coffeehouse also has a story that can be told through Hayri's narrative. His presentation of his views on the coffeehouse reminds us of the discussion between Sabri Hoca and İsmail Molla in *Mahur Beste.*

Meanwhile, Hayri is shaken by the death of his wife Emine. He is left alone with her two children (Ahmet and Zehra): "Our home had been destroyed; left alone with our two children, I lost the will to work, and, even worse, I lost all faith. But I was no longer afraid. The worst that could happen had happened. Now I was free." (SAE: 145). This freedom comes to Hayri with a disbelief and he starts to drift in life in a hopeless way. Hayri İrdal, first he started working in the Psychoanalysis Society founded by Dr. Ramiz, and later in the Spiritualism Society. Both the Psychoanalytic Society and the Spiritualism Society are actually a continuation of the absurd and disconnected life in the coffee house. Hayri, who married Pakize, whom he met in this social environment, has to take care of his sister-in-law after the death of his mother-in-law and father-in-law. Pakize is nothing like Emine, his previous wife. She mixes real life with the magical world of cinema, which he loves so much, and this situation also disrupts Hayri's reality against Pakize. It is presented as a non-experience presented in Mahur Beste, reminiscent of the marriage of Behçet Bey and Atiye. By the way, Ispritizm Society is not a foreign place for Hayri İrdal. While trying to escape from his past, Hayri İrdal realizes that he has fallen into the trap of his past. The shadow of Seyit Lütfullah is all over the Spiritism Society. For Hayri, truth is that he begins to feel again "closer to [Seyit Lûtfullah] since joining the Spiritualist Society." No matter how pure the association's scientific goals, and no matter how serious its debates and

investigations, was the true master of the manor" (SAE: 175-176). Hayri İrdal, who left the Spiritualism Society, started to work with Cemal Bey, whom he knew from the society, but became unemployed when he was fired from here. At the end of this chapter, Hayri who goes home to deliver the bad news, sees that his wife and sister-in-law are more worried about the beauty pageant than starvation.

4.2.2.1 Psychoanalysis Sessions with Dr. Ramiz

The moment Doctor Ramiz enters the novel, the door of an important discussion is opened for Tanpınar. Dr. Ramiz is a character who sees psychoanalysis as the only method to understand everything and is very interested in social issues. In this way, he is portrayed as a western and alienated character, but like every timeless clock, he makes correct determinations twice a day. In a way that we can see in the 19th -century Turkish novel, Dr. Ramiz is also alienated from the society he lives in and is able to understand every detail about the society in a way that is disconnected from its own context. He has also just come from Vienna and has a deep interest and love for Europe. This has a story for him that works in psychoanalytic and Freudian contexts. On the other hand, Tanpınar is very interested in this story. This interest appears one of the Tanpınar's article titled *Civilization Transformation and Inner Man* (Tanpınar, 2020: 38). Here, Tanpınar does not dare to say that "since the Tanzimat we have been living in a kind of Oedipus complex, that is, the complex of the man who unknowingly killed his father". However, Tanpınar can be braver through *The Time Regulation Institute* and through Dr. Ramiz, who lives in this universe. Hayri describes Dr. Ramiz as follows;

> *Even that first day I could see that Dr. Ramiz was interested in psychoanalysis less as a means of treatment for individual patients than as a science that might remake the world in its image, a road to salvation that rivaled the established religions. To him, this new science was everything: crime, murder, disease, greed, poverty, misery, misfortune, congenital disabilities, and archrivals— these things didn't exist. No living hell lay beyond the reason of man's will. There was only psychoanalysis. Sooner or later everything came back to it. With this one humble key, he proposed to explain all life's mysteries.* (SAE: 102)

Dr. Ramiz's diagnosis of Hayri is not exactly in the context of the Oedipus complex, but he addresses another context that Hayri dislikes his father. But throughout psychoanalysis sessions, it turns out that Dr. Ramiz, with his strange movements and symptoms leaking from the unconscious, is not in a position to fully represent the

consciousness. This situation finds its meaning in the statement "Almost everyone has been sick more or less since the emergence of psychoanalysis", which Dr. Ramiz expressed as a basic assumption of the science of psychoanalysis he advocated (SAE: 108). In this respect, Dr. Ramiz is no exception. He is included in the novel as an imported now and is there to identify something on Hayri that Tanpınar did not dare. This process will be the first blow of a transformation that Hayri goes through in order to tell his own story. The other impact comes from the Halit Ayarcı.

4.2.3. Through the Morning: Halit Ayarcı as a Plastic Force

The third chapter, entitled "Towards the Morning" begins by describing Hayri's helplessness and despair. Hayri is unemployed, trying to make a living with the magic tricks he learned from Seyit Lûtfullah in the coffee house. In order to lighten the burden on his back a little, he can't see any other way but to give his daughter Zehra to the rude Topal İsmail, a vagrant who frequents the coffeehouse. Here, while waiting for Dr. Ramiz to borrow a few cents at the coffeehouse, Dr. Ramiz enters with a stranger. Dr. Ramiz introduces Hayri to Halit Ayarcı. Dr. Ramiz asks Hayri to take a look at Halit Ayarcı's broken watch. While looking at the clock with the hope of earning a few cents, Hayri begins to utter the words from his master Nuri Efendi's repertoire in order to get some more. Convinced that these words had some influence on Halit Ayarcı, Hayri displays all his dexterity and eloquence to impress the person who will later become his benefactor. Despite briefly describing how the watch should be repaired, Halit Ayarcı insists that Hayri accompany him. In the evening of that day, Hayri İrdal, Halit Ayarcı and Dr. Ramiz goes to drink together. From that night on, Hayri İrdal's life begins to change. Halit Ayarcı listens to Hayri's whole life story from himself. Hayri İrdal tells the story of everything Halit Ayarcı, starting from her ugly sister-in-law who wants to be a beauty queen and her talentless sister-in-law who wants to be a singer, and his desperation in getting his daughter married to Topal İsmail. Halit Ayarcı says that all these problems can be solved with "a small change in welfare, a little effort and effort, a small difference of opinion" (SAE: 222) and says that he will start with his sister-in-law who is enthusiastic about music. Halit Ayarcı has a character that defends the new and negates every reactionary situation against the new. "Yes, why wouldn't these people be a little frustrated with you for not understanding them? What could be more natural?" (SAE: 223) Just at this stage, Halit Ayarcı diagnoses

another disease or disability in Hayri after Dr. Ramiz. This diagnosis is based on his lack of experience. Hes says, "But don't begrudge them, for you have had no experience with life and humankind. You are like an army convinced of its defeat before entering the war. Instead of stepping onto the bridge of the ship, you've taken cover down in the hull" (SAE: 223). Moreover, Halit Ayarcı accuses Hayri of not being a "realist", who insists that his sister-in-law is incompetent! In order to understand the nature of the relationship between Hayri İrdal and Halit Ayarcı, it is important to understand the realism of Halit Ayarcı.

> *Look now, Hayri Bey, (...) What do you achieve by accepting reality as it is? What will that offer apart from a slew of petty decisions that are neither meaningful nor valuable on their own? You can't do anything but draw up endless lists of what you need and do not have. What difference does that make? If anything, it only leads you away from your true path. You become permanently settled in pessimism and eventually you are crushed beneath it. To see the truth as it is . . . is to admit defeat. (...) If Newton had considered the apple that dropped onto his head as nothing but an apple, he might have deemed it rotten and tossed it aside. But he didn't. Instead he asked himself, just what can I do with this apple? He asked just what its maximum benefit might be. And you should do the very same! My baldız wants nothing but to be a successful musician. So I have two factors: my baldız and music. As the first factor cannot be changed, I have no choice but to change the second. Just what kind of music does my baldız like, then? This is what you must consider. Or will you stay forever in your cul-de-sac? Why of course not."* (SAE: 225-226).

Halit Ayarcı's realism is open to innovation and pragmatist realism. This realism is not concerned with the present forms of the past. With a Nietzschean style, Halit Ayarcı reveals the share of the ahistorical in the formation of the historical narrative, and brings to life an individual attempt equivalent to the "plastic power" that reveals the new, together with forgetting (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 7). Thus, he aims to revive the unrealized experience of the past in a way that works and takes action.

After that night, Hayri İrdal's life changes rapidly. As Halit Ayarcı said, his sister-in-law becomes a famous singer. Hayri also starts working in the office of the Institute, where he just sits all day. One day the mayor comes to the Bureau, another day someone more important and Halit Ayarcı convinces them of the necessity of the institute. Then the Institute suddenly starts to grow. Sub-branches, local offices, and the Society of Time Lovers are established. Of course, relatives of Hayri and Halit Ayarcı are placed in all these places. Hayri writes a book on *Sheikh Ahmet Zamani*,

who has no flaws other than the fact that the Institute has its roots and never existed. In other countries, institutions similar to SAE and Society of Watch Lovers are established. Although Hayri İrdal is the most important person of the Institute after Halit Ayarcı, he has no faith in his work. However, he is not in a position to give up the opportunities this job provides him. The third part ends with a cocktail attended by important scientists from abroad. All the guests are having fun, but Hayri is very bored. He shares his disbelief about his work with Halit Ayarcı. The third chapter ends with this discussion between Halit Ayarcı and Hayri İrdal.

4.2.4. Every Season Has an End: Disintegration of Institute

In the last chapter titled "Every Season Has an End", the process of the Institute's disintegration is explained. The sequence of events that brought the end of the Institute begins with the construction of a modern Institute building. A competition is opened for the new building architecture. The fact that Hayri İrdal puts the phrase "...and in accordance with the [time] on his name from the outside and inside" to make fun of the announcement of the competition makes it impossible for the competition to be concluded. In the end, Hayri is forced to make an absurd design through the image of clock *mübarek*. After this highly praised design, Halit Ayarcı suggested that Hayri also design the houses to be built for the Institute staff. All employees naturally oppose this proposal. Halit Ayarcı realizes that he cannot actually change anything at that moment. He cuts his ties with the Institute for a big disappointment. As a result of the audits, it is determined that the Institute is unnecessary and the decision to liquidate the Institute is taken. Halit Ayarcı does the Institute's staff a final favor and gets them to work in the Institute's Liquidation Commission.

The construction of the Institute building and the words "inside" and "outside" in the competition opened for it, open the existence of the *Time Regulation Institute* to a discussion in the symbolic sense as form and content. The architectural problem, which was somehow solved by Hayri, turns into a great despair when the staff of the institute objects to the idea of building the houses of the employees in the same absurdity. This discussion is undoubtedly preferred by Tanpınar to describe the inadequacy of the idea of embracing the new, which is a solution to the novel's disconnection from the past and present, in the face of a content problem. Halit Ayarcı, who can be read as a

Nietzschean plastic power with the power to pull the new out of the past, despairs in the face of the objections of the employees and thinks that he has been deceived, revealing his failure to transform into a particular human experience at the moment when the new is fully established (the institute building). In this respect, the absurdity of the "institute's building" and the guest reminding Hayri of the unnecessaryness of such an institute renders the necessity of the existence of the institute meaningless for both Hayri and Halit Ayarcı, as an attempt that did not exist from the very beginning. In this sense, the last part of the novel provides a suitable ground to think that the Republican Institutions were constructed to explain their dysfunction and inadequacy in reaching basic human experience. Thus, especially at the end of the novel, the Time Regulation Institute is read as an allegory of Turkish modernization as an unsuccessful attempt. This reading is undoubtedly not an impossible reading as Oğuzertem states. However, it can also cause ignoring the symbolic details that spread throughout the novel.

In this respect, it is also important not to overlook the story of another architectural detail, shared by Hayri at the beginning of the novel, of the balustrade (*parmaklık*) of the Kahvecibaşı Mosque cemetery. The story of the balustrade also makes it possible to read the narrative of *The Time Regulation Institute* both as the story of Hayri's development and as the journey of a historical balustrade towards the window on the porch of Hayri's new home, Clock Villa. As a matter of fact, in the first part of the novel, Hayri points to this balustrade as the reason for writing all these memories: "Some four years ago, I discovered [encountered] a piece of an old balustrade. Having bought it on the spot, I had it mounted over the French door in my office, which looks out onto the Clock Villa's patio and garden, with its seasonal flowers. I am in no doubt that this balustrade is what has led me to labor over certain points in my memoirs" (SAE: 54-55). Since the Kahvecibaşı Mosque cemetery is also the site of the ruined madrasah where Seyit Lütfullah stayed, it is also important to realize how the ghost of Seyit Lütfullah haunts the entire novel. Hayri first sells this balustrade to an antique dealer, and years later he gets it back for thirty times as much. The Jewish antique dealer he bargained with says that the balustrade comes from *Konya*, but Hayri know very well that it comes from his childhood. Otherwise, Hayri does not give any other meaning to this balustrade:

It doesn't weigh too heavily upon me to see cemeteries disappear or to see priceless, exquisitely carved and inscribed tombstones used as basins, ornaments over public fountains, or makeshift shelves on radiators. As for this coffeehouse proprietor Salih Aga, after whom the cemetery was named, I've known for some time that the man was not a saint. Despite my vows and all the candles, I lit in that mosque, my mother still passed away; and so, saint or no saint, I'd never been able to forgive him. At this point in my life, I am not about to bemoan the fact that one can no longer find a single cemetery in the city center! Modern life commands us to stay far from the notion of death. (SAE: 57-58)

The value Hayri attaches to the balustrade is the value he attaches to his past and childhood. The story of The Time Regulation Institute was made possible thanks to Hayri's transformation into a storyteller who can tell his own story after he first met Dr. Ramiz and then Halit Ayarcı. Thus, like the story of the balustrade that animates Hayri's memories, the story of the The Time Regulation Institute is the story of the a peculiar time, temporality and transformation that the balustrade of Kahvecibaşı Mosque cemetery represents.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

If we are to accept that the social, historical and individual consequences of modernity are actually based on a new temporal experience, this temporal experience first of all reveals itself in time lived at an individual level. For this reason, the first and most important step of trying to tell the story of modernity will be to include the individual's surprise and conflict in the face of this new time experience into the modern narrative. Because the individual experience of time does not live through a collective memory, which is the product of a collective consciousness that is thought to have created it jointly within a certain collectivity, but only through a cleavage that occurs in the depths of its own temporal experience. In other words, the first encounter is the encounter of the lived time with a new moment. Ricoeur (2006: 122) underlines that Halbwachs' *Collective Memory* (1925/1992) is based mainly on the idea that we need others to remember. Because the idea of collectivity is a statistical assumption in whichboth social sciences and the discipline of history gather facts. As I have shown in the discussion in the second chapter, social theory in this context has ensured that human existence is scientific and factual to the extent that it can be considered collectively. In this context, history or historiography has been able to create its own existence and boundaries as it explains historical reality and reality through the temporal experiences of collectivities. The idea of collectivity has progressed by telling the common story of human existence as a blind spot in all historical and social narratives. This has led to the emergence of the form of temporality, which is used theoretically, as a historical time that corresponds to the homogeneous and empty time in the Benjaminian (1968/2007: 325) sense. However, as arguedthroughout this work, it is sufficient for the past to encounter only another moment to remember, and we need others in the sense Halbwachs (1925/1992) expresses, to tell that memory as an experience.

What great narratives, great social transformations, and great history perceive as a great transformation has to be something greater than human. Structures, contexts, institutions, and the subject are all treated in a hypothetical temporality larger than human. Distinctions such as subject-object, traditional modern, east-west originated from the time of this hypothetical and detached theory of human experience (Agamben, 1978/1993; Benjamin, 1968/2007; Fabian, 1983/2006). Considering Enlightenment as a historical break with other enlightened people in history presupposes the belief that there is no place or time from the very beginning of the claim. However, when we consider that the enlightened individual is a particular individual in the 18th century, this assumption will disappear. When we think that that particular individual is Jean Jacques Rousseau, we begin to tell the story of enlightenment through his life. In that story, we can see that "le tourbillon social", which we encounter between the lines of *Emile* (1800/1979), first exists in Rousseau's own story of his life. Thus, we can realize that thusly Rousseau was the first person to use the word "moderniste" in its current meaning, that Rousseau's father was a watchmaker and that he worked as a watchmaker in the Topkapı Palace between 1705 and 1711. From here, another narrative will begin to form with the surprise and conflict that any encounter must contain. We also recognize that Rousseau's novel *Julie* or *New Heloise* (1761) is based on the destruction of an individual experience in the middle of the eighteenth century, and that this is not a problem peculiar to the twentieth century. As a matter of fact, the astonishment and inner conflicts of St. Preux, the protagonist of the novel, in the face of urban life are the same as the individual's reactions to the uninterrupted flowing images of the outside world in the metropolis in Georg Simmel's *The Metropolis and Mental Life* (1903). More than a century in between, it is man, not modernity, that brings the texts of Rousseau (1761) and Simmel (1903) so close together. The opening passage of *The Metropolis and Mental Life*, Simmel declares his aim as one in which "the products of specifically modern life are questioned as to their inner nature, as it were, the body of culture as to its soul [Author'semphasis]" (Simmel, 1971: 325). This can be seen to be the task of Simmel's sociology of modernity (Frisby, 1986: 46). This task does not conceive of modernity as a rupture or a great transformation. Even, it does not consider it as a gap between before and after. Nor is it based on a big difference between the traditional and the modern. Because

this difference[119] already exists in the relationship that individual establish with society.

This study is based on the idea that the line that can be drawn from Rousseau to Simmel can be drawn to Tanpınar in the same way. Tanpınar has also made the same effort to capture the conflicts brought by modern life and add it to the story of modernity. When we think in terms of all his works, he constantly thought about the relationship between the new and the old, the past and the present. In his newspaper articles and interviews, he approached the discussion of rupture and continuity, which is inherent in the Turkish modernization narrative, sometimes like a westerner and sometimes like an easterner. Their reactions to social events have also been criticized for being ambiguous in this context. It is understood that this ambiguity was a deliberate choice, while describing himself as an "old Occidentalist" in the preface to his work *Five Cites* (Tanpınar, 1946/2000: 25). This context is important in terms of analyzing the ways in which Tanpınar, who is above all an aesthetic person, reflects an inner conflict about human in his own work (Dolcerocca: 2017, 178). Only in this way will it be seen that the ambiguous position of Tanpınar, which is emphasized in the Turkish modernization debate, turns into an opportunity in his literary works. Because Tanpınar has included the contradictions of the society in which he lives, including his own contradictions, in his narrative in the context of a multiple temporality in which aesthetics, history and society are intertwined. In other words, the problem of modernization and experience, which Berman (1982: 34) reads through Goethe's Faust, is told in a similar context in *The Time Regulation Institute*, through Hayri İrdal, who represents the contradictions of Tanpınar's inner man. As I stated in the second chapter, this effort can be started as a surprise that occured when he saw the contradiction of Behçet. In the letter he wrote to Behçet Bey in *Mahur Beste* in 1944, he incorporated this surprise into his narrative and transformed it into an uncanny image of Hayri İrdal living in an absolute present of a past from which no return is possible. In this sense, it is possible to say that Tanpınar is not interested in great narratives and stories of transformation, and that he believes that what happens with

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[119] Difference in a form of Differance, which Derrida attaches the special function to it: "Differance is therefore the formation of form. But it is on the other hand the being-imprinted of the imprint" (Derrida: 1976/1997: 63).

modernity can be understood in the context of a new history and time relation, not in the course of a historical time.

In *Mahur Beste* and *The Time Regulation Institute*, this new context of history and time is encountered in various ways. Instead of locating various temporalities in a total history, Tanpınar designs temporalities separately and depicts them in different forms. In this respect, we find Tanpınar designing his characters as a social type with a Simmelist desire. Or to repeat Kracauer's (Kracauer, 1920: 92) words for Simmel, none of Tanpınar's novel heroes live in historical time. The social presentation of the inner reality of the human, which Tanpınar defines as the inner human, gets closer to the Simmelian social type form and turns into an important tool both in his novels and in the description of real historical figures. As in Simmel, who deals with the individual and the individual's relationship with society in the context of a formal sociology, in Tanpınar, the inner human emerges in the context of the individual's inner cleavage and interaction with the other forms. In this context, it is the sum of the individual's age, his experiences, and the transformation of these experiences through interactions with others. The example given through Ziya Pasha in the second chapter reveals how Tanpınar's view of history and historicity differs from Sabri Ülgener. As a matter of fact, Ziya Pasha, which Ülgener describes with a generalization through mentality, turns into a social type in the hands of Tanpınar. There are many reasons to identify Ziya Pasha with Ata Molla in Mahur Beste. Conversely, Ata Molla is conceived as a social type of Ziya Pasha. However, he is still not Ziya Pasha. Sabri Hoca,[120] which he describes in the context of forgetting, also appears as another social type in *Mahur Beste*. Tanpınar tells the social story of how a revolutionary became a revolutionary with Sabri Hoca, whom he describes as a "strange revolutionary." Sabri Hoca's past, his relations with his family and his environment are made in a Nietzschean style with an emphasis on forgetting. It is not a historical character; it is depicted without the help of superhuman structures such as facts or ideological currents. Sabri Hoca is told from within himself, from his own experience and from the details of his own story.

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[120] However, just like Ata Molla, İsmail Molla, Abdüsselam Bey or Seyit Lütfullah, Tanpınar also creates coincidences that will allow the reader to portray Sabri Hocaas Sabri Ülgener in his imagination. Tanpınar's way of describing Sabri Hoca's despair in *Mahur Beste* includes many references to Sabri Ülgener's mentality analysis: "This was the *mentality* that lasted from father to son as a social instinct instilled in individuals by every civilization as a legacy. It was very difficult to change it. However, as long as he remained as he was, he would appear before us again, taking on a form at every step. Here, Sabri Hoca was struggling in the despair of these thoughts [Author's emphasis]" (MB: 86).

Forgeting is the basic form of sociability here. However, somewhere in Mahur Beste, during the east-west debate between Sabri Hoca and İsmail Molla, the words of İsmail Molla to Behçet Bey are taken as an important dictum that is often quoted from Tanpınar's works and is thought to summarize Tanpınar's view of Turkish modernization: "My son Behçet, do you know what bankruptcy of a civilization is? Human decays, and do not remain; It is a set of spiritual values that make a civilization human. Do you understand the magnitude of your problem? (MB: 91). The reason for the despair of Sabri Hoca, the "forgotten man" that Tanpınar shaped with forgeting, is that he forgot the past. In front of Sabri Hoca, there is İsmail Molla. İsmail Molla represents pure experience, not so much related to the past and believing that he lives that past in the present. This discussion, which Behçet Bey watched silently, is the discussion of forgetting and present, which takes place symbolically in Mahur Beste. It should be noted that Tanpınar is not a party to this discussion. He is the discussion itsef. However, during this discussion, Tanpınar also forgets Behçet Bey. He writes a letter at the end of the novel to apologize for this forgetting. In the letter, he explains the reason for forgetting Behçet Bey that he realizes Behçet Bey had no home to return to. According to Tanpınar, Behçet Bey's house burned down. For Tanpınar, symbolically the house is civilization, which is the initial universe of human experience, and it is the place of memory.

The burned house, where no return is possible, is important in Tanpınar in terms of the effect of the past on the present. Georgy Lukas (1971: 29) reminds the situation in *The Theory of the Novel*: "Time can become a constituent element only when the ties with the love house are broken." It is also interesting that Lukacs described the dilemma and dilemma of being inside and outside the house in the context of the "fire"[121] metaphor. Tanpınar also includes the meanings of this burned house image in his work as a ruin in the form of a past that lives in the present. In *The Time Regulation Institute*, we encounter this concept of ruin in every instance in the novel. But the veryimage of

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[121] "The world is wide and yet it is like a home, for the fire that burnt in the soul is of the same essential nature as the stars; the world and the self, the light and the fire, are sharply distinct, yet they never become permanent strangers to one another, for fire is the soul of all light and all fire clothes itself in light. Thus each action of the, soul becomes meaningful and rounded in this duality: complete in meaning-in sense-and complete for the senses; rounded because the soul rests within itself even while it acts; rounded because its action separates itself from it and, having become itself, finds a center of its own and draws a closed circumference round itself. 'Philosophy is really homesickness,' says Novalis: 'it is the urge to be at home everywhere.'" (Lukacs, 1971: 29)

ruin appears in the social type represented by Seyit Lütfullah and in the place where he lived. Seyit Lütfullah lives in a madrasa. However, the madrasa is ruined. Simmel (1911/1958: 384) defines ruin that "it is the site of life from which life has departed." Ruin has meaning in the tension of being and not being like Simmel's other types. As a remnant of a past, it is both there and not there. Seyit Lütfullah is also depicted as a ruin in the novel, and this situation is described both as "stranger" and as "adventurer". The treasure that Seyit Lütfullah is after, which is the reason of all what happened to Hayri and also is the reason for the whole plot of the novel. The ghostly state of the ruin, which does not belong to the present, transforms the present. Tanpınar attributes such a great role to the character of Seyit Lütfullah, which he builds on funny, meaningless and incompetence. Since he wants to show that the skill in the incompetence and how both they can be the source of another story. Thus, Tanpınar through this character provides the reader with an alternative to the connection between the past and the present, which cannot be understood as continuity or rupture. It is not a coincidence that Seyit Lütufullah is depicted through religious images – madrasah, mosque vases, clothes. But these images are there not to highlight the corruption in religion, but to show that religion itself belongs to another temporality. Thus, the depiction of Seyit Lütfullah evokes the "reactionary forces" that Niyazi Berkes sees as the biggest obstacle to secularization in Turkish modernity, but remained undefined in his approach. Contrary to Berkes, Tanpınar does not explain its reality with incompetence, nor does he try to understand it through a failure[122]. Instead, he presents its ghost, both here and not, in the form of a ruin and tells only the story with its inherent counsel.

The context of counsel is important in terms of revealing the historical and sociological contexts of Tanpınar's text. Right at the beginning of *The Time Regulation Institute,* Hayri's thoughts on the concept of freedom reveal how Tanpınar is thinking about an elusive issue: "I must confess I've always found freedom an elusive concept" (*SAE*: 21). Everything Tanpınar presents throughout the novel is as elusive as the concept of

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[122] Because he has a personal goal, *Kayser Andronikos* treasure, which he is after, is necessary for him to marry his lover Aselban, who lives in the spirit world. He has never been married. In addition, features that allow him to be considered as reactionary and features that do not are presented together. In mosque sermons, he preaches to people to pray more than to eat. However, on the other hand, it is claimed that he read Marx.

freedom itself. This is why the novel, like a holy book, leaves a different and usefel counsel for everyone who reads it. Benjamin argues that "every real story (…) contains, openly or covertly, something useful" and "every case the storyteller is a man who has counsel for his readers" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 86). For Benjamin, the usefulness[123] is the transformation of experience into another experience. This is more than just the transmission of consciousness or memory. Tanpınar presents conscious and unconscious images together throughout the *The Time Regulation Institute*. Through the character Hayri, which he designed as a storyteller, he collects all the images that appear and disappear instantly and arrange them side by side. Precisely for this reason, the novel becomes very suitable to be read, for some, as an allegory of Turkish modernization as a story of people who are culturally[124] and temporally disconnected from their past. Or, for others, it is very suitable to be read as an irony containing the reproaches of Tanpınar, the "melancholic narrator"[125] of a disappointment. However, the novel both allows and resists its reception as allegory or irony, just as in the presentation of the characters. Instead as a functional counsel, Tanpınar tries to avoid all the totalizing meanings of historical time and pushes the limits of transferring a human experience at a micro level. He does this not by making anirony or anallegory of the great historical or linguistic story of rupture (Ertürk, 2018: 188) of Turkish modernization, but by incorporating Simmelian microscopic conflicts specific to human experience into his novel. Abdüsselam Bey's naming Hayri's daughter after her own mother and leaving his entire inheritance to her can be read as a conflict based on naming a child in any marriage. Thus, it will be realized that Abdüsselam Bey, like Seyit Lütfullah, is a ghost living in the present of a lost past, trying to revive his abandoned mansion (Ruin). This is also the reason for the unconsciousness of Dr. Ramiz which leads him strange movements and obsessions, who could not actually control his own consciousness during the psychoanalysis

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[123] It would be useful here to recall the phrase "useless knowledge" that Nietzsche mentioned at the very beginning of *The Use and Abuse of History* (Nietzsche, 1873/1957: 3).

[124] According to Süha Oğuzertem, "Tanpınar's allegory makes fun of culture by pretending to describe something that cannot be understood and explained in the absence of subject and object, and only plays with the language that makes it possible" (Oğuzertem, 2018: 336).

[125] Nergis Ertürk thinks that "In contrast to the melancholic narrator of the *Five Cities*, who seeks to resurrect the purged words of her linguistic and literary past, the Time Regulation Institute narrator is conditioned (or conditioned) to" skip "them" (Ertürk, 2018: 187).

sessions of Hayri. Tanpınar adds forgetting to historical narrative, unconsciousness to consciousness, and a secrecy to all interactions. This adding, constantly produces ghosts[126] in the novel. However, these ghosts are singular tragedies that can occur not only in the context of modernity in general or Turkish modernization in particular, but also in every present representation of the past. Heeding Bergson's call[127] (Bergson, 1889) with a Simmelian style (Simmel, 1903), Tanpınar includes the momentary strange encounters of these micro conflicts into his novel like a bold novelist. Through these momentary encounters, he destroys the cronosophic approaches to be attributed to the novel with a deconstructive chronology from the very beginning. This momentary encounter even permeates the narrative of Tanpınar's decision to write the novel. Asked in an interview[128], "How did you find this person?" In response to the question: "I did not find him, he came himself. One day I missed the ferry due to the inconsistency of the city clocks, I suddenly encounter him under the clock of Kadıköy pier and he never left me." (Tanpınar, 2002: 234).

Tanpınar's encounter with Hayri makes an impossible story tellable for him. However, there is another encounter that turns Hayri into a "storyteller". At the beginning of the novel, Hayri points out the reason why he prolongs these memories so long, as his encounter with an old balustrade in an antique shop: "Some four years ago, I discovered [encountered] a piece of an old balustrade" (SAE: 54-55). The balustrade belongs to the Kahvecibaşı Mosque Cemetery, where Seyit Lütfullah's madrasah is also located. The reader learns that Hayri had previously sold this balustrade to another antique dealer when he needed money. After a long time, Hayri buys it again for thirty

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[126] In a vein that Derrida does in *Specters of Marx* (1994), one can call this ghosts "Specters of Tanpınar", since like Derrida Tanpınar also wants to show that life and death, past and present is not opposite to each other. As Wendy Brown (2001: 145) puts it: "Affirming this non-opposition also entails living without conceits of foundations, origins, and progress, and especially without clear distinctions between the real and the fictive, the ideal and the material, the past and the present."

[127] Bergson expresses this call in *Time and Free Will* (1889) as such: "Now, if some bold novelist, tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego, shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental absurdity, under this juxtaposition of simple states an infinite permeation of a thousand different impressions which have already ceased to exist the instant they are named, we commend him for having known us better than we knew ourselves. (...) the very fact that he spreads out our feeling in a homogeneous time, and expresses its elements by words, shows that he in his turn is only offering us its shadow but he has arranged this shadow in such a way as to make us suspect the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it..." (Bergson, 1889/2001: 133-134).

[128] Interview conducted by Ayşe Nur and published on 19 June 1954 under the title *Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar Tells About His New Work* (Tanpınar, 2002: 233-240).

times the price he sold, from another antique dealer. The antique dealer says that the balustrade comes from Konya and that its antique value is very high. However, Hayri knows that it comes from his childhood. Having bought it on the spot, Hayri mounts it over the French door in his office, which looks out onto his new home, the Clock Villa 's patio and garden. The balustrade never leaves Hayri again, and with it, his past with all the memories becomes a tellable story. As he declares, "for whatever reason, it is my past, and not my current position in life, that holds the key to my problems; I can neither escape from it nor entirely accept its mandate" (SAE: 54).

Then, *The Time Regulation Institute* is also the narration of a story that we encounter again and again with its specters in every moment, but we can neither escape nor entirely accept its mandate; a story that never leaves us.

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EDUCATION

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Ph.D.	METU Sociology	2023
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WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2015-present	AKU Sociology	Res. Assistant
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FOREIGN LANGUAGE

Advanced English

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ACADEMIC INTERESTS

• Methodology and Epistemology of Social Sciences

• Sociology of Knowledge

• Philosophy and History of Science

• French Philosophy and Social Sciences

• Turkish Modernization

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Büyük toplumsal dönüşümler ve bizzat bu dönüşümlerle birlikte ortaya çıkan insanlık hikâyesini birleştirme çabaları tarihin ve sosyoloji teorisinin temel ilgi alanını oluşturmuştur. Bu ilgi her defasında büyük tarihsel anlatılar şeklinde ortya çıkmıştır. Tarihin totalleştirilmesi olarak okunabilecek bu durum iyi incelendiğinde buralardaki kör noktaların insanın toplumsal ve tarihsel gerçekliğinin teorik boşluğuna denk geldiği görülecektir. Johannes Fabian'ın (1983/2006: xxxix) tercih ettiği gibi söylenecek olursa, gözlemcinin karşısındaki insanın somut gerçekliği, her zaman teorik bir soyutlamaya ya da onun deneye dayalı gerçekliğinin teorik yokluğuna dönüşmüş ve bu durum gözlemlenenin insanüstü yapı karşısındaki pasifliği olarak kodlanmıştır. Böylece siyasal anlamda Ulus devletleşme, toplumsal ve kültürel anlamda modernleşme, ekonomik anlamda kapitalistleşme süreçleri her bir alandaki büyük dönüşümlerin büyük hikâyeleri olarak karşımıza çıkarlar. Her biri bir şekilde tarihin önceki safhalarını bu büyük dönüşüm hikâyesine bağlayan sosyoloji, antropoloji ve iktisat gibi sosyal bilimsel girişimler bu büyük ve tekil anlatıların insanlık tarihindeki yeri ve öneminin ortaya konması için ortaya çıkmış ve zamanla bu süreçlerin evrenselleştiği alanlara dönüşmüşlerdir. Teorik perspektiflerin tanıklık bağlamı yoluyla ortaya çıkan bu evrensellik, kendisini ya zamanın mutlak ve kollektif bir şimdide evrenselliştiği bir tarihsel zaman bilincinde, ya da bütün gelişmelerin tarihsel zeminini oluşturan Avrupamerkezcilik şeklinde göstermiştir. Bugün bu hikâyeyi kendi toplumsallaşması ve kendi kültürel dinamikleri üzerinden anlamaya ve anlatmaya niyetlenen her girişim dollaylı ya da dolaysız bir şekilde kuzey avrupada gerçekleşmiş olan Rönesans, Aydınlanma, ya da Fransız Devrimi'ne atıf yapmak durumdadır. Bu da, bütün bu tarihsel olayların bir kronolojisi olarak ortaya çıkan ilerleme, süreç ve yapı gibi kavramların bu anlama ve anlatma girişimlerine sirayet etmesi açısından bu evreneliciliğin hem bir göstergesi hem de bir sonucudur.

Bhambra'nın (2007: 2) vurguladığı gibi başta sosyoloji olmak üzere deneye dayalı genellemelere dayalı bütün sosyal bilimler 16. yüzyılda ortaya çıkan bir kopuş ve fark varsayımı ile yola çıkmışlardır. Bu disiplinlerin büyük filozofları, iktisadçıları ya da sosyologlarının büyük eserleri ya 18. yüzyılda gerçekleşen Fransız Devrimi'nin

sonrasında ya da 19. yüzyıl boyunca gerçekleşen Sanayi Devriminin sonuçları ile birlikte ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu yüzyıllar, tarihsel ve toplumsal her unsurun çok büyük bir hızla geçmiş ve bugün arasındaki uçurumu derinleştirerek dönüştüğü bir zaman dilimine karşılık gelir. Böylelikle insan yaşamı ve hafızasına yönelik herşey de farklılaşmıştır. Farklı olanı anlamak, tanımlamak ve açıklamak her bilimsel merakın temel motivasyon kaynaklarıdır. Başka bir ifadeyle her bilimsel merak karşılaştığı farklılaşmayı evrensel şekilde anlama ve açıklama çabasını içerir. Öte yandan Sarah Ahmed'in ifade ettiği gibi her karşılaşma bir şaşırma ve ihtilafı beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu nedenle her karşılaşma hikâyesinin anlatılabilmesi için karşılaşmanın barındırdığı şaşkınlık ve ihtilafın korunması gerekmektedir. Böylelikle karşılaşma tekilleştirme anlamında bir sabitlemeyi ve sabitlemenin imkânsızlığını birlikte barındırmalıdır (Ahmed: 2000: 6-8). Fransız Devriminin hemen sonrasını deneyimlemiş August Comte "insanlık dini" olarak adlandırdığı yeni bir evrensel insanlık kültü hiç kuşkusuzdur ki insanın kollektif olarak zaman ve mekânla kurduğu ilişkiyi tekilleştirme girişimlerinin ilk olmasa da en önemli örneğidir. Söz konusu insanlık dini zamanla bugün toplumsal kolletivitenin bir disiplin çerçevesinde çalışılmasına dönüşmüş ve bugün adına sosyoloji dediğimiz araştırma alanını ortaya çıkarmıştır. 18. yüzyılın başında Comte'un ifade ettiği pozitivist insanlık dini, 19. yüzyılın sonunda Emile Durkheim'ın eserlerinde "kolektif bilince" dönüşecektir (Durkheim, 1893/1994: 38-39). Toplumun yapısal işlevselci bir açıklaması olan "kollektif bilinç" ve onun olgular üzerinden çalışılması Durkheim'ın katı bilimselciliğinde "toplumun bir şey gibi çalışılması" çağrısıyla birleşecektir (Durkheim, 1895/1982: 113). Durkheim'ın sosyolojik girişimi zamanın ruhuyla da uyumlu bir şekilde ulus devlet hikâyesinin ihtiyaç duyduğu bütünleşme, birlik ve düzen bağlamlarını vurguluyordu. Öte yandan fazlaca modern bir şimdiki zamana vurgu yapan ve geçmişin devrik yapıları üstüne yeniden kurgulanan bu ulusal bütünlük fikrinin bir geçmişe ve tarih bilincine dayanması da gerekirdi. Maurice Halbwachs da geçmişin bütünleştirilmesi bağlamında Durkheim ile benzer bir kolektivitenin izinde, kollektif hafıza'nın önemini vurgulamış ve bu hafızanın yine toplumsal bütünlük için taşıdığı önemi ayrıntılandırmıştır. Ancak Fransız pozitivizminin kollektivitelere olan ilgisi ve bütünlüğüne yönelik olan inancı, bu kolektiviteyi oluşturan bireylerin bilinçleri ve geçmişi hatırlama biçimlerinin bir bütün ve eksiksiz olduğu varsayımına dayanıyordu. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*'sinde (1925) vurguladığı gibi hafıza geçmişi yeniden yaşamamızı mümkün kılmamaktadır, ancak onu

yeniden inşa edebileceğimiz bir kaynak olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. "Hatırlama yetisi" der Halbwachs, "uyanık zihnin yetileri toplamıyla sıkı bir bağlantı içindedir", bu da onun için "anılarımız ne kadar açık, belirgin ve eksiksizse, ne kadar imgelerle dolu ve renkliyse hislerimizin de o kadar faal" olacağı anlamına gelmektedir (Halbwachs, 1925/1992: 45). Ancak Halbwachs'ın "uyanık zihin" ile "hislerin faal olması" arasında kurduğu ilişki, her ne kadar yaşamın bir deneyime dönüşmesine yaptığı vurgu açısından önemli olsa da, hafızanın yalnızca uyanık zihin üzerinden açıklaması nedeniyle bilincin ve hafızanın bütünlüğüne ve parçalanmazlığına yaptığı vurgu toplumsalın komünal kurulumuna katkı yapmıştır. Nitekim Durkheim'ın otuzdokuz yaşında yazdığı eseri *İntihar (1897)*, bireyin bu kollektif bilinç ve hafıza karşısındaki tanımlanamazlığını tekrar kollektivite anlatısına dâhil etme girişimin ilk ve en önemli örneği olacaktır. Sosyal teori bilincin önemli bir kısmı olan bilinçdışı ve hafızanın (tarihin) önemli bir girdisi olan unutuşu dışarda bıraktığı oranda evrensel olduğuna inanılan bir insan kollektivitesinin hikâyesini bütünlüklü olarak anlatılabilir kılmıştır.

Öte yandan, sosyal teorinin doğum anına denk gelen bu bakış açısı, yeni zamanların beraberinde getirdiği büyük dönüşümlerle paralel olduğu ölçüde yeni bir zaman bilincine de dayanmaktadır. Bu bilinç geçmiş ve geleceği kollektif bir şekilde deneyimlendiği düşünülen bir şimdiye oturtma girişimi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Ve bu yeniden inşa ancak ve ancak kollektif bir hatırlamaya yapılan vurgu ile mümkün olabilirmiştir. Bu aynı zamanda hayali bir cemaat olan ulus devletin oluşumuna denk gelen "modern bir eşzamanlılık" olarak da işleyecektir (Anderson: 1983/2006: 24). Adına pozitivist, yapısalcı ve işlevselci okul diyeceğimiz bu yaklaşım sosyoloji disiplininin temellerini atarken, bu temele gerek kollektivif bilince katılım, gerekse de kollektif hafızaya katılım açısından bir istisna bırakmamış, başka bir ifadeyle Ahmed'in (2002) vurguladığı anlamda şaşırmayı, unutmayı ve iksinden kaynaklanan ihtilafları bu kollektiviteden sapmalar olarak değerlendirmiştir. Ancak tarih, toplum ve bireyin birbirinden ayrı değerlendirilemeyeceği temeline dayanan başka teorik bağlamlar da makro bir teorinin içindeki kısa devreleri görünür kılmıştır. Bu, Alman tarihselci okulunun insan eylemininin tikelliğini anlama çabalarının sunduğu daha mikro bir perspektif sayesinde mümkün olmuştur. Bu okulun ortaya attığı düşüncelerde, insanın eylemine verdiği anlamın yalnız bir bilinçlilik felsefesi bağlamında ele alınamayacağı vurgulanmış, barındırdığı keyfiliklerin anlaşılması gerektiğinin altı çizilmiştir. Wilhelm Dilthey bu vurgunun önemli sahiplerinden

biridir. Dilthey'e (1961: 97) göre geçmiş anlamın biricik kaynağıdır ve bu nedenle anlama çabası bütünüyle tarihsel olmak zorundadır. Çünkü insan tarihsel bir varlıktır. Tarihsel olduğu oranda da belirli bir zaman ve mekân deneyimi ile hareket etmektedir. Bu anlamda, Dilthey'in çağdaşı Max Weber de bireyin toplumsal eyleminin tarihselliğini sorunsallaştımış, sosyal teorisini, bireyin eylemine yüklediği öznel anlamla incelenebilecek bir sosyal eylem anlayışı üzerine inşa etmiştir. Ancak Weberci teori de, bireyin eylemine yüklediği bu anlamın dönüşümünü, büyük bir dönüşüm hikâyesi ile paralel olarak ele almış, kapitalizmin gelişiminin gölgesinde kalan eylemin anlamındaki değişimi incelemiştir. Böylece insan eylemine içkin olan anlam ve büyük bir tarihsel dönüşüm, pozitivist anlamda neden-sonuç olarak değil, ancak Weber'in "seçici yakınlık" dediği yöntemsel tercihle iç içe geçmiş bir şekilde ortaya konmuştur (Weber, 1978: 341). Ancak bu durumda da Habermas'ın (1972: 303) ifade ettiği gibi "tarihselcilik" başka bir yoldan insanın eyleminin tarihselliğini anlamanın ve açıklamanın pozitivist bir yöntemi haline gelmiştir.

İster kollektif temsillerin ve bireyüstü olguların hesaba katıldığı yapısalcı yaklaşımlar ister, bireyin biricik eylemindeki anlamın araştırılması olan tarihselci yaklaşımlarda ortaya çıkan açmaz bir şekilde insan deneyiminin hikâyeye dâhil edilmesindeki zorluklar olarak ortaya çıkar. Böylece de modernleşme, sanayileşme ya da kapitasitleşme tartışmalarıyla birlikte tarih sahnesine çıkan sosyolojik teroiye de musallat olur. Bugün bütün kollektif temsillerin ya da insanın tarihselliğini anlama ve açıklama çabamızın kullandığı araçları sağladığımız büyük bir tartışma alanı kendi tarihi içinde tutarlı, ancak kendi ötekisiyle karşılaştığında tutarlılığını kısadevreler üzerinden devam ettiren bir hikâyeyi anlatmaktadır. Jorge Larrain'ın (1994: 18-26) gösterdiği gibi gerek 18. yüzyıl aydınlanma düşünürleri gerekse de 19. yüzyıl avrupa düşüncesi sömürge düzeninin retoriğini yapmışlar ve uygar-barbar dikotomisinin entellektüel zeminini oluşturmuşlardır.[129] İster pozitivist evrensellik iddiası ister, tikel tarihsel bir varlık olan insanın hikâyesini anlama ve anlatma çabası 20. yüzyıl sonrasında Chakrabarty'nin (2000: 4) "siyasal modernlik" olarak adlandırdığı bir bağlamda küreselleşmiştir. Küreselleştiği oranda da kendi içindeki yarık ötekisi ile

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[129] Jorge Larrain bu durumu "Akıl ve Farklılığın İndirgenmesi" başlığı altında tartışır ve J. B. Say, James Mill gibi klasik iktisatçılardan Hegel'in *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*'sine kadar geniş bir bağlamda bu örnekleri sıralar (Larrain, 1994: 18-23). Ayrıca Avrupa düşüncesi içinde Akla yapılan vurgunun yol açıtığı ırkçılığı "Akıl ve Irkçılık" baglamında tartışırken John Locke ve David Hume'un eserlerindeki ırkçı bağlamların altını çizer. (Larrain, 1994: 23 -26)

arasındaki bir uçuruma dönüşmüştür. 19. yüzyıldan 20. yüzyıla uzanan bir hat özellikle "siyasal modernliğin" somut ya da zihisel olarak küreselleştiği bir zaman dilimi olarak geçerliliğini dünya çapına yaydığı bir ortak dile ya da mirasa dönüşmüştür. Bugün sosyal bilimin yapılabildiği zemin olarak tüm karşılaşma hikâyelerinin de anlatılabileceği düzlem burasıdır. Bu çalışma bu düzlemin sunduğu imkânlar içinden, yine bu düzlemin handikaplarının farkında olarak insanın hikâyesinin onun eylemine değil ancak deneyimine atıfla nasıl anlatılabileceğinin imkânlarını sorgulamaktadır.

Bu nedenle bütün hikâyelerin bu dilin sağladığı bir kelime dağarcığı yardımıyla ancak tikel karşılaşmaların barındırdığı şaşırma ve ihtilaf ile anlatılması gerekmektedir. Böyle bir anlatı çabası, yapılar, süreçler ve geçişler üzerinden değil ancak karşılaşmanın sağladığı bir anın tekilliğinin verdiği güç ile başlamalıdır. Anın tekilliği Simmel'in (2000: 11) "öncesizliğin ve sonrasızlığın ışığında an resimleri" olarak adlandırdığı anlamda tekil bir an olacaktır. İnsanı bir ara kesitte, bir "antropofor" (antrhropophorus) olarak ele almayı gerektiren bu bakış açısı, insan deneyimini de mutlak bir bilinç ya da mutlak bir bilinçsizlik olarak değil, toplumsallık içinde ikisinin iç içe geçtiği bir bağlamda ve oluştuğu anda yakalayabilecektir. Sosyoloji geleneği içinde bu bağlama en çok yaklaşan teori Simmel'in teorisi olmuştur. Simmelci formal sosyoloji insan deneyiminin anlık ve mikroskobik gerçekliğini bütün toplumsal süreçlerin bir DNA'sı olarak ortaya koymuştur. Böylelikle de tarihin totalleştirilmesinden, sosyal teorinin komünal kolektivitelere ve yapılara atıf yapan geleneğinden farklılaşmıştır. Birkaç insanın etkileşime girdiği her an ve her yerde toplumsallaşmayı yakalayan Simmelci teori, böylece büyük anlatıların dışında bırakılmış hikâyeleri de anlatıya dâhil edebilmenin önemli bir yolunu sunmaktadır.

Bu şekilde Türk modernleşmesi gibi daha yerel ve tikel bir hikâyenin de aynı unsurları barındırdığı ve bu unsurlar yoluyla daha anlaşılabilir olacağı ortaya konabilecektir. Türk modernleşmesi hikâyesinin de anlatılabilmesi için Doğu ile Batının büyük karşılaşması hikâyesini noktasal bir anda somutlaştıracak bir karşılaşma anının saptanması ve Davison'un[130] (2002: 69-70) ifade ettiği gibi modern deneyim

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[130] Davison'a göre "modernliğin geçmişini ve geleceğini yerine geçme yoluyla gerçekleştirilen bir geçiş olarak düşünmek, onun bir ihtilaf anına karşılık geldiğini görmemizi önler." (Davison, 2002: 69)

karşısında oluşan ihtilafların da modernlik anlatısına dâhil edilmesi gerekmektedir. Böyle bir karşılaşma 4 Şubat 1853 de August Comte ile Tanzimat fermanının müellifi Osmanlı Sadrazamı Mustafa Reşit Paşa arasında gerçekleşir. Pozitivizmin ve Sosyolojinin (Pozitif Felsefe) kurucu düşünürü August Comte'un Osmanlı Sadrazamı Mustafa Reşit Paşa'ya yazdığı 4 Şubat 1853 tarihli mektubu Türk modernleşmesi hikâyesinin anlatılması için uygun bir başlangıç noktası sunar. Bu mektup, August Comte'un "insanlık dini" olarak tanımladığı insanlığı evrensel bir kült etrafında birleştirme girişimini, bu girişim için birçok uygun tarihsel özellikleri bulunduğunu düşündüğü bir "Doğu Islam toplumuna" anlatma ve onları davet etme niyetiyle yazılmıştır. Comte'un birçok açıdan önemli içerikler barındıran mektubu Islam dininin positivist evrensellik için Katolik Hristiyanlıktan çok daha uygun taraflarının olduğu varsayımı ile yazılır:

> *Ortaçağ'ın sonlarından itibaren, seçkin akılların ilahiyattan kurtulması, farklı biçimlerde de olsa, Batı'da olduğu kadar Doğu'da da zorunlu olarak aynı hızla ilerledi. Zira bu kurtuluş, her iki tek tanrıcılığın, pozitivizmin evrenselliği ile bağdaşmayan iddialı tavırlarının ortak gereksizliğini hissettiren kesin bir çatışmanın sonucudur. Hattâ daha basit olan inancı ve daha uygulanabilir olan yönetimi sayesinde gerçeğe daha yakın olan İslâmî deha, pozitif dinin kabul edilmesine Katolik dehadan daha az karşı olmalıdır.* (Comte: 1853/2009: 480-481)

Auguste Comte'un mektubunun satırları arasında ortaya çıkan kör noktalar, kendi başına Avrupa düşüncesinde Aydınlanma yüzyılı ile damgasını vuran evrensel pozitivist düşüncenin hem kendi içindeki özne kavrayışını hem de kendi dışındaki öteki kurgusunu yansıtmaktadır. Pasajda çeşitli övgülere mashar olan "İslam toplumları", bütüncül olarak Islam ile eşitlenmiş bir topluma ve tekil bir özne ya da sınıf olarak da Mustafa Reşit Paşa'nın kimliği ile eşitlenmiş bir yönetici sınıfa indirgenmiştir. Bu açıdan Tanıl Bora'nın (2017: 45) bu mektuplaşmayı betimlerken tercih ettiği gibi romantik bir karşılaşmadır bu[131]. Çünkü muhattabını daha baştan varsayımsal olarak kurgulamıştır. Tanzimat reformlarının toplumsal ve kültürel hayatta oluşturduğu ikilikler mektubun içinde dillendirilmez. Yöneticilerde olduğunu düşündüğü reform arzusunun ise yöneticiler ile halk arasındaki bir kopuklukla mümkün olabildiğini de hesaba katmaz. Bununla birlikte, Auguste Comte'un

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[131] Tanıl Bora bu karşılaşmanın romantik bir buluşma olduğunu düşünür. Çünkü Bora'ya göre "Aydınlanma ve hümanizmin iyimserliğini, bilimsel determinizmle payandalanmış bir öznelciliğe-iradeciliğe bağlayan Comte pozitivizminin Osmanlı modemistlerini büyülemiş olması doğaldır" (Bora, 2017: 45).

evrenselci ve evrimci görüşleri Mustafa Reşit'in sosyal çevresinde bulunan ve ona göre entellektüel ilgisi daha yüksek olan Ahmet Rıza ve Ziya Paşa gibi dönemin önemli figürlerinde karşılık bulur. Bu fikirler, hem İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti hem de daha sonrasında Cumhuriyet'in temel Batılılaşma ajandaları içinde yer alır. Comte'un görüşlerinin daha bilimsel bir zemine oturduğu ve bilimsel bir girişime dönüştüğü Emile Durkheim ile Ziya Gökalp'in teorik ve sosyolojik karşılaşması ise 20. yüzyılın başlarında bu sefer toplumsal ve kültürel dualiteleri teorik olarak yeniden üretir. Gökalp'in *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muassırlaşmak* (1918*)* adlı eseri Durkheimcı Sosyolojiyi Türk modernleşmesi bağlamına tercume ederken, medeniyet ve hars şeklinde ortaya çıkan dışarısı ve içerisi bağlamında bir dualiteye sırtını dayar. Her ne kadar Gökalp (1917: 288) bu dualitenin ifade ettiği gerilimin zamanla sönümleneceğini, iki kutbun zamanla "özümseme" yoluyla tekil bir kültüre dönüşeceğini umsa da Cumhuriyet'in ilanından sonra da dualiteler hem teoride hem de patik yaşamda varlığını devam ettirir. Ancak burada yine Ziya Gökalp'in çağdaşı olan Mehmet İzzet'e bir parantez açmak ve onun Alman tarihselciliğine yönelik ilgisinin altını çizmek gerekir. Berkes'in ifade ettiği gibi Mehmet İzzet'in çalışmaları ve Darülfünun'daki dersleri "toplumbilim alanına karşı ilgiyi genişletecek güçte bir profesördür" (Berkes, 1997: 55; 1936/1985: 143). Bugün gerek Türk modernleşmesi tartışmaları içinde, gerekse de Türk sosyoloji tarihi içinde isminin fazlaca zikredilmiyor olmasının nedeni erken yaşta hayata veda etmesidir. Ancak Gökalp'in tersine Türk sosyolojisinin Durkheimcı pozitivist başlangıcına Simmelci bir alternatif olarak beliren Mehmet İzzet'in çalışmaları, onun erken yaştaki ölümüyle sistemli bir ekole dönüşememiştir.

20. yüzyılın ortalarına gelindiğinde Türk Modernleşmesi'nin dualiteler üreten bu hikâyesi, yüzyılın başında doğmuş ve toplumsal anlamda büyük dönüşümlere tanıklık etmiş bir kuşağın eserlerindeki odak noktasını oluşturur. Burada birçok isim hem tanzimat düşünür, aydın ve yöneticilerinin batı ile kurdukları ilişkiyi hem de Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura gibi düşünürlerin Batının teorik geleneğini alımlama biçimlerini sorgularlar. Bu kuşağın önemli eserlerini ortaya koyduğu 1940lı ve 1950li yıllar, sürekli dualiteler üretmiş Doğu ve Batı karşılaşmasının (Tanzimat Fermanı'nın) yüzüncü yılında hem geçmiş ile şimdinin hem de yeni kurulan Ulus devlet ile toplumunun arasında oluşan fiili kopuklukların oluştuğu zamanlardır. Cumhuriyet devrimlerinin birçok düğümü, Büyük İskenderin kılıç darbesiyle çözmeye

çalışmasının toplumun gündelik hayatında oluşturduğu başka ikilemler de aynı şekilde gündemdedir. Bu anlamda bütün dualitelerin tartışıldığı temel bir karşıtlık olarak ortaya konan kopuş ve süreklilik bağlamları bu kuşağın temel ilgi alanını oluşturmuştur. Kemal Sayar (1998), bu kuşağı[132] 1910 kuşağı olarak tanımlar ve önceki kuşaklarla temel farklarının ise "bir tarih mirasından hareketle Türk toplumunu belirleyen temel süreçleri araştırmak" olduğu düşüncesindedir (Sayar, 1998: 225). Ona göre bu aynı zamanda araştırmalara zaman boyutunun da dâhil edilmesiyle mümkün olmuştur. Bu tarihsel ve toplumsal çalışmalar dönemin ruhuyla da uyum içindedir. Mümtaz Turhan'ın *Kültür Değişmeleri* 1951 yılında, Niyazi Berkes'in *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* adlı eseri 1964 yılında, Sabri Ülgener'in *İktisadi İntihat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri* de 1951 yılında yayımlanır. Bu eserlerin ortak noktası teorik olarak kendi tarihsel gerçekliği içinde Türk modernleşmesinin kültürel, siyasal ve ekonomik boşluklarını, geçmiş ve şimdi arasındaki kopukluğun nedenlerini ortaya koyacak şekilde tartışmalarıdır. Bu boşluk ya da kopukluk fikri aslında nesnelerine daha en başta yaklaşırken görmek istedikleri şeyi görememenin onlarda beliren bir şaşkınlığı olarak ortaya çıkar. Ancak eserlerine bu şaşkınlık hep teorik bir izah ile açıklama arzusuna dönüşür. Tarihsel bakış açısı eserlerindeki methodolojiye yerleşirken tarih ile zaman ilişkisi tam da Chakrabarty'nin "siyasal modernite" olarak tanımladığı zamansallığın etkisi altındadır. Ayrıca batıdaki evrensel ve yerel bir bağlamda ortaya çıkan, toplumsal ikilemlerin de izlerini taşır. Bu anlamda mesele Ülgener'de ortaçağlaşma şeklinde izah edilen kapitalizmin gelişmesine karşı tarihsel ve kültürel engellerle, Niyazi Berkes'de ise toplumsal devrimlerin temelinde olan sekülerleşmenin ünündeki engellerle ifade edilir. Batı modernitesinin kurgulanmasına eşlik etmiş süreçler, dönemler ve yapılar üstünden işleyen tarihsel zaman bu eserlerin bakış açısına sirayet etmiştir. Sirayet ettiği oranda da Türk modernleşmesi anlatısına içkin olan tarihin dışında kalma, beceriksizlik ve edilgenlik gibi temalara bağlı kalmıştır.

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[132] Kemal Sayar, "Türk Düşüncesinde 1910 Kuşağı" adlı makalesinde (1998: 223-228), cumhuriyeti 1880 kuşağının göğüslediğini düşünür, 1890 kuşağının Balkan, I. Dünya ve Kurtuluş savaşlarında kaybedildiğini, 1900 doğumluların ve 1910 doğumluların ise yaşadıkları toplumun tarihine ve geçirdiği dönüşümleri anlamaya yönelik bir merakla çalışmalar yürüttüklerini iddia eder. Onun 1900 kuşağından saydığı isimler arasında Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar (1901), Hilmi Ziya Ülken (1900), A. Gölpınarlı (1900), Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu (1901), Ömer Lütfi Barkan (1901) vardır. Ayrıca 1910 kuşağı olarak da Sabri Fehmi Ülgener (1911), Mümtaz Turhan (1908), Niyazi Berkes (1908) Behice Boran (1910) ve Nurettin Topçu'nun (1909) isimlerini sayar.

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar'ın eserleri ise özellikle 1940'lardan başlayarak başka bir ihtiyacın etkisi altında geçmişin şimdi üzerindeki etkisi bağlamındaki bir vurgu ile ortaya çıkar. En fazla etkilendiği figürlerin başında gelen Yahya Kemal Beyatlı'da olduğu gibi, Tanpınar için de mesele geçmiş ve şimdi, eski ve yeni arasındaki uçurumun sebeplerini anlamaktır. Bu bazen sözkonusu uçurumdan şikâyet etmek, bazen bu uçurumun ızdırabını hissetmek olarak ortaya çıkar. Ancak eskiyi yeni bir dille ifade etmek anlamında modernist bir çabanın da ilk nüvelerini görürüz eserlerinde. Niyazi Berkes'in ve Sabri Ülgener'in bir yetersizlik ve beceriksizlik bağlamında yaklaştığı boşluğa, Tanpınar insan deneyiminin ve bu deneyim bağlamında beliren tekilliklerin karşılıklı etkileşime girdiği kültürel ve toplumsal bir sosyalliğin (*sociation*) hikâyesini yerleştirir. Aynı zamanda bu hikâye, insanın çevresi, geçmişi ve şimdisiyle ilişkisi bağlamında yeni bir zaman ve tarih ilişkisi bağlamında anlatılır. Bu bağlamda özel bir ilgiyi hak eder ve bu çalışmanın temel merakını da Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar'ın eserindeki bu farklılık ve arayış oluşturmaktadır. Türk modernleşme tarihi ve tartışmaları açısından bir kendine özgülük barındıran eserleri özellikle romanlarının yayınlandığı 1943 ve 1954 yılları asında önemli bir dönüşüm geçirir. *Mahur Beste* (1944) bu tarihsel sosyolojik merakın ve Türk modernleşme hikâyesinin farklı bir üslupla anlatıldığı ilk romanıdır. 1954 yılında tefrika halinde yayımlanmaya başlayan *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü* ise saatlere olan vurgusuyla farklı zamansallıkların çoklu etkileşiminin hikâyesinin anlatıldığı en son ve en önemli romanıdır. Aynı zamanda bu romanda Tanpınar, tarihsel zamanın dikotomik açmazlarından kaçınarak Türk modernleşmesinin siyasal, toplumsal ve kültürel hikâyesini, "iç insan" olarak tanımladığı insanın iç dünyasından ve bu iç dünyanın sosyal etkileşim anında ortaya çıkan toplumsal tipleri üzerinden anlamaya ve anlatmaya çalışmıştır. Zaman kavramına şiirlerinde, gazete yazılarında ve en son da romanlarında özel bir yer vermiş olan Tanpınar'ın temel meselesi burada iddia ettiğim şekliyle Türk modernleşme hikâyesini hem yeni bir tarih ve zaman ilişkisi, hem de yeni bir toplum ve birey ilişkisi üzerinden anlatmaktır.

Tanpınar'ın eserini, Berkes ve Ülgener ile karşılaştırarak anlamaya çalışan bu çalışmanın temel sorunu böylelikle diğerlerinin bir kopuş ya da süreç olarak değerlendirdiği bir tarihsel akışı Tanpınar için birçok karakterin birbiriyle etkileşime girdiği bir sosyal gerçekliğin hikâyesine nasıl dönüştürebildiğidir. Bu hikâye aynı zamanda geçmişin de şimdi üzerinde sürekli etki ettiği bir anlatı olarak kendine has

özellikler barındırmaktadır. Burada Tanpınar'ın eserini ayrıştıran önemli farklılığı, belirli bir perspektiften işlemeyen ve tarihin dışında kalmış olarak değerlendirilen bir toplumsal gerçeklik olarak bir tarihsel akışı başka bir bağlamda hikâyesi anlatılabilir bir deneyim olarak sunabilmiş olmasıdır. Böylelikle ikinci bölümün temel ilgisini oluşturan zaman kavramının tarih, sosyal teori ve insan deneyimi ile olan ilişkisi Tanpınar'ın eserlerinde bir arayış olarak ortaya çıkar. Tanpınar'ı ve onun çağdaşlarını etkileyen 20. yüzyıldaki tarih ve sosyoloji ilişkisinin yeni bir zaman ve tarih ilişkisi arayışında ortaya çıkan bu tartışma alanı, o zamana kadar özne ve nesne geriliminde anlaşılan insan deneyimini anlamaya ve açıklamaya alternetif yöntemler ortaya koymuştur. Modernitenin hem nedeni, hem de onun varolmasını ve küreselleşmesini sağlayan Benjamin'in "homojen boş zaman" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 261) olarak tanımladığı tarihsel zamanın eleştirildiği bu bağlam etkisini dönemin eserlerinde göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda klasik sosyoloji geleneği içinde moderniteyi insan deneyiminde yakalamış Georg Simmel'in toplum ve tarih üzerine görüşleri Tanpınar'ın anlatmaya çalıştığı toplumsal ve tarihsel hikâyenin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için önemli bir durak olarak belirmektedir. Simmel'i sosyolojik teori içinde çağdaşlarından ayrıcalıklı kılan nedenler, Tanpınar'ı Türk modernleşmesi tartışması içinde kendi çağdaşları arasında ayrıcalıklı kılan nedenlerle paralellik göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda Tanpınar'ın, sürekli olarak kopuş ve süreklilik, geçmiş ve şimdi, geleneksel modern şeklindeki ikilikler üzerinden okunan Türk modernleşmesi tartışmasının içindeki ayrıcalıklı konumu, Simmelci bir bağlamda ortaya çıkan insan toplumsallığının ve deneyiminin farklı zamansallağını anlama girişimiyle birlikte okunduğunda daha anlamlı olmaktadır. Bu açıdan bu çalışmanın ilgi odağı Tanpınar'ın ilk romanı olan *Mahur Beste* ve tamamlanmış son romanı olan *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*'nde anlattığı hikâyenin geçmiş ve şimdi arasındaki kopuklukta insan deneyimini anlama ve aktarma imkânları üzerinedir. Bu imkânlar yukarıda bahsetmiş olduğum gibi iki önemli engeli barındırır. Bunlardan ilki sosyal teoriye her zaman içkin olmuş olan tarihsel zamanının kendisini dönemler, olgular ve yapılar üzerinden kurgulayan durumudur. Öte yandan başka bir engel Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar'ın eserinin alımlanmasında ortaya çıkmış "hazır okuma kategorileridir" (Pelvanoğlu, 2014: 166).

Simmelci sosyal tipler Tanpınar'ın eserinde çeşitli şekillerde ortaya çıkarlar. Ancak temelde Tanpınar'ın tarih felsefesi ve zaman kavrayışıyla ilişkili başka bir ihtiyacını

karşılamak için oradadırlar. Bu açıdan *Mahur Beste* ile başlar bu durum ve *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*'nde en etkili biçimine ulaşır. Tanpınar sosyal tipler yoluyla iki romanında da tarihsel zamanın kısa devrelerinden ve dezavantajlarından kaçınmaya çalışır. Böylece büyük bir modernleşme hikâyesini ve bu hikâyenin imkânsızlıklarını anlatmak yerine, medeniyet değiştirmesi dediği (Tanpınar, 2020: 38) bir kültürel dönüşümün insan deneyimindeki anlık izlerini takip eder. Bu açıdan okuyucuları tarafından sıklıkla çok fazla etkilendiği düşünülen Bergson'un bir çağrısına da cevap vermiş olur. Bergson bu çağrıyı *Time and Free Will* (1888) adlı eserinde şu şekilde yapar: "eğer cesur bir romancı, geleneksel egomuzun zekice ördüğü perdeyi yırtıp atarak, adlandırıldığı anda zaten varlığı sona eren binlerce farklı izlenimin sonsuz sayıda iç içe sızmasının bitişik dizilişini bize gösterebilirse, bize kendimizi bildiğimizden daha iyi gösterdiği için övgüler düzeriz" (Bergson, 1888/2001: 133-134). Tanpınar'ın ilk romanı olan *Mahur Beste* Bergson'cu bu çağrıya bir cevap niteliğindeki ilk girişimidir. Tanpınar, Bergson'un ifade ettiği gibi adlandırıldığı anda varlığı sona eren binlerce farklı izlenimi romanlarında kendi estetik üslubu ile resmeder. Özellikle insan deneyimini de Simmelci bir tarih felsefesi bağlamında, birer sosyal tip formunda betimlerken, hem gerçekliğin bir modelini oluşturmaya çalışır, hem de edebi üslubunun ve estetiğinin izin verdiği ölçüde bu modelin teorik bağlamda okunabileceği imkânları yaratır. Kracauer'in (1920: 92) Simmel'in sosyal tipleri için söylemiş olduğu gibi söylecek olursak Tanpınar'ın eserinde ortaya çıkan sosyal tiplerin hiç biri tarihsel zamanda yaşamazlar. Bu nedenledir ki onları bir şekilde tarihsel zamanın ya da siyasal modernitenin içine oturtma girişimleri şimdiye kadar hep bir hayal kırıklığı ile karşılaşmışlardır.

Mahur Beste'nin başkarakteri olan Behçet Bey, bir yatakta başlayan hikâyesiyle "iki uyku arasındaki düşler" içinde de sıkışıp kalmıştır. İlk bakışta Orientalist bir bağlamın içeriğini dolduracak nitelikte atıl ve edilgen bir şekilde resmedilir. Bu anlamda Dariush Shayegan'ın (Sheyagan, 1992) ifade ettiği gibi tarih dışında kalma ve uyuya kalma şeklinde okunabilecek bir içerikle sunulur Behçet Bey. Bu doğu insanının atıl ve edilgen ve acı çekmekten zevk alan yapısına bir gönderme olarak okunabileceği gibi geçmiş ve şimdi arasındaki bir ilişki biçimi olarak da okunabilir. Bu açıdan başka bir açıdan bakıldığında Behçet Bey, hem Derridacı (1993/2006) bağlamda ele alınabilcek bir hayalet, hem de antikalara, geçmişe ve kitapların ciltlerine olan tutkusuyla da Simmelci (1911/1958: 384) bağlamda geçmişin bir harabesi gibidir. Ne

babası ne karısı ne de başkaları tarafından takdir edilmeyen, sosyal yetenekleri sınırlı olan bir kişiliktir. Ancak bu edilgen adamın hikâyesini anlatırken Tanpınar başka karakteri keşfeder ve o karakterler üzerinden başka bir hikâyenin başka bir şekilde anlatılabileceğini farkeder. Bu karakterlerin en başında Sabri Hoca gelmektedir. Romanda "tuhaf bir ihtilalci" olarak karşılaşılan bu karakter Tanpınar tarafından bir unutuluş ve unutuş bağlamında betimlenir. Sabri Hoca, Simmelci bir şekilde söylenecek olursa unutulan adam olarak adlandırılabilecek bir sosyal tipdir. Hem İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile olan ilişkisi hem de karıştığı Ali Suavi olayı bu unutuluş ve unutuşun beraberinde getirdiği bir ümitsizlikle anlatılır romanda. Bir devrimci ve ihtilalcinin geçmişin yüklerinden kurtulup nasıl şimdideki yeniyi arzulayabileceğinin toplumsal bir resmidir Sabri Hoca. Behçet Bey'in babası İsmail Molla ve kayınpederi olan Ata Molla ise II. Abdülhamid dönemi ilmiye sınıfı içinde beliren diğer önemli sosyal tiplerdendir. Özellikle İsmail Molla Sabri Hoca ile bir zıtlık içinde kendi geçmişi ve şimdisi ile uyumlu, sokaktaki yaşama inanan bir adamdır. *Mahur Beste*'nin sonunda Tanpınar'ın yazar konumundan Behçet Bey'e hitaben yazdığı mektup bu sosyal tiplerin hikâyesini anlatırken bu sefer Tanpınar'ın unuttuğu Behçet Bey'e bir özürün sunumudur. Mektupta Tanpınar, Behçet beye seslenirken "evet sizin de bizim gibi bir zamanınız var (...) fakat ona hükmetme şekliniz ayrı. Sizin için hâl hatırlama anınızdan ibaret (...) gerisi için tam bir kayıtsızlık içindesiniz" diyecektir (MB: 155). Tam da bu nedenledir ki Tanpınar Behçet Bey üzerinden kurgulamaya çalıştığı geçmişten kopuk olma durumunu "dışarıda kalınmış bir ev" metaforundan, "baştan aşağı yanmış bir ev" metaforuna doğru değiştirir. Bu nedenle Behçet Bey'in hikâyesi tarihsel zamanın içinden anlatılabiliyordur ancak Behçet Bey kendi hikâyesini kendi zamanından anlatamamaktadır.

Bu değişim 1954 yılında tefrika halinde yayımlanan *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsün*'de kendi hikâyesini anlatabilen bir karakterin ortaya çıkmasına neden olur. Yaşamın bir deneyime dönüşemediği ve Tanpınar'ın kendi ifadesiyle şimdide yaşayamayan Behçet Bey karakterinin yerini Hayri İrdal alır. Romanın yazılma arzusunu da belirleyen bir karşılaşma hikâyesi Tanpınar'ın Hayri ile karşılaşmasında da anlamını bulur. 19 Haziran 1954 yılında, "Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar Yeni Eserini Anlatıyor" başlığı ile yayımlanan Ayşe Nur ile yapılan bir söyleşide "bu şahsı nasıl buldunuz?" sorusuna şöyle cevap verir; "Bulmadım, kendi geldi. Şehir saatlerinin birbirini tutmaması yüzünden vapuru kaçırdığım bir günde Kadıköy iskelesinin saatinin altında birden bire

onunla karşılaştım ve bir daha beni terketmedi" diyecektir (Tanpınar, 2002: 234). Tekinsiz ve güvenilmez bir karakter olan Hayri, Tanpınar'ın geçmişin hikâyesini şimdi ile birlikte anlatmak için seçtiği bir hikâye anlatıcısıdır. Benjamin hikâye anlatıcısına yüklediği anlamla örtüşecek şekilde Hayri irdal da "uzaklardan gelmiş ve yaşadığı toplumun bir parçası olamamış" bir hikâye anlatıcısı gibi sadece olanın değil olmayanın da hikâyesini anlatır. Aslında Goethe'nin Faust'undaki gelişim hikâyesi gibi Hayri'nin anıları da temelde birbirinden kopuk olan anların arka arkaya sıralanışıdır. Bu aynı zamanda bilinç ve bilinç dışının da iç içe geçtiği bir bütünlüklü akıştır. Bu nedenle *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*'nün hikâyesini Hayri'den dinlerken, Tanpınar'ın hikâyeyi sadece bilincin ve hafızanın bir unsuru olarak kabul etmediğini ancak bilinçdışını da eklemek istediğini düşünmek için çok fazla neden vardır. Bu durum Hayri'nin çocukluğuna özgü bir durum olarak anlattığı hürriyet üzerine olan düşüncelerinde ortaya çıkar:

> *Benim çocukluğumun belli başlı imtiyazı hürriyetti. Bu kelimeyi bugün sadece siyasî mânasında kullanıyoruz. Ne yazık! Onu politikaya mahsus bir şey addedenler korkarım ki, hiçbir zaman mânasını anlamayacaklardır. Politikadaki hürriyet, bir yığın hürriyetsizliğin anahtarı veya ardına kadar açık duran kapısıdır. Meğer ki dünyanın en kıt nimeti olsun; ve bir tek insan onunla şöyle iyice karnını doyurmak istedi mi etrafındakiler mutlak surette aç kalsınlar. Ben bu kadar kendi zıddı ile beraber gelen ve zıtlarının altında kaybolan nesne görmedim. Kısa ömrüm de yedi sekiz defa memleketimize geldiğini işittim. Evet, bir kere bile kimse bana gittiğini söylemediği hâlde, yedi sekiz defa geldi; ve o geldi diye biz sevincimizden, davul zurna, sokaklara fırladık.* (SAE: 22)

Hayri'de betimlediği hürriyet kavramı gibi kendi zıttıyla bir ve yakalanması zor bir karakterdir. Tam da bu nedenle kendi hikayesini anlatabilmektedir. Hiç beklenilmediği anda bir takım nasihatler vermekte ve toplumsal ve tarihsel hakikatlerden bahsetmektedir. Böylelikle Hayri'nin anlattığı hikayenin içinde beliren karakterler birer sosyal tip olarak alınabilecek bir bağlamın içini doldururlar. Romanın birinci bölümünde Hayri'nin çocukluk anıları içinde beliren Nuri Efendi, Aristidi Efendi, Seyit Lütfullah ve Abdüsselam Bey her biri belirli bir bağlamda bir özgül toplumsal tipin içeriğini dolduracak şekilde oradadırlar. Nuri Efendi geçmişi ve geçmişin büyülü zamanını temsil eder. Nuri Efendi bir muvakkittir ve muvakkithanesi de diğer karakterlerin (sosyal tip) birbiriyle etkileşime girdiği bir sosyal mekan olarak işlev görür. Wishnitzer (2015: 33) dönemin toplumsal şartları açısından *muvakkithane* tercihinin öneminin altını çizerken, zamansallık ve toplumsallığın bir araya geldiği bir

mekan olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Böyle bir muvakkithanenin içinde beliren başka bir figür de Seyit Lütfullah'dır. Tanpınar kısmen Simmel'in yabancısı kısmen de maceracısı gibi resmettiği bu sosyal tiple en çok geçmişin harabesine ulaşmayı arzular. Seyit Lütfullah hem yaşadığı yerin bir medresenin harabesi olması hem de kendi görünümüyle bir harabenin sosyal bir tip olarak temsili gibidir. Bu açıdan Simmel'in harabeye yüklediği toplumsal anlam gibi Seyit Lütfullah da yaşamın terkettiği bir alandan gelir ve yaşamı geçmiş ve şimdi diye ikiye böler. Simmel, için harabe hem geçimişin bir bakiyesi hem de onun şimdideki bir temsilidir. Bu nedenle Simmel'in diğer sosyal tiplerinde olduğu gibi harabe de hem buradadır hem de değildir. Tıpkı bir hayalet gibi şimdi ve geçmiş arasındaki dikotomiyi bozar. Simmel'in maceracısında olduğu gibi Seyit Lütfullah'ın varlığı da hem bir cami vaizi olarak, hem de cinler alemindeki sevgilisi Aselban ile evlenebilmek için peşinde olduğu Kayser Andronikos'un hazinesi gibi toplumsal alanının hem içinde hem de dışındadır. Nitekim Seyit Lütfullah'ın toplumsal alana dışarıdan getirdiği bu macera, romanın bütün olay örgüsünü etkileyecek bir şekilde romana dahil edilir.

Anlatılamaz olanı anlatmaya soyunmuş herkes gibi, Tanpınar'ın eseri de komik, ironic ve aleorik unsurlar içermektedir. Bu unsurlar özellikle Tanpınar'ın ölümü sonrasındaki bir çok yorumcunun özellikle romanın edebi üslubu bağlamındaki tartışmalarına sirayet etmiştir. Ancak bu unsurların esas yapıları dikkatlice incelendiğinde Tanpınar'ın eserini ayrıcalıklı kılanının esas olarak anlatmak istediği hikayeyi bütün anlatılamazlığına ragmen anlatmaya çalışan bir anlatıcının kasıtsız olarak ürettiği bir komedi, ironi ve alegori olduğunu anlamak önemlidir. Burada bu kasıtsızlığı, Benjamin'in Proust'un eseri için söylediği bağlamda gayri iradi bir hatırlamanın (*mémoire involontaire*) beraberinde getirdiği bir durum olarak değerlendirmek yerinde olacaktır. Benjamin, Proust'un "bir hayatı gerçekte olduğu gibi değil de onu yaşayan kişinin hatırladığı gibi betimlediğini" ifade eder. Çünkü "hatırlayan yazar için önemli olan kendi hatırası değil, hafızanın dokuduğu ağdır [böylece] Gayri iradi hatırlama, aslında hatıra denen şeyden çok unutuşa daha yakındır" (Benjamin, 1968/2007: 202). Bu nedenle unutuşun, bilinçdışının hikayesi olan Hayri ve Enstitü'nün anlatısı da, Oğuzertem'in (2018: 324) ifadesiyle "sıhhati bozuk saatlerin" beraberinde getirdiği bir zamansızlıkta anlatılması gereken bir hikayedir. Ya da başka bir şekilde söylenecek olursa tarihsel zamanın anlatısının dışında bir yerden, kronolojik olarak değil ancak kairolojik (Agamben, 1993: 101) bir zamanın anlık belirişleri üzerinden anlatılması

gerekmektedir. *Mahur Beste*'de Benjaminci "hikaye anlatıcılığı" konumuna kendisi geçen Tanpınar, *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsün*'de bu görevi Hayri'ye verir. Hamdi'den Hayri'ye doğru bu geçiş, adına ister Türk modernleşmesi, ister kapitalistleşme isterse de Andersoncu bağlamda Ulus devletleşme diyelim, bir süreç olarak okunmuş, ancak hep bir süreç olmaya direnen bir hikayeyi Tanpınar açısından bütün kör noktaları ile anlatılabilir kılmıştır. Böylece Niyazi Berkes'in ikiyüz yıldır bocalamamızın nedeni olan "gerici güçler" olarak tarihin ve toplumsallığın dışında bir yerde konumlandırdığı bir başarısızlığı, Seyit Lütfullah'ın bütün bir romana yayılan hayaletimsi imgesi yoluyla hikayesi anlatılabilir bir akışta yakalamayı başarmıştır. Bu anlatı, süreksizlik olarak sürekliliğin, ya da deneyim olmayan deneyimin hikayesidir. Anlamını Seyit Lütfullah'ın kaldığı medresenin harabesindeki Kahvecibaşı Camii'nin mezarlığının parmaklıklarında bulan bir anlatıdır. Başka bir ifadeyle söylenecek olursa *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*'nün hikayesi o parmaklıkların bir harabeden, Hayri'nin "çalışma odasına, (yeni evi) Villa Saat'ın verandasına ve mevsim çiçekleri ile dolu bahçesine açılan kapı penceresine" (SAE: 54-55) olan yolculuğunun hikayesidir. Bugün Tanpınar'ın eserinin üstünden yetmiş yıldan fazla bir süre geçmiş olmasına rağmen sokağa her çıktığımızda, yanından geçtiğimiz her tarihi camide karşılaşacağımız ve hem şaşkınlığı hem de ihtilaflarıyla bizi hiç terketmeyen bir hikayedir *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü*.

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TEZİN TÜRÜ/ DEGREE**:**   **Yüksek Lisans**/ Master   ☐   **Doktora** / PhD   ⊠

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